News

New 'World Stadium Index' report exposes the best and the worst

Thu, 10 May 2012 20:12:00 +0200

A new study from Idan and Play the Game has analysed 75 mega-event stadiums from 20 different countries and found that the great amount of resources spent on constructing the stadiums are in many cases seriously disproportionate to the utilisation of the stadiums after the event. The report ‘World Stadium Index: Stadiums built for major sporting events – bright future or future burden?’ has looked at stadiums constructed or extensively renovated as a part of a mega-event during 1996-2010, including the Olympics, Commonwealth Games, Pan-American Games, Asian Games, All Africa Games, the FIFA World Cup, UEFA European Championships and the Africa Cup of Nations. The objective of the report has been to investigate the use of the stadiums after the event to see which mega-event stadiums can be called a success and which stand empty after the event, becoming a financial burden for their owners. The main variable in the report is thus the number of spectators per year, and by dividing the attendance figures with the capacity of the stadium, the report has created an index showing the stadium utilisation in 2010 making it possible to compare the stadiums included in the study. The best and the worst
The most successful stadium in the report, with regards to attendance figures, is Atlanta’s Turner Field stadium, originally built for the 1996 Olympics. It has a capacity of almost 50.000 people and in 2010 the home field of the popular local baseball team, the Atlanta Braves, succeeded in attracting enough spectators to fill the stadium 50 times that year. See the list of the top five stadiums below. At the other end of the scale we find Nagano’s stadium, built for the Winter Olympics in 1998. This stadium has also been rebuilt into a baseball stadium, but even though baseball is a popular sport in Japan, Nagano does not have an attractive home team. The stadium, which seats 30,000 people, only managed to attract 18,000 spectators in 2010 equal to filling the stadium 0.6 times. See the list of the bottom five stadiums below. The 2006 FIFA World Cup in Germany is the single most successful event in the study as most of the stadiums built for the event have seen a large inflow of spectators after the World Cup. Germany’s strong football tradition and the fact that the national football league has the highest attendance figures in the world meant that the local need was great enough to fill the large stadiums on a regular basis. The Allianz Arena in Munich is the single most attended football stadium in the report. The stadiums built or renovated for the UEFA European Championships in Portugal in 2004 have a more problematic legacy. Aside from three teams, attendance figures in the Portuguese football league are low and, as the report argues, it takes more than a new stadium to get an inflow of spectators. Three of the stadiums couldn’t even fill their stands three times during 2010 and several of the stadiums built for the event have since been put up for sale. External requirements trump local needs
In many cases, host countries and cities forget to take local needs into account before venturing into great construction projects, customising their stadiums according to the requirements of the major sports organisations such as the IOC, FIFA and UEFA. Both FIFA and UEFA have expanded its minimum stadium capacity requirements. Today FIFA demands a stadium that can seat 80,000 spectators for the final and all other stadiums must have at least 40,000 seats, while UEFA requests two stadiums seating 50,000 spectators and the rest seating at least 30,000 to 40,000 people. The problem, the report finds, has therefore been that it is difficult to adapt the stadium to the daily needs of the local communities after the event. This not only results in empty stadiums, but also in a great financial burden for the stadium owners, typically cities or municipalities, who have to maintain the stadiums in the future. The 5 highest and 5 lowest ranked stadiums in the stadium index Top 5

Bottom 5

Download the report here Go to Play the Game’s theme page dedicated to the report, where you can find more information on the study of mega-event stadiums, download specific chapters from the report or read other articles from Play the Game regarding mega-event stadiums and their legacies.

