

AUTONOMY IN NATIONAL OLYMPIC COMMITTEES 2017

An autonomy index

Report / June 2017



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Play the Game

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Titel

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Preface

The aim of this index is to provide an overview of relationships between the National Olympic Committees (NOCs) and national governments in terms of direct and formal overlap between NOC leadership and positions in the national government by late 2016.

It is not unusual that NOC leaders are connected to national governments through their parallel positions as head of state, member of government, a ruling family, or similar. However, the extent to which the NOCs' top managements are comprised of individuals with formal links to national governments has yet to be studied. Such relationships can question the independence of the concerned NOCs.

This survey is conducted in order to map the formal relationships between top NOC executives, here defined as NOC presidents and secretary generals, and national governments in order to provide a better overview of the political autonomy of the world's NOCs as of late 2016.

The overlap of individuals in leading positions across NOCs and governmental institutions is not the only way a government can circumvent the autonomy of an NOC. Furthermore, this survey does not claim that formal links between an NOC and a national government are misused by default. Formal links, however, indicate risks of political interference given that NOC managers are directly or indirectly bound to their national governments.

Consequently, formal relationships between NOC leaders and national governments entail possible conflicts of interest and questions of loyalty, hence raising the questions: Is the autonomy of an NOC led by a president, who also represents the national government, an illusion? If so, which implications will this have for the sports movement's quest for self-governance? This survey far from addresses all aspects of these questions, but hopefully it will create a better and more evidence-based platform for further discussion.

Background and introduction to the survey

On 31 October 2014, members of the United Nations General Assembly recognised the autonomy and independence of sports as well the role of the International Olympic Committee (IOC) in leading the Olympic movement through the adoption of the resolution: “Sport for development and peace”¹.

The IOC praised the resolution calling it a “historic milestone in the relations between sport and politics”. Thomas Bach, president of the IOC, underlined the importance of the resolution and the autonomy of sport stating that;

“We must form partnerships with political organisations based on this recognition of the autonomy of sport. The excellent relations between the UN and the IOC can in this respect serve as an example for relations on the national level between national Olympic committees and national governments. This relationship with governments requires that sport always remains politically neutral”².

A year later, at Play the Game’s conference in Aarhus, Denmark, Ethics and Compliance Officer of the IOC, Pâquerette Girard Zappelli, confirmed the IOC’s stance on the autonomy of sport saying that governments interfering in the work of National Olympic Committees (NOCs) “must not be”³.

Zappelli’s statement is in line with article 27 of the Olympic Charter which outlines the mission and role of the NOCs. Article 27 does not exclude cooperation between governmental institutions and NOCs. Furthermore, the Olympic Charter does not prohibit NOCs to elect as members representatives of government authorities⁴. However, the charter states that the NOCs must resist external political and economic pressures.

¹ UN General Assembly (2014): *Sport for development and peace*,

http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/69/L.5

² IOC (2014): *Historic milestone: United Nations recognises autonomy of sports*,

<https://www.olympic.org/news/historic-milestone-united-nations-recognises-autonomy-of-sport>

³ Play the Game (2015): *The year that killed the autonomy of sport*,

http://www.playthegame.org/news/comments/2015/021_the-year-that-killed-the-autonomy-of-sport/

⁴ The Olympic Charter (2016), article 28, rule 4.

Table 1. Olympic Charter rules concerning NOC autonomy

Rule no.	Article 27
Rule 5.	“In order to fulfil their mission, the NOCs may cooperate with governmental bodies, with which they shall achieve harmonious relations. However, they shall not associate themselves with any activity which would be in contradiction with the Olympic Charter. The NOCs may also cooperate with non-governmental bodies” ⁵ .
Rule 6.	“The NOCs must preserve their autonomy and resist all pressures of any kind, including but not limited to political, legal, religious or economic pressures which may prevent them from complying with the Olympic Charter” ⁶ .
Rule no.	Article 28
Rule 4.	“Governments or other public authorities shall not designate any members of an NOC. However, an NOC may decide, at its discretion, to elect as members representatives of such authorities” ⁷ .

