The Dead Zone: How abolishing relegation in Mexican football opened the door to match-fixing

Óscar Balmen, an award-winning Mexican journalist with 15 years of experience covering organised crime — from drug trafficking to money laundering — describes the rise of match-fixing and illegal betting in Mexican football through his investigation into a cartel-owned team in lower divisions. Speaking exclusively with Play the Game, Balmen notes that while he has not received direct threats after publishing his investigation, he “knows from sources in Michoacán that in some regions of Tierra Caliente, the story of the Mapaches (Raccoons) of New Italy was not well received".

Mexico is hosting the FIFA World Cup for a third time – an unprecedented feat. Yet this milestone sits uneasily alongside a domestic football system marked by governance failures, conflicts of political interest, and questionable financial practices.

A structural shift in 2020 amplified these concerns: the owners of Mexican league football decided to suspend promotion and relegation across the top two divisions for up to six years.

The decision severely weakened sporting competitiveness and created a Dead Zone in lower divisions, opening the door for match-fixing and illegal sports gambling. This is particularly significant given Mexico's prominence within the Confederation of North, Central America and Caribbean Association Football (CONCACAF), where its leagues, clubs, and players serve as a regional reference point.

Mexico’s fractured football system

The Mexican football system differs fundamentally from traditional association models in Europe or South America. The Mexican Football Association (FMF) has historically been owned and governed by the 18 teams that participate in Liga MX — the country’s top flight — and its sister league, Liga MX Femenil (Women’s Liga MX), rather than functioning as an independent governing body.

In effect, there has been no distinction between the regulator and the regulated. Club owners collectively control governance decisions, commercial interests, and even the national team.

In April 2026, at the latest FMF owners' meeting, it was decided that Liga MX will legally separate from the FMF to improve governance practices and optimise business performance in the coming years. Whether the move will amount to anything beyond an administrative reshuffle remains to be seen.

The league structure itself is also unconventional. The 18 teams compete in two tournaments per year, the Apertura (August - December) and Clausura (January - June), with the top eight teams advancing to the playoffs (Liguilla) and a champion crowned every six months. With promotion and relegation suspended, the FMF introduced a financial penalty system as a replacement.

Multi-club ownership (MCO) also has a central role in shaping the Mexican football system, serving as a shield to “keep shadier investors at bay and guarantee a degree of stability in a league where bankruptcies are common, and clubs routinely change names and locations”, as Play the Game reported back in 2025.

While recent ownership changes suggest a partial dismantling of MCO structures, concentration of power remains significant. Grupo Pachuca — a Mexican sports and entertainment conglomerate that owns and manages professional football clubs and related businesses — will remain the only MCO group for the Apertura 2026 season, but other ownership ties persist across the system.

When financial penalties replaced sporting consequences

Mexico’s football governance is marked by unchecked MCO, financial opacity, and a closed league without relegation and promotion — concentrating power within a shrinking group of stakeholders.

Teams operate as private entities owned by businesspeople or corporations rather than community-based clubs. When a team is purchased, their names, home grounds, and identities can change overnight. Ownership within Liga MX and the second-tier Expansión MX is controlled through an affiliation certificate issued by the FMF; whoever holds this certificate — provided they are approved by the other team owners — controls the franchise.

The relocation of Monarcas Morelia to Mazatlán FC, the most recent such case ahead of the 2026 World Cup, exemplifies how sporting identity can be subordinated to commercial interests.

When the promotion and relegation deal was struck, the Expansión MX teams were guaranteed an annual payment of 20 million pesos (~956,000 euros) each to ensure their survival. The deal had more to do with protecting the valuation of Liga MX teams and shielding them from the financial consequences of relegation than with supporting lower divisions.

The financial penalty introduced to replace relegation was based on a coefficient table, which tracks performance over three years (six tournaments). The bottom three teams each year had to pay substantial fines by the end of the season. In the second year following the deal, Liga MX reduced fines by 30% — money that was intended to support the Expansión MX clubs. The system was scrapped in the latest FMF owners’ meeting in April 2026.