Hollow visions create empty stands

Wed, 09 May 2012 13:07:00 +0200

Abuja in Nigeria, Nagano in Japan, Aveiro in Portugal – there are not many similarities between these three cities located on three different continents, but two things bind them together: They have in recent times built a modern stadium for one of sport's biggest events, and they are all left with expensive, underutilised arenas. In the report 'World Stadium Index', the Danish Institute for Sports Studies (Idan) and Play the Game have analysed the use of 75 stadiums built for mega-events. The report documents a striking lack of sporting and economic justification, when stadiums costing hundreds of millions of dollars only draw a few thousand spectators each year. The most thought-provoking aspect is perhaps the report's demonstration of how often these so-called 'white elephants' occur in the wake of sport’s mega-events, despite the sporting organisations’ and local authorities’ promises of economic, sporting and social gains. Less than half of the Portuguese arenas from the European Championship in 2004 are used with reasonable intensity today. The expensive, oversized, but often architecturally interesting stadiums have in several Portuguese communities ended up as a heavy financial burden for the local taxpayers. Similar examples are found in abundance among arenas constructed for the Olympic Games, continental championships, World Cups and Commonwealth Games. Visions as a substitute for consideration
The many examples of unsuccessful stadium projects reflect the fact that the most fundamental principles of stadium operations are often overlooked or deliberately ignored when cities and countries build a nest for sport's greatest events. Rather than basing the project on realistic business models, more or less flimsy visions are often launched describing how the event and the stadium construction will boost the local sports interest and economy, although the more certain legacy is often a continuous drain of public funds for the maintenance of buildings that are rarely used. In developing countries, this is especially noteworthy, as the cost of stadium construction projects can be completely disproportional to the local living standards and economic ability. Often, host cities and countries overlook the fact that even a very modern stadium is not in itself a guarantee that the stands will be filled after the event. Rather, this depends on whether the local area already has a high profile home team that can draw a lot of spectators or a highly professional operator who is able to fill the stadium in an alternative way with concerts or other events where there are no sports teams to draw in crowds of people. The consequence is that large stadium facilities are often out of touch with the more modest local needs for culture and sport. Therefore, even the most iconic prestige buildings may end up as windswept concrete shells without significant sporting or cultural content. Just ask Leipzig, Cape Town, Istanbul or Beijing. From hollow to real sustainability
One may sadly fear that shady interests of the construction industry or corrupt decision-makers in some cases are the real 'visions' behind the idea to bid for a mega-event. That local authorities bear the main responsibility for the inflated dreams of iconic stadiums is certainly obvious. Less regarded is the joint responsibility of the international sports organisations in these stadium ventures. Several sports organisations, including the IOC, have put 'environmental sustainability' on the list of formal requirements for potential hosts of sporting events. But can a building project costing tens or hundreds of millions of dollars be environmentally friendly if it basically serves no purpose after the event? And why does sporting and economic sustainability rank so far down on the sports organisations’ lists of expectations for the aspiring candidate cities? In its specifications for the facilities for Euro 2016, UEFA writes that ”when planning the stadium capacity, the future use of the stadium must be taken into account.” But at the same time UEFA, like FIFA and other sports organisations, is drastically expanding its stadium capacity requirements. When Denmark played England at Malmö Stadium during the European Championship in 1992, the match took place in front of 26,300 spectators, many of them standing. Today, UEFA calls for arenas with room for a minimum of 30,000-40,000 seated spectators and an even bigger stadium for the final. In addition, the European Championship has grown from just eight teams in 1992 to 24 teams in France four years from now. This development, in combination with the growing international competition for hosting major sporting events, contributes to a waste of resources which in the area of stadiums alone accounts for billions of dollars, but which will most certainly be even larger if one includes other sports facilities built for major events. The economic and ecological waste of resources can only be stopped if the leaders of sport’s governing organisations accept their part of the responsibility by adding stricter sustainability criteria into their bidding procedures – and take them seriously. Large, architecturally acclaimed stadium constructions can become icons of sporting events, but even the most beautiful icon cannot excuse the decisions to build redundant or unnecessarily expensive stadiums, which are left over after the events as symbols of a waste of money that could have been spent much better on sport itself.

Download the report here (English version) You can also go to Play the Game’s theme page dedicated to the report, where you can find more information on the study of mega-event stadiums, download specific chapters from the report or read other articles from Play the Game regarding mega-event stadiums and their legacies.