Source: The Olympic Charter (2016)

Herein lies a potential conflict of interest. Can a government representative and head of an NOC be expected to act independently from political pressures he or she may be partly or fully responsible for? Is a government representative willing and able to respect the autonomy of the NOC that he/she is leading should a situation arise in which government and Olympic interests are not in line politically? And how can an NOC ‘at its discretion’ – as written in the Olympic Charter – elect as members, representatives of government authorities without further jeopardising its autonomy in countries with little political freedom?

To strengthen the debate about the autonomy of sport within the Olympic Movement, this survey attempts to outline the extent to which NOCs are managed by individuals representing governments, ruling monarchies or by individuals with senior positions in governmental sports institutions.

Additionally, this survey explores whether there is a pattern between NOC leadership characteristics and the level of political freedom in countries around the world. When the political system of a country is characterised by a lack of political freedom e.g. freedom of speech, personal autonomy, associational and organisational rights etc., it is possible that this would be reflected in the political independence of an NOC.

⁵ Ibid, article 27, rule 5.

⁶ Ibid, article 27, rule 6.

⁷ Ibid, article 28, rule 4.

Method

Autonomy and the NOCs

To assess the extent to which the NOCs are at risk of government interference because of formal ties between the leadership and national governments, one must define autonomy, and more specifically, what political autonomy in the context of the Olympic Movement is.

The Olympic Charter defines autonomy as “[...] the Olympic Movement shall have the rights and obligations of autonomy, which include freely establishing and controlling the rules of sport, determining the structure and governance of their organisations, enjoying the right of elections free from any outside influence and the responsibility for ensuring that principles of good governance be applied”⁸. Thus, autonomy in an Olympic context is the right to self-governance free from external controlling influence.

As mentioned, this survey does not investigate if specific NOC leaders are in fact affected or controlled by their national government in a way that limits the autonomy of the NOC but merely points out existing formal ties. However, the possibility of an NOC leader being formally connected to governmental institutions, as allowed by the rules of the Olympic Charter, makes the NOC susceptible to external interference.

Data

This survey includes NOC Presidents and Secretary Generals as these two posts comprise the key leadership within an NOC. The information used to study the relations of NOC leaders has primarily been retrieved from the Association of National Olympic Committees (ANOC)’s NOC directory⁹ from June 2016 through May 2017¹⁰. The information provided by ANOC about individual leaders of the NOCs varies from disclosing only a name to providing information about education, as well as current and/or previous positions. Relying solely on ANOC’s data carries a significant risk of information shortage. For this reason, in some cases, additional sources have been used for cross checking.

However, basing the results primarily on information from ANOC reduces the risk of overestimating the extent to which NOC leaders are connected to government bodies as the information retrieved from ANOC has been provided by the NOCs themselves. As such, the survey yields a conservative estimate of the extent to which NOC leaders are formally tied to national governments – because of lacking or unspecified information about their professional background. Furthermore, NOC leaders are replaced or re-elected every few years and therefore, the results of the survey provide only a snapshot of the situation.

⁸ Ibid, Fundamental principles of Olympism.

⁹ Information about the NOCs have been retrieved from the Association of National Olympic Committees’ (ANOC) NOC Directory. However, some of the information is out-of-date and, therefore, additional online sources have been included to increase the validity of the results.

¹⁰ The ANOC database was updated in the spring of 2017. The update included new information about elected NOC leaders from late 2016.

Throughout this survey, an NOC leader is perceived to be connected to government bodies when he or she is employed or formally affiliated with such. The selection criteria are:

1. The president and/or the secretary general is also serving the national government as part of the ruling cabinet (e.g. Minister) or as a highly ranked government official;
2. The president/secretary general is a member/part of a royal family in a country with an absolute monarchy or similar¹¹.

Indirect relationships such as friend- or kinship with individuals who represent government bodies have been disregarded due to the ambiguity of such relationships.