Over the last five years, eight teams have paid these fines. Juárez FC paid the most, summing up to 177 million pesos (~8.5 million euros), followed by Tijuana with 174 million pesos (~8.3 million euros), and Mazatlán FC accruing 147 million pesos (~7.1 million euros). Coincidentally, six of these teams belong to MCO groups – including Atlético San Luis, owned by Atlético de Madrid.

Table 1: Teams that finished in the bottom three each season and were required to pay fines

Table 2: Total fines paid by each team

The promotion mimic: Gatekeeping Liga MX

In 2022, the FMF introduced a certification process for second-division clubs seeking conditional promotion, which includes several requirements for clubs. To succeed, teams must demonstrate financial transparency and stability, prove they are not part of an MCO or backed by a local government, and provide a suitable venue for matches, among other conditions.

Beyond certification, a further padlock was placed on promotion. According to a Liga MX document released in February 2022, “for sporting promotion to LIGA MX to occur at the end of the 2022-2023 season, there had to be at least four certified clubs, with one of them also winning the Champion of Champions of Expansion MX.”

In 2023, Ricardo Salinas Pliego – owner of TV Azteca, Mexico’s second-largest broadcaster, and owner of the former MCO Grupo Salinas, which controlled Mazatlán FC and Club Puebla – openly endorsed abolishing relegation: “Close Liga MX. Eliminate relegation and fines permanently, so that team owners can invest with confidence in the future of their clubs, with a long-term vision for player development and without the constant threat of losing their investments”.

His argument exposed the financial logic behind the model. Relegation to the second tier would lead to a loss of tens of millions of euros, as franchise values suffer significant depreciation once exposed to the consequences of sporting failure. Expansión MX clubs also attract far fewer sponsors and viewers than Liga MX teams, resulting in minimal revenue.

Without the threat of relegation or the incentive of promotion, weaker teams have little motivation to invest in improvement. A bottom-table finish carries no consequences. Puebla, which finished last in the 2025–26 coefficient table, and Mazatlán FC, which finished last in 2024–25 and occupied 16th place in the two preceding seasons, illustrate the point.

As a result, Expansión MX has turned into a zombie league: professional in name but deprived of the vital organ of sporting ambition: the ability to rise. Without the dream of promotion, the value of second-division franchises has collapsed, both on the pitch and financially.

In a healthy football pyramid, a second-division team can act as a speculative asset: investors put money into clubs in the hope of winning promotion and reaching the top tier. Under the current Mexican model, however, the potential upside is capped. Winning a trophy does not bring promotion, while operational costs remain high. Consequently, fan engagement has declined, stadium attendance and viewership are low, and revenue from television rights and sponsorships is limited.

Survival football: life below Liga MX

Weary of being neglected by the FMF, ten Expansión MX teams filed a lawsuit with the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) in May 2025 against Liga MX and the FMF.

Club Deportivo Leones Negros led the claim, followed by Atlético Morelia, CF Atlante, Cimarrones de Sonora FC, Oaxaca FC, CD Zacatecas, Venados FC, Club Atlético La Paz, Club Jaiba Brava and Cancún FC as the initial appellant clubs. That claim did not sit well within the FMF. Several media outlets reported that the FMF allegedly retaliated by withholding the agreed monthly subsidy payments.

In what seemed like a Hollywood plot twist, almost immediately after filing the claim with CAS, Atlante withdrew without revealing its motives. Later, Cimarrones de Sonora FC, Oaxaca FC (Alebrijes) and Club Jaiba Brava (Tampico Madero) followed its moves. In September 2025, CAS dismissed the clubs’ appeal to immediately reinstate relegation and promotion.

Reuters reported the CAS statement as follows: "The CAS Panel concluded that the FMF had always determined to suspend the system until the conclusion of the 2025-2026 season, which was made clear to the clubs when the decision was taken”.