Professor Mark Pieth gives keynote address to EASM 2012

Fri, 27 Apr 2012 08:58:00 +0200

Drawing on fresh experiences from one of the most intriguing management challenges of today, that of heading FIFA’s Independent Governance Committee, professor Mark Pieth will join EASM 2012 to give a keynote address under the working title “Democracy and transparency: European privileges or global values?” Though Pieth has an impressive track record in fighting corruption, money laundering and organised crime on an international scale, it remains to be seen whether his work for FIFA – an organisation that has so far proved very reform-resistant – will bear fruit and lead to changes in world football that can convince a skeptical public opinion. Much will depend on the upcoming FIFA Congress in May and the expected release in Switzerland of the secret ISL dossier on corruption among FIFA’s top officials. Come September and the EASM conference, Mark Pieth will be in a much better position to give his opinion on the results of the IGC. Find Mark Pieth’s CV here Other confirmed speakers with relation to football are FIFA’s former international director Jérôme Champagne, and Jean-Claude Mbvoumin, director and founder of the Foot Solidaire network which aims to assist young footballers that have become victims of unscrupulous trafficking.

Read about Foot Solidaire (in French) here

EASM 2012 'Sport between business and civil society' is the overall theme of the 20th EASM Conference in Aalborg, Denmark, on 18-21 September 2012. It is the first time ever that the European Association for Sport Management (EASM) is holding its annual conference in Denmark, where the rapidly growing sport management environment is looking forward to sharing inspiration, knowledge and research with delegates from all over Europe and beyond. Read more about the conference and the different sessions and register at www.easm2012.com

New in Knowledge Bank: Threats to sporting integrity: doping, match-fixing and corruption

Mon, 23 Apr 2012 12:52:00 +0200

With a point of departure in IOC president Jacque Rogge’s statement from 2010 that “cheating driven by betting is undoubtedly the biggest threat to sport after doping,” Catherine Ordway presents her view on corruption in sport. In her presentation, she argues that we need to focus on stamping out corruption in sport in all its forms, and not just limit ourselves to ‘match-fixing’. Breaches of the rules, such as doping and match-fixing, are threats to sport which Ordway argues are merely symptomatic of bigger corruption and lack of transparency issues. To illustrate her point, she presents a long line of cases from the International Handball Federation (IHF) arguing that the leadership by the IHF president appears to have created a culture where referees are found to have been paid off to unfairly penalise one team, teams turn a blind eye, or actively encourage, athletes to dope, and the President himself is under suspicion of having benefited from his position in irregular manners. None of these examples directly refer to betting, or to organised crime, but it is not too much of a stretch to imagine that organised criminals are lurking somewhere behind this picture. She ends her presentation by discussing the proposal of establishing an anti-corruption unit along the lines of the International Anti-doping Agency (WADA), the challenges and benefits of such a unit and how this might be put into use in the fight against corruption in sport across national borders. Read the full presentation here