Adhering to the above selection criteria provides a very conservative estimate of existing links. The number of actual links would be much higher if one included diplomatic, familiar, business and/or other relations.


¹¹ Generally, we have made a distinction between constitutional and absolute monarchies, but in certain cases a constitutional monarchy has been assessed to have such a high degree of formal power that they have been included. See Annex.

Results

NOCs are one of several constituents of the Olympic Movement together with the International Sports Federations (IFs), the Organising Committees for the Olympic Games (OCOGs), all other recognised federations, institutions and organisations, as well athletes, judges/referees, coaches and other sports technicians, as defined by the IOC¹². The mission of the NOCs is to develop, promote, and protect the Olympic Movement in their respective countries, in accordance with the Olympic Charter¹³. There are 206 NOCs covering five continents. The Kuwait Olympic Committee is currently suspended since October 27, 2015 due to alleged governmental interference in Kuwaiti sports organisations¹⁴ and has therefore not been included in this survey.

Of the 205 surveyed NOCs 30 are led by a president and/or secretary general – 26 presidents and 8 secretary generals – with formal ties to government institutions. In total, nearly 15% of all NOCs are led by individuals who are formally connected to a national government. See figure 1.

Figure 1. NOCs with/without formal ties to government



Note: The numbers within the dark/light-blue area indicate the absolute count of NOCs.

As figure 2 shows, there are strong regional differences in the distribution of the affected NOCs.

The regional confederation the Olympic Council of Asia (OCA) has by far the highest percentage of NOC leadership employed or formally connected to government institutions (36.4%). The regional confederation with the second most is the Oceanian (ONOCA) (11.8%),


¹² Olympic.org (2016): https://stillmed.olympic.org/Documents/Reference_documents_Factsheets/The_Olympic_Movement.pdf

¹³ Olympic.org (2016): <https://www.olympic.org/national-olympic-committees>

¹⁴ Play the Game (2016): http://www.playthegame.org/news/news-articles/2016/0219_kuwait-dissolves-olympic-committee-and-national-football-association/

followed by the European (EOC) (10%), African (ANOCA) (7.4%) and the American (PASO) (7.3%).

Figure 2. NOCs led by individuals with formal ties to a national government (%)




Note: Percentage includes both NOC secretary generals and presidents.

Asia (OCA)

Compared to the other regional confederations, the OCA maintains the largest proportion of NOCs led by individuals formally connected to government bodies. Of the 43 NOCs in the confederation (excluding the suspended NOC of Kuwait), 16 NOCs (36.4%), are represented by a government connected president and/or secretary general. See figure 3. In total, 19 NOC leaders are connected to state bodies in the 16 NOCs.

Figure 3. OCA NOCs with/without formal ties to government



Note: The numbers within the dark/light-blue area indicate the absolute count of NOCs.

Of the 19 Asian NOC leaders, most are either a part of the ruling cabinet, i.e. holds a ministerial position, or form part of the ruling royal family. Seven of the leaders are royalty and five are ministers. Two of the NOC presidents in OCA also serve as president of the country (the presidents of the NOCs of Tajikistan and Turkmenistan).

Examples of NOC leaders with governmental ties include:

- Mr. Khon Thong, president of the NOC of Cambodia, and Minister of Tourism;
- Prince Feisal al Hussein, president of the NOC of Jordan, and son of King Hussein Ibn Talal¹⁵;
- Mr. Chuan-Jin Tan, president of the NOC of Singapore, and Minister for Social and Family Development;
- Mrs Sengdeuane Lachanthaboun, president of the NOC of Lao People's Democratic Republic, and Minister for Education and Sport.

An example of an Asian NOC leader that has not fulfilled the selection criteria, despite having very close ties to the government in power, is the president of the Kazakhstani NOC, Timur Kulibayev. Kulibayev is a Kazakhstani business oligarch and son-in-law of Kazakh president Nursultan Nazarbayev. Kulibayev has held several positions in important state-owned enterprises and has significant influence in the country, according to multiple sources^{16 17}.