The promotion and relegation system is therefore expected to return for the 2026–27 Liga MX season. But the saga did not resolve the deeper question: whether the pathway back to sporting mobility will be genuine or whether it will remain constrained by certification rules, ownership interests, and the financial priorities of Liga MX clubs.

The commodification of a national passion

In Mexican football, relocating franchises to another city — regardless of history, fan bases, or sporting achievement — is treated almost as a norm.

Following the FMF owners' meeting in December 2025, the likely motive behind Atlante’s withdrawal from the CAS lawsuit became clear. In the absence of a sporting path to Liga MX, the only viable route for Expansión MX teams to join the top flight is to purchase an existing Liga MX franchise and relocate it.

As confirmed by Liga MX President Mikel Arriola, Atlante is set to take Mazatlán’s place in the Liga MX and return the franchise to Mexico City in a deal reported to be worth approximately 55.8 million euros. The future of Mazatlán FC remains unclear. Ricardo Salinas Pliego cited "legal uncertainty, security issues, and a lack of investment conditions" as reasons for the club's departure from El Encanto Stadium, without addressing any financial arrangements or the team's future.

Atlante’s case is particularly notable: the most successful team of the Expansión MX era with three championships, its infrastructure surpasses that of several current Liga MX clubs.

How the Dead Zone enables match-fixing and illegal betting

The most damaging collateral effect of the Dead Zone is the erosion of competitive integrity. Low wages in lower divisions make players easier targets for match-fixers, especially when games carry no sporting consequences. The gap between their salaries and the potential payout from match-fixing is stark.

According to El Economista, monthly wages in Mexico’s third division (Liga Premier) ranged from 7,000 to 25,000 pesos (~330 to ~1,180 euros) in 2020. By contrast, Mediotiempo reported in 2025 that three Real Apodaca players were offered 60,000 pesos (~2,830 euros) per fixed match.

The lack of visibility also matters. Low public interest, poor-quality broadcasts, and limited FMF oversight create a fertile ground for manipulation. In matches that attract little scrutiny, small events — corners, yellow cards, red cards, or specific periods of play — can become targets for betting manipulation.

Paola López Yrigoyen, a former Liga MX Femenil player now working with FIFPRO, shared an account of being approached while at Pachuca by an industry tipster:

“When I played at Pachuca, someone did approach me to, well, first just to inform me: ‘Did you know that you are among the three players who, round by round, generate the most corners? You are usually in the top 3. And you generate these many corners. Would you like, in the next game, to make one more corner in the first half?’”

Despite the speculator offering significantly more than Paola earned at the time, she refused. But she warned that many players on low wages are far more vulnerable. This risk is exacerbated by the accessibility of online gambling and the lack of a national or global regulator, making it difficult to monitor wagers in lower divisions where oversight and visibility are minimal.

When asked whether the FMF's sports system and bureaucratic infrastructure allow or encourage match-fixing and illegal betting, journalist Óscar Balmen’s response was emphatic:

“Without a doubt. It is a complex structure with overlapping powers, opaque responsibilities, and little experience with external audits. Furthermore, although there are numerous indications that the FMF receives public funds — through tourism promotion contracts, or construction projects like stadiums — it is impossible to request information about their financial statements because they consider themselves, shockingly, a non-profit organisation.“

Balmen argues that hostility to transparency makes Mexican football attractive to organised crime.

“Resistance to others scrutinising their accounts and actions immediately makes them an attractive target for organised crime, which can launder their dirty money under the legitimate guise of sports through the buying and selling of players, payments for scouting, special training, team-building trips, and the purchase of uniforms — all done with money from illegal betting resulting from match-fixing”.

Betting on impunity: weak laws in Mexican football

Between January and September 2025, the FMF’s Disciplinary Commission informed that it had investigated 15 clubs – including Liga de Expansión, Liga Premier, and Liga MX Femenil – based on alerts about match-fixing through illegal betting.