Soccer meets politics at Doha’s Mohammed Abdul Wahhab Mosque

Fri, 20 Apr 2012 09:02:00 +0200

A multi-domed, sand-coloured, architectural marvel, Doha’s newest and biggest mosque, symbolizes both Qatar’s bold storm into the 21st century and the pitfalls that that march entails. It’s not the mosque itself that raises eyebrows but its naming after an 18th century warrior priest, Sheikh Mohammed Abdul Wahhab, the founder of Islam’s most puritan sect Ironically, the mosque owes its naming to the debate Qatar’s winning of the right to host the 2022 World Cup has sparked. It is a debate that goes to the heart of the energy-rich Gulf state’s identity and the place its ruler, Emir Hamad bin Khalifa al Thani, wants to carve out for his tiny city-state. The World Cup constitutes a centrepiece of a strategy that seeks to reshape the identity of the world’s only state outside of Saudi Arabia that adheres to Wahhabism, one of Islam’s most austere and restrictive interpretations of Islam; position Qatar as a global player capable of punching above its weight; create opportunities to leverage its enormous wealth in a bid to reduce its reliance on the export of one commodity; and enhance its security by establishing mutually beneficial relations with friend and foe and ensuring that it is at the cutting edge of history. The sports leg of Qatar’s broader, high-risk geo-political, economic and media strategy – involving the creation of a world class airline, Qatar Airways; Al Jazeera as a cutting edge global broadcaster; a far more liberal interpretation of Wahhabism than that of Saudi Arabia and support for many of the popular uprisings sweeping the Middle East and North Africa – is emerging as a driver of imminent restructuring of the region’s soccer landscape as well as of social change. To achieve his goal, Emir Hamad has embarked on a buying spree of European soccer assets such as Paris Saint Germain and top league European broadcast rights as well as big ticket sponsorship agreements with the likes of FC Barcelona and the Tour de France, multiple bids for the hosting of international sports tournaments and the construction of world class infrastructure at a cost of tens of billions of dollar. The strategy, which has exposed Qatar to an unprecedented degree of international scrutiny, has already succeeded in putting Qatar with a population of some 1.7 million of which some two thirds are expatriates on the global map. Doha’s massive international airport is even before its completion an international hub connecting the world’s seven continents. Al Jazeera competes with the BBC as the world’s foremost global broadcaster while Qatari businessmen are beginning to reap benefits in terms of business opportunities from their country’s investment in sports. Doha is a sought after venue for disputing parties such as the United States and the Taliban, bitterly divided Palestinian factions and warring parties in Sudan, to find a way to bridge their differences. It is a strategy that envisions cost outstripping material benefit for years to come with some individual components producing tangible results quicker than others. In many ways however, the intangibles – regional and political change, global positioning and the benefits of being on the right side of history – are as if not more important than a bookkeeper’s calculation of outlays and revenues. Sparking opposition in the emir’s backyard
Yet, it is those intangibles that are sparking opposition in Emir Hamad’s own backyard to the social and economic changes necessary to transform Qatar into a global sports hub and the political and diplomatic path on which the Gulf state has embarked that is likely to produce a region very different from the one conservative Wahhabis envision. These intangibles challenge a religious and cultural environment that discourages women’s involvement in sports, often sees Western-style entertainment and fun as irreligious, opposes the kind of political change sweeping the Middle East and North Africa and favours government and society’s uncompromising adherence to Islamic law. In the latest spat, conservative Qataris, including members of the royal family, quietly backed by Saudi Arabia have challenged the emir’s authority to allow the sale of alcohol and pork to non-Muslims. The conservative opposition has already prompted the ban of alcohol on a man-made island largely frequented by expatriates, a decision to make Arabic rather than English the language of instruction in education and a boycott of Qatar Airways. So far both sides have scored points. Sports has been exempted from the imposition of Arabic as the language of instruction while the naming of the mosque after Sheikh Mohammed throws a bone to the conservatives albeit one that is unlikely to satisfy them.