Oceania (ONOC)


Of the 17 NOCs within the ONOC, only two NOCs (11.8%) are represented by an individual directly connected to the national government. See figure 4. The NOC leaders in question also serve as ministers in their respective countries' governments.

¹⁵ The key powers and decision-making abilities are ultimately vested in the king. Feisal al Hussein has repeatedly served as regent in the absence of the king. Source: Freedom House (2016): <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2016/jordan>

¹⁶ The Telegraph (2011): <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/banksandfinance/8446134/Timur-Kulibayev-to-head-80bn-Kazakh-Sovereign-wealth-fund.html>

¹⁷ The Independent (2014): <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/analysis-and-features/piping-hot-how-putin-won-china-gas-deal-9463907.html>

Figure 4. ONOC NOCs with/without formal ties to government




Note: The numbers within the dark/light-blue area indicate the absolute count of NOCs.

Among those not included is an NOC president who is serving as president of a national association for gambling operators. Another recently ran for parliamentary election and is politically active in the ruling political party.

Europe (EOC)

In Europe, five (10%) out of the 50 NOCs comprising the EOC are led by an individual with strong formal ties to governmental institutions. See figure 5.

Figure 5. EOC NOCs with/without formal ties to government



Note: The numbers within the dark/light-blue area indicate the absolute count of NOCs.

Globally there are four state leaders who also hold the post as NOC president. Two of these are from the European confederation: Azerbaijan and Belarus.


As is the case in confederations in other regions of the world, some European countries have NOCs whose leaders are perceived as having close ties to the national government but who

are not formally connected, as per the selection criteria of this survey. For example, Armenian NOC president Gagik Tsarukyan, who is deeply engaged in Armenian politics, is not included, although he is highly susceptible to political pressures from the Armenian government¹⁸. There are also a handful of parliamentary members among the European NOC leaders who have not been included, because they are not part of the ruling government.

Africa (ANOCA)

There are 54 NOCs in the African regional confederation ANOCA. Among the NOC leaders are five individuals with formal links to the national government. As such, 7.4% of the NOCs in the African confederation of Olympic committees are led by one (or more) individual with strong formal ties to the national government. See figure 6.

Figure 6. ANOCA NOCs with/without formal ties to government



Note: The numbers within the dark/light-blue area indicate the absolute count of NOCs.


Among the five African leaders with positions in a national government are two government ministers, one Secretary of State and one Director of Treasury and Public Accounting.

America (PASO)

PASO is the regional confederation with the lowest number and proportion of NOC leaders with formal ties to national governments. In the Americas, only 3 (7.3%) of the 41 NOCs are represented by individuals formally connected to government bodies. See figure 7.

¹⁸ Open Democracy (2016): <https://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/emil-sanamyan/running-for-tsar-armenia-s-gagik-tsarukyan>

Figure 7. PASO NOCs with/without formal ties to government



Note: The numbers within the dark/light-blue area indicate the absolute count of NOCs.

The NOC leaders with formal governmental ties include a minister, a senior ministerial officer, and a presidential advisor. Furthermore, one NOC president was running for senator during the time of the data collection, while another serves as vice speaker in the national congress of his country, these occupations are not included in this survey.


Freedom scores

To broaden the discussion, index scores on political liberties from Freedom House have been included to assess¹⁹ whether NOCs within countries with low estimated political freedom are more often led by individuals who are formally connected to the national government.

Freedom scores from Freedom House evaluate the state of political rights and civil liberties in 195 countries around the world. Political rights and civil liberties describe the extent to which citizens enjoy free and fair elections as well as freedom of expression, assembly and association. Freedom scores thus depict overall characteristics of a political system in a given country²⁰. If citizens of a given country have little or no autonomy over their political rights because of government oppression, it is possible that an organisation such as an NOC, is susceptible to governmental interference and thus, will suffer from a lack of political autonomy.