Out of the 21 matches and 60 players investigated, only ten individuals were sanctioned for being involved in illicit activities aimed at manipulating competitions. Due to the lack of legislation focused on specific cases of match-fixing, the sanctions imposed at the first three professional divisions were only reported to the Mexican Attorney General's Office.

Under the 2026 Federal Revenue Law initiative, Mexico has increased the tax burden on gambling. The special tax on production and services (IEPS) for games of chance and raffles has risen from 30% to 50%. Furthermore, digital games of chance and raffles operated by foreign residents without physical presence in Mexico have seen tax rates increase from zero to 50% for 2026.

Before the approval of these measures, in October 2025, Forbes Mexico reported that the move "would encourage informality and ultimately result in lower receipts, since around 60 percent of the online gaming market operates illegally in Mexico". The same article highlighted that approximately 4,500 illegal sites operate in the country, while the formal entertainment and betting sector generates more than 10 billion pesos (~470 million euros) annually.

Regarding the legal classification of match-fixing, Óscar Balmen stated: “The Mexican government, through the Sports Committees in the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies, could classify match-fixing as sports corruption and equate its penalties to fraud, or even consider it a form of organised crime. However, this proposed reform to the Federal Penal Code has not been put to a vote in the Chamber of Deputies. The most recent proposal was presented in June of last year by Morena party deputy Daniel Andrade, and it has not even been voted on in the first round, which is the committee stage”.

Paola López Yrigoyen highlighted the absence of a dedicated regulatory body for match-fixing, both within and outside Mexico. She contended that match-fixing is more pervasive to sporting integrity than doping, yet it lacks a global authority comparable to the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA).

Yrigoyen suggests that while the surge in betting data may initially exacerbate the issue, it will likely provide the impetus for formal regulation. “Now there is an important commercial vein that can, eventually, lead to the creation of a global regulator body. That would, nevertheless, be grounded mainly on economic motives, not ethical. Other issues, such as harassment and abuse, are equally damaging to players and, in some cases, involve greater numbers of victims across a wider age range. Yet, no body exists to regulate them efficiently at a global level. Is women's integrity worth less because it cannot be monetised?"

Continuing her parallel with WADA — which she hints that, apart from overseeing competitive balance and fairness, has helped to anchor the Olympics as “the one and only” global multi-sports competition of its kind in the market — she suggests that “while regulation is needed, it must put athletes’ integrity and safety first, not just protect commercial stability and institutional control. Subverting this order will diminish the overall value of sports – the core motive of any regulation in the industry, right?”

The World Cup hangover: what changes after 2026?

The future seems unstable and grim. Although CAS ruled that the promotion and relegation system will return for the 2026-27 Liga MX season, the specific certification mechanisms have yet to be announced. What consequences await the six clubs that challenged the FMF remains to be seen. Ultimately, it is the FMF that dictates the rules of professional football in Mexico.

Although Atlante's sporting record merits promotion to Liga MX, its withdrawal of the lawsuit against the FMF — and its purchase of the Mazatlán FC franchise — symbolically validated the owners' decision to abolish relegation to protect their financial interests. The move potentially closes the door on the remaining Expansión MX clubs.

Balmen offered a bleak final assessment:

“The World Cup is just a 39-day break. In the Expansion MX and the Liga Premier, match-fixing will be done through violence; that is, coaches and owners linked to organised crime will pressure other teams or referees to tip the scales in favour of one side. In the First Division, it will be done through illegal betting, which seeks to directly influence players in exchange for a cut of the winnings. I do not think the dynamics we already know in Mexico will change”.

Play the Game contacted Dip. Paola Michelle Longoria López, Head of the Sports Committee in the Chamber of Deputies; Lic. Ana Karen Hernández, Head of the Sports Committee in the Senate; and Isidro Chávez, FMF Media and Communications Manager, with requests for comment. None responded.