Asian Cup in 2010 in Qatar. Photo: lefty1007/Flickr

Beyond forging a national identity, sports serves also as an effort to pre-empt the kind of youth-led rebellion that has been rocking much of the region for the past 16 months. “Our goal is to create a dialogue that resonates with and talks to the youth. This is an opportunity to inspire and engage young people…. Sports are at the heart of Qatar’s development… Sports like education and arts are part of our national identity,” Noora Al Mannai, CEO of Qatar’s bid to win the right to host the 2020 Olympic Games, told a recent brainstorm in Qatar designed to define the role of government, NGOs and business in sports. She described “empowering young people” as one reason for the bid alongside Qatar’s efforts to mediate conflicts and reduce regional obesity and diabetes levels. Sport as a trigger for social change
Nonetheless, sports are likely to spark a social revolution of sorts as long as the emir is able to keep the conservatives in check. For one, it is forcing Qatar to become the first wealthy Gulf state dependent on expatriate labour to significantly improve working conditions and the legal environment of expatriate workers in line with international standards. It is however not clear yet whether that will also mean legalizing the existence of trade unions. With international trade unions threatening a global campaign under the slogan 'No World Cup in Qatar without labour rights,' Qatar has further vowed to ensure that contractors involved in preparations for the 2022 World Cup will adhere to international labour laws. Qatar 2022 Supreme Committee Secretary General Hassan Al Thawadi conceded early this year that "major sporting events shed a spotlight on conditions in countries. There are labour issues here in the country, but Qatar is committed to reform. We will require that contractors impose a clause to ensure that international labour standards are met. Sport and football in particular, is a very powerful force. Certainly we can use it for the benefit of the region." Qatar and other oil-rich Gulf states have long been targeted by labour organizations for their treatment of particularly unskilled and low-skilled workers. Qatar like the UAE and others in the Gulf operates a sponsorship program under which all foreign workers have to have a local sponsor who can make seeking alternative employment or another sponsor difficult and who often retains the worker’s passport on employment. Trade unionists argue that the lack of a minimum wage further enhances exploitation of labour. The issue of workers’ rights touches a raw nerve in countries like Qatar and the UAE where the local population constitutes a minority. Gulf states are concerned that improving labour conditions would not only have economic consequences but also give foreigners a greater stake in a society which ensures they are forced to leave the country once their contract has ended. Qatar’s employment of sports to project itself internationally coupled with pressure from the International Olympic Committee (IOC) has also prompted Qatar to field women’s athletes for the first time in its history at this year’s London Olympics. Qatar alongside Saudi Arabia, which is still struggling with how to respond to the IOC, and Brunei, is the only country never to have been represented by women at an international tournament. To be fair, women in Qatar, in contrast to their sisters in Saudi Arabia, are by and large subject to far less restrictions. Increasing professionalization and commercialization in the region
Finally, in a part of the world where sports and particularly soccer are often a battlefield for political, ethnic, religious and gender rights, Qatar’s successful bid for the 2022 World Cup has sparked a growing push towards professionalization, commercialization and the creation of a proper football industry as a key to unlocking economic opportunity. For many in the region, last year’s Asia Cup final in Doha, in which half of the competing teams hailed from the Middle East with not one reaching the semi-finals, constituted a wake-up call. It is an experience, Middle Eastern leaders and soccer officials do not want repeated at the Qatar World Cup. "Something is moving," says Santino Saguto, an Italian soccer management consultant based in Dubai. "Qatar 2022 has prompted the region to discuss ways to create value. The leagues, the football associations and the media are starting to buy into the concept. That's how it started in Europe." The UAE took a first step a few years ago when for the first time it marketed the rights to broadcast its league matches – a key step in generating revenue and creating value. The UAE example is reportedly being discussed by Saudi Arabia, the region's most important league beyond Egypt. That is not to say that the UAE's blazing of the trail is not without its birth pangs. Commercial broadcasters charge that state-owned networks distort competition by paying exorbitant amounts for the exclusive right to broadcast major football events. They point to Al Jazeera's clinching of the right to broadcast the 2018 and 2022 Fifa World Cups for an undisclosed amount believed to be in excess of US$3 billion. Abu Dhabi Media Company, owned by the royal family, was moreover awarded the exclusive rights to air the English Premier League in the UAE.

James M. Dorsey is a senior fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies at Nanyang Technological University in Singapore and the author of the blog, The Turbulent World of Middle East Soccer.