The comparison of the results of this survey and index scores from Freedom House reveals an apparent pattern between countries with low estimated political freedom and NOCs that are led by leaders who are formally connected to a national government. The mean freedom score of 4.3 on a scale from 0 to 7 indicates that on average, the countries wherein an NOC is led by individuals with formal ties to government, are only partially free in respect to civil liberties and political rights²¹.

Figure 8. Freedom House scores in national Olympic confederation countries



Note: Mean freedom scores are based on data from 2017. The scores determine whether countries are Free (1.0 to 2.5), Partly Free (3.0 to 5.0), or Not Free (5.5 to 7.0).

¹⁹ Note: As we have included only descriptive statistics it is not possible to determine whether there is a causal effect of levels of political freedom and civil liberties on NOC leadership.

²⁰ Freedom House (2017): <https://freedomhouse.org/report/methodology-freedom-world-2017>

²¹ The average of a country's or territory's political rights and civil liberties ratings is called the Freedom Rating, and it is this figure that determines the status of Free (1.0 to 2.5), Partly Free (3.0 to 5.0), or Not Free (5.5 to 7.0). Source: Freedom House

Africa (ANOCA)

A mean freedom rating of 4.5 denotes limited political rights and civil liberties across countries in Africa²². See figure 8. In countries where the NOC is led by individuals with formal ties to the national government the level of civil liberties and political freedom in general, is notably lower (5.8) compared to countries in which formal ties between the national government and NOC leadership do not exist (4.4).

Asia (OCA)

The mean freedom score of 4.8 reveals that Asia, as a region, generally suffers from government interference in the political autonomy of citizens. However, there is still a clear difference in the mean freedom score of countries where NOC leadership is tied to the national government (5.6) and countries where NOC leaders do not have formal obligations to the national government (4.4).

America (PASO)

The mean freedom score of the affected countries in the region is 4.3. When considering civil liberties and political rights, this indicates that countries, where the NOC is led by individuals with formal ties to the national government are on average, only “partly free”. However, in countries where the NOC leadership do not have formal obligations to the national government citizens enjoy a much greater level of political freedom and civil liberties (2.0). Overall, the Americas region does not suffer from severe problems of government interference in the political autonomy of its citizens (2.4).

Europe (EOC)

The mean score of 4.7 for NOC’s tied to governments implies that the affected countries in Europe are “not free”. This is in stark contrast to the mean score of 1.7 in countries where NOC leadership is not formally connected to government. As such, in terms of civil liberties and political rights, Europe is the region with the greatest difference between countries where NOC leaders are formally connected to the national government, and countries where the NOC leaders are not.

Oceania (ONOC)

The affected countries in Oceania (Kiribati and Palau) have a mean freedom score of 1 indicating that the national governments impose no restrictions on civil liberties and the political rights of citizens. Furthermore, the average freedom score including all countries in Oceania is 1.7, indicating overall high levels of political freedom and civil liberties within the region.

²² Freedom House (2017): <https://freedomhouse.org/report/methodology-freedom-world-2017>

Table 2. Summary of findings

	Percentage of NOCs connected to government bodies	Mean freedom score in affected countries	Mean freedom score in the region
Africa (ANOCA)	7.4 %	5.8	4.5
Asia (OCA)	36.4 %	5.6	4.8
America (PASO)	7.3 %	4.3	2.4
Europe (EOC)	10 %	4.7	2
Oceania (ONOC)	11.8 %	1	1.7
All regions	14.6 %	4.3	3

Note: Percentages show the proportion of NOC leaders connected to government bodies within the specified region.

Summary and discussion

The results of this survey show that 34 NOC leaders are also employed by or representing national governments on a high level. More specifically, the survey shows that nearly 15% or one in seven of all NOCs, are led by a president and/or secretary general with formal obligations to their national government.

Of the five regional confederations, the Asian OCA holds the largest relative proportion (36.4%) of government-connected NOC leaders followed by Oceania (11.8%) and Europe (10%). A great number of NOC leaders hold a position as minister of either tourism and/or sport. Furthermore, especially in Asia, a considerable number of NOC leaders belong to the ruling or highly politically influential royal family.

Another factor that has not been included in the formal reporting of this survey, but which adds to the notion that sport and politics are often entangled, is the observation that a significant part of the NOC leaders either are or have been practicing politicians²³. This suggests that holding the position as an NOC leader is appealing to politically involved persons who are currently holding or have held positions within governmental institutions. Such individuals could also be expected to have relatively large networks in political circles.

Finally, the freedom scores illustrate that, on average, in countries where NOC leaders have formal obligations to the national government, citizens have fewer civil liberties and political rights than citizens of countries where the NOC leaders do not have any formal obligation to the national government. This tendency is most easily spotted on the European and Asian continents.

In the European region, the relatively few countries with an evident relation between NOC management and nation leadership are also the European countries with a tarnished reputation in terms of adhering to human rights and democratic practices. In Asia, the extraordinarily high number of NOCs with personal ties between sport and government/ruling families mirrors the generally low ranking of Asian/Middle East countries on the freedom index.

Perspectives

It is difficult to conclude from a simple survey such as this, to what extent formal relationships to national governments restrain the autonomy of NOCs in practise. As such, this autonomy index can only imply a possible causality. However, the survey points to obvious conflict of interest problems due to the fact that in some parts of the world there are strong formal ties between the NOC's and the national government/ruling family.

This has several implications:

²³ The annex of this survey does not include all NOCs – only those that are led by individuals with formal connections to a national government. For a full list of NOCs, please contact Play the Game.

Firstly, with the political and organisational centre of the Olympic movement slowly shifting eastwards from its traditional strongholds in largely western democratic countries towards more authoritarian countries in the regions of Asia, Middle East and Eastern Europe²⁴, the borders between NOCs and national governments are becoming increasingly blurred. As such, this challenges the very concept of sport as an independent international movement that is free to define its own agenda and able to avoid conflict of interest. Rather than being a possible partner for governments to promote the ideals stated in the Olympic Charter, the NOCs can become a convenient tool in the hands of most often non-democratic governments or ruling families using sport events and sports political influence to attract international attention and prestige, open doors to new political and diplomatic relations and create business opportunities. Hence, sport is reduced to an instrument of soft power²⁵.

Secondly, the contrast between rhetoric on sport's autonomy and the reality increases if a significant part of the NOCs not only have to navigate in a country with few political rights, but are even headed by a president, minister or member of a ruling family. The very idea of autonomy and the Olympic Movement's ability to defend its own principles is obviously challenged in such cases.

Despite these risks, cases of IOC sanctions due to government interference during recent years have not included NOCs led by individuals with formal ties to government – except for the case of the suspension of the Kuwaiti NOC²⁶.

Is this a sign that ministers and royal family members comprising NOC leadership pose no problem to the autonomy of the Olympic Movement?

The IOC may have refrained from adhering to stricter principles of political autonomy for pragmatic reasons like sport's universalism or current situation where an increasing number of cities from democratic countries are rejecting bids for future Olympic Games^{27 28 29 30 31}.

²⁴ Play the Game (2013): http://www.playthegame.org/fileadmin/image/PtG2013/Presentations/30_October_Wednesday/SorenBang_Playthegame2013_final.pdf

²⁵ For further reading on the use and impact of sport as a soft power instrument see: Play the Game (2015): http://www.playthegame.org/news/news-articles/2015/0115_sporting-soft-power-is-cheaper-than-hard-power-but-not-always-successful; Grix, Jonathan & Lee, Donna (2013): Soft Power, Sports Mega-Events and Emerging States: The Lure of the Politics of Attraction, *Global Society*, Volume 27, Issue 4, pp. 521-536.