Continued disagreement over special World Cup law

Fri, 20 Apr 2012 08:36:00 +0200

Last month it seemed that the long-standing conflict over a special law Brazil is expected to adopt for the World Cup in 2014, had been resolved. After a meeting between FIFA president Sepp Blatter and the Brazilian president, Dilma Rousseff, on 16 March, Blatter announced that they agreed that all obligations should be met and the special law should be adopted as soon as possible. It thus seemed that Brazil would also accommodate FIFA and its World Cup sponsor Budweiser by allowing beer sales at the World Cup stadiums despite great national resistance. Beer sales at football matches have been banned in Brazil since July 2010, and as a result the country has seen a decline in the number of violent incidents at its stadiums. FIFA, in turn, has argued that allowing beer sales at World Cup stadiums is one of the promises Brazil committed itself to when the country signed the agreement to become the host nation. FIFA’s general secretary, Jérôme Valcke, made it clear three months ago that "alcoholic drinks are part of the FIFA World Cup, so we're going to have them,” and added: "excuse me if I sound a bit arrogant but that's something we won't negotiate.” Later he created a real crisis in the relations between the two parties when he declared that the Brazilian organisers were too slow and needed to give themselves “a kick up the backside” if they were to meet the deadlines. Senate: No deal on beer sales
Valcke later had to publicly apologise for the latter statement, and it seemed that the conflicts were resolved when the Chamber of Deputies of the National Congress of Brazil finally adopted the bill and sent it on for final approval in the upper chamber of Congress, the Senate. But now the Senate rejects the claim that Brazil has made any promises to FIFA regarding beer sales. On 12 April, the Senate’s Center for Studies and Research held a workshop on the special law where legal advisor Alexandre Sidnei Guimarães went through the main points of the law as well as Brazil’s promises and commitments made in connection with the Brazilian bid for the World Cup. In his presentation he underlined that Brazil did not make any promises to permit beer sales when the deal was made in 2007. At that time, a ban against beer sales was, on the contrary, a part of FIFA’s own safety guidelines (see below). According to Senate advisor Guimarães, these safety guidelines were only relaxed in 2009, when the current rules took effect at which time FIFA accepted that the sales of alcoholic drinks could be allowed. The Senate is now waiting for Blatter
The Brazilian Senate is therefore puzzled over the claim that Brazil should have given any guarantees about selling beer in the stadiums. According to renowned Brazilian journalist and blogger José Cruz, this is something that the Senate would like to discuss with Sepp Blatter. Blatter was reported to have accepted an invitation to an open debate in the Senate, but has since remained silent, and a date for a visit has not yet been determined. The adoption of the special law is therefore not necessarily just around the corner, as FIFA claimed after meeting with Dilma Rousseff in March.

In its Safety Guidelines from 2004, FIFA wrote:

Article 19
Ban on the sale of alcohol

The sale and public distribution of alcohol shall be forbidden within the confines of the stadium before and during the match.
If any persons inside the stadium are found to be under the influence of alcohol or any other substances that may affect their state of mind, the police and security forces shall remove them from the stadium immediately.
Beverages may only be served in plastic cups.

Report recommends European cooperation against match-fixing

Wed, 18 Apr 2012 10:37:00 +0200

In recent years, the fight against match-fixing has climbed up the political agenda supported by a growing number of cases and a fear among leading international sports organisations that the integrity of sport is threatened if match-fixing and similar on-pitch related forms of corruption are not addressed. Now a new study had been launched by the European Commission, which maps how corruption in sport is covered in national legislation in the 27 member states. The study conducted by KEA European Affairs, a Brussels based advisory and research organisation specialised in sport and creative industries, also comes up with 10 recommendations for a more efficient fight against match-fixing based on interviews with governments, sports organisations, experts and other stakeholders. Different legal approaches
Although there are big differences in how the EU member states address the problem legally, the report concludes that match-fixing in its various forms can generally be prosecuted in all EU countries – either through the normal criminal law forbidding corruption and fraud or through specific criminal laws targeting sports related crimes. But there are loopholes making it difficult to fight for example betting related match-fixing in amateur sports in some states. The report also concludes that the lack of a coherent legal basis between Member States can make cooperation in fighting crime more difficult, mentioning the exchange of information between law enforcement agencies as a particular challenge. In the legal field, the report therefore recommends that the EU adopts a definition of the manipulation of sport results and ensures that Member States have an effective legal framework to cope with match-fixing. And the EU should be actively involved in the negotiation of a possible convention on match-fixing – a step the Council of Europe is looking at right now. The report also calls for disciplinary rules against match-fixing in sports organisations as well as a closer collaboration of sport organisations with law enforcement agencies and betting operators. Operational problems
But the major obstacles in prosecuting cases of match-fixing activities are operational rather than legal, as the report writes: “The vast majority of stakeholders agreed that the main difficulty resides in providing evidence to the prosecution.” Spotting that a match may have been fixed is a challenge. It is even more difficult to prove that a certain player or referee deliberately underperformed or manipulated the result or had been in contact with the criminal underworld. According to the report, such difficulties lead to the abandonment of investigations or the dismissal of cases. The resource intensive prosecutions of the offences can also end up being disproportionate to the very modest sanctions given in some countries. Other obstacles identified in the study are low levels of awareness of the problem and a lack of dialogue and coordination among the different stakeholders. On the operational level, the report recommends a stronger international cooperation that includes agencies like Europol, sports organisations and betting companies. An increasing exchange of information and best practices between stakeholders and countries as well as a more general awareness of the problem among authorities and policy makers is also needed, the report claims. Finally, there is a need for that more data on the causes, the scale of the problem and results of preventive measures and other initiatives to fight against match-fixing. According to the European Commission, the report will be an input for future discussions on fighting match-fixing with governmental and non-governmental stakeholders. Download the report here