²⁶ IOC (2015): <https://www.olympic.org/news/suspension-of-the-kuwait-olympic-committee>

²⁷ Budapest, Hungary withdraw its bid to host the 2024 Summer Olympic Games. See Play the Game (2017): http://www.playthegame.org/news/news-articles/2017/0278_budapest-to-drop-bid-to-host-2024-olympic-games/

²⁸ Graubünden, Switzerland withdraw its bid for the 2026 Winter Olympics. See Play the Game (2017): http://www.playthegame.org/news/news-articles/2017/0275_olympic-hosting-bid-rejected-by-swiss-voters/

²⁹ Rome, Italy withdraws 2024 Summer Olympic bid. See BBC (2016): <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-37624948>

³⁰ Hamburg drops its planned bid for the 2024 Olympics. See Play the Game (2015): http://www.playthegame.org/news/news-articles/2015/0128_hamburg-says-no-to-the-olympics/

³¹ Boston, USA withdrew from the race to host the 2024 Summer Olympics. See Play the Game (2015): http://www.playthegame.org/news/news-articles/2015/0064_boston-2024-bid-was-risky-says-new-report/

Thirdly, the present survey provides a basis for debate about how the NOC leaders with formal ties to national governments could be susceptible to pressures from government bodies and how the Olympic movement should respond to the fact that a number of NOCs are highly susceptible to interference by national governments, autocrats or rulers who themselves would be the last to recognise the autonomy of sport.

Could or should the IOC introduce conflict of interest principles ruling out certain categories of people as leaders of NOCs, e.g. members of government and heads of state?

In any case, the fact that more than one out of ten top level NOC leaders are formally connected to national governments, making conflicts of interest highly probable, should be a cause of concern for the Olympic Movement.

Appendices

Affected NOCs³²

Africa (ANOCA)

Country	NOC	NOC President	Ties to Government	NOC Secretary General	Ties to government	FH Score
Burundi	Comité National Olympique du Burundi	Evariste Ndayishimiye	Minister of Internal Affairs and Public Security	Darius Nahayo	None	6.5
Equatorial Guinea	Comité Olímpico de Guinea Ecuatorial	Manuel Sabino Asumu Cawan	Secretary of State for Post and Transport	Pedro-Mabale Fuga Afang	Presidential Adviser for Youth and Sports. State Secretary for Youth and Sports. Ministerial Sports Advisor	7
Ivory Coast	Comité National Olympique de Côte d'Ivoire	Lassana Yikiré Palenfo	Minister in charge of Security	Nah Aminatah Fofana	None	4
Mauritania	Comité Olímpico de Guinea Ecuatorial	Mohamed Mahmoud Ould Mah	Director of Treasury and Public Accounting. General Treasurer for Mauritania	Abdel Kader Dieng	None	5.5

³² Information about NOC leaders and Freedom House score has been retrieved from June 2016 through May 2017. Presidents and Secretary Generals elected post 2016 have not been included – see Methods.

Asia (OCA)

Country	NOC	NOC President	Ties to government	NOC Secretary General	Ties to government	FH Score
Bahrain	Bahrain Olympic Committee	Sheikh Nasser Bin Hamad Al Khalifa	Part of the Bahraini royal family Commander of Bahrain's Royal Guard Representative of His Majesty the King for Charity Work and Youth Affairs	Abdulrahman Sadeq Askar	Assistant Secretary-General, Supreme Council of Youth and Sport	6.5
Brunei Darussalam	Brunei Darussalam National Olympic Council	Prince Haji Sufri Bolkia	Prince	Mr Zuraimi Abdul sani	None	5.5
Cambodia	National Olympic Committee of Cambodia	Khon Thong	Minister of Tourism	Chamroeun Vath	Under-Secretary of State in the Ministry of Tourism	5.5
China	Chinese Olympic Committee	Zhongwen Gou	Director – General Administration of Sport of China	Luzeng Song	Director General – Department of External Affairs, General Administration of Sport of China	6.5
Islamic Republic of Iran	National Olympic Committee of the Islamic Republic of Iran	Q-Mars Hasehmi	Secretary of Central Selection Board of Ministry of Education 2010- , Acting President and Physical Education & Health Deputy	Shahrokh Shahnazi	None	6
Jordan	Jordan Olympic Committee	Prince Feisal Al Hussein	Prince	Lana Al-Jaghbeer	None	5.5

Lao People's Democratic Republic	National Olympic Committee of Lao	Sengdeuane Lachanthaboun	Minister for Education and Sport	Somphu Phongsas	None	6,5
Malaysia	Olympic Council of Malaysia	Prince Tunku Imran	Prince	Beng Choo Low	None	4
Myanmar	Myanmar Olympic Committee	U Tint HSAN		Mr Myo HLAING	Director General – Sport and Physical Education Department, Ministry of Sport	5
Qatar	Qatar Olympic Committee	Joaan bin Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani	Member of royal family	Thani Abdulrahman Al Kuwari	None	5.5
Saudi Arabia	Saudi Arabian Olympic Committee	Prince Abdullah Bin Mosaad Bin Abdulaziz	General President of Youth Welfare in Saudi Arabia.	Hossam Ali Al-Qurashi	None	7
Singapore	Singapore National Olympic Council	Chuan-Jin Tan	Minister for Social and Family Development	Chris Chan	None	4
Tajikistan	National Olympic Committee of the Republic of Tajikistan	Emomali Rahmon	President of Tadjikistan	Bahrullo Rajabaliyev	None	6.5
Timor-Leste	Comité Olímpico Nacional de Timor-Leste	Francisco Kalbuadi lay	Minister of Tourism	Fernando Antonio da Costa	None	3
Turkmenistan	National Olympic Committee of Turkmenistan	Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov	President of Turkmenistan	Azat Myradov	None	7
United Arab Emirates	United Arab Emirates National Olympic Committee	Ahmed Bin Mohammed Bin Rashed Al Maktoum	Royal family	Mohammad Ali Al Kamali	None	6

America (PASO)

Country	NOC	NOC President	Ties to government	NOC Secretary General	Ties to government	FH Score
Antigua and Barbuda	The Antigua and Barbuda Olympic Association	Chet Greene	Senator, National Parliament, Minister of Trade, Commerce & Industry, Sports, Culture & National Festivals	Cliff L. Williams	None	2
Cayman Islands	Cayman Islands Olympic Committee	Donald McLean	None	Carson K. Ebanks	Chief Officer, Ministry of Financial Services, Tourism and Development	-
Cuba	Comité Olímpico Cubano	José Ramón Fernández Alvarez	Adviser of the President - State and Ministers' Councils	Ruperto Herrera Tabio	None	6.5

Europe (EOC)

Country	NOC	NOC President	Ties to government	NOC Secretary General	Ties to government	FH Score
Azerbaijan	National Olympic Committee of the Azerbaijani Republic	Ilham Aliyev	President of Azerbaijan	Aghajan Abiyev	None	6.5
Belarus	National Olympic Committee of the Republic of Belarus	Alexandre Lukashenko	President of the Republic of Belarus 1994-	Anatol Kotau	None	6.5
Greece	Comité Olympique Hellénique	Spyros Capralos	None	Emmanuel Katsiadakis	Honorary General Director of the Ministry of Economy and Finance	2
Monaco	Comité Olympique Monégasque	Prince Albert II	Prince regent of Monaco	Yvette Lambin-Berti	None	2
Russian Federation	Russian Olympic Committee	Alexander Zhukov	First Deputy Chairman of the State Duma of the Federal Assembly. Member of High Council of the N. Party "Edinaya Rossiya" (United Russia)	Anastasia Davydova	None	6.5

Oceania (ONOC)

Country	NOC	NOC President	Ties to government	NOC Secretary General	Ties to government	FH Score
Kiribati	Kiribati National Olympic Committee	David Collins	Minister for Women, Youth, Social Affairs and sport	Kautu Temakei	None	1
Palau	Palau National Olympic Committee	Frank Kyota	None	Baklai Temengil	Minister for Community and Cultural Affairs	1



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