Middle Eastern buying spree changes European soccer landscape

Fri, 13 Apr 2012 10:26:00 +0200

A Middle Eastern soccer-focused buying spree is changing the European football landscape even if the jury is still out on whether money can buy success on the pitch. Spearheaded by gas-rich Qatar, Middle Eastern states, royals and wealthy businessmen have in recent years acquired soccer clubs and top European league broadcast rights as part of a multi-layered strategy designed to boost international images, strengthen national pride and identity, create business opportunities and generate tourism. In financial terms and purchasing power, Middle Eastern cash has by and large bolstered teams it has acquired in Britain, France, Spain and Germany by fuelling expensive transfers and enabling clubs to upgrade their facilities even if it has yet to produce trophies. Critics charge, however, that money is insufficient to buy success and note that some clubs have suffered the downside of failed and politically troubled Middle Eastern acquisitions. The Middle East’s lists of acquisitions is impressive even if Gulf buyers have at times signalled their refusal to buy at any price and found out the hard way that money can’t buy everything. Qatar has so far failed to secure a prize catch, Manchester United, reportedly because of a discrepancy of several hundred million dollars between the asking price and the Gulf state’s bid; Dubai International Capital’s efforts several years ago to gain control of Liverpool FC failed too as did Qatar’s attempt last year to gain control of AS Roma; and a bid by Qatar’s sovereign wealth fund, the Qatar Investment Fund, to acquire the media agency that controls the broadcasting rights to world soccer body FIFA’s World Cup lost out to a London-based private equity firm, Bridgepoint Capital Target list reads like a who’s who
Nevertheless, the region’s soccer-related European holdings, sponsorships and acquisition target list reads like a who’s who. The spree was kicked off by Emirates Airlines as far back as 2004 with its 15-year sponsorship of Arsenal FC valued at GBP 100 million and the renaming of its stadium as Emirates Stadium. The agreement was at the time the largest ever British sponsorship deal. Other Emirates European sponsorships followed including AC Milan, Real Madrid, Paris Saint Germain, Hamburger SV and Olympiacos FC as well as FIFA. To its credit, Emirates proved among the sponsors to be the most vocal in its criticism of the soccer body’s handling of the worst corruption crisis in its 108-year old history. Fans enthusiastically greeted the, the Middle East’s first acquisition of a European club, by wearing in 2008 Arab headdress and waving British pound notes with the picture of the queen replaced by a Gulf sheikh at the team’s first post-acquisition match. Little wonder given that the new owners within 24 hours of their takeover had put GBP 100 million on the table for player acquisition and clinched Real Madrid's Brazilian forward Robinho for a British record £32.5m when he had seemed destined for Chelsea. A stream of high profile acquisitions followed. Performance has improved radically with Manchester City winning in 2011 its first FA Cup in 42 years and qualifying for the first time for the UEFA Champions League. Manchester City has since concluded a controversial, ten-year, GBP 400 million sponsorship deal with Abu Dhabi carrier Etihad that sparked renew discussion about financial fair play given that it could give the Manchester Club an unfair advantage. The acquisition of Manchester City followed in 2011 by that of Spanish La Liga soccer club Getafe CF by Dubai-based company Royal Emirates Group owned by Dubai royal Sheikh Butti Bin Suhail Al Maktoum for an estimated $100 million and of financially troubled second division German soccer club TSV 1860 Munich by a 34-year old Abu Dhabi-based Jordanian businessman, Hasan Abdullah Ismaik, were exceptions rather than the rule of the UAE’s sports strategy. Unlike rival Qatar, the UAE despite its acquisitions seems more narrowly focussed on the commercial aspects of sports with sponsorships, the hosting of international tournaments and finance. In an illustration of the UAE’s focus, Dubai’s United Investment Bank last year launched the region’s first alternative investment soccer fund modelled on similar controversial European funds amid rising fan opposition in Turkey, Spain and Portugal. The Royal Football Fund aims to hedge bets in football player markets by acquiring the economic rights of young players in Latin America, Africa and Europe. An estimated 20 per cent of the fund will be invested in listed soccer clubs and television rights for friendly games and tournaments. Fans fear that the association with investment funds undermines a club’s ability to generate funds of its own and often favours vested interests. Besiktas fan opposition to third party acquisition of three Portuguese players -- Hugo Almeida, Simao Sabrosa and Manuel Fernandez -- was for example fuelled by unsubstantiated suspicions that the fund involved was a front for club president Yildirim Demiroren, a wealthy businessman who has lent Besiktas just under $100 million. Qatar becomes the Middle East’s buyer per excellence
Not that Qatar has been oblivious to the commercial and reputational benefits of sponsorship – think Qatar Foundation’s 2010 $225 million sponsorship of Barcelona FC and the 2011 naming of Qatar Airways as the Tour de France’s official airline – and tournament hosting – its controversial success in winning the right to host the 2022 World Cup. Brasher than the UAE, certainly after the financial crisis in Dubai in 2008 that has left the emirate laden with debt, Qatar has emerged as the Middle East’s buyer per excellence with not only a willingness to wield more cash but also with more associated assets to leverage such as its Al Jazeera television network. Qatar Sports Investments last year matched Abu Dhabi’s purchase of Manchester City with its acquisition of a 70 per cent stake in Paris Saint-Germain, which hasn’t won a match in the past month, as well as of Malaga FC by Qatari royal Sheikh Abdullah Bin Nasser Al Thani. Qatar’s strategy, in contrast to that of the UAE, appears to be anchored in a more fundamental policy that aims to make sports a pillar of national identity and has had greater success in commercially leveraging its assets. Al Jazeera, for one, is taking aim at Europe's pay-TV market, using sport to build a global media brand. The broadcaster is racing to launch a new French channel in early June in time for the European soccer championships after spending some 300 million euros on broadcast rights to France's soccer league, the Champions League and Europa League, as well as some top-flight games from Germany and Italy. The broadcaster is also reported to be willing to pay big money in a bid for UK rights to the English Premier League now mostly held by News Corp affiliate BSkyB. Al Jazeera’s European campaign builds on its success as the most popular sports network in the Middle East and Africa, with two free and 15 pay channels, plus an English version with a dozen commentators and producers. To compete however with the likes of Sky and France’s Canal+, Al Jazeera will have to build a distribution platform of its own, involving deals with cable, telecommunications, and satellite operators. Al Jazeera also recently acquired rights to the Champions League and the UEFA EURO 2012 and 2016, as well as some top German and Italian matches and looking at challenging this spring Rupert Murdoch’s BskyB for British rights to the English Premier League, at approximately $3 billion the world’s most expensive soccer league broadcast rights. Al Jazeera could also bid for German Bundesliga rights. Al Jazeera acquired the rights under its new French company beIN SPORT together with TF1 and M6. IPTV operator Free has agreed to provide Al Jazeera a French platform, but the broadcaster has yet to sign similar agreements elsewhere in Europe as well as in the United States. Spain and Germany have emerged as the greatest beneficiaries of the commercial offsets that energy-rich Gulf states hope to reap from their massive investments in professional sports. Sheikh Abdullah won a contract in May 2011 to develop the $550 million Marbella yacht port project a year after his acquisition of Malaga. Royal Emirates Group is looking at investing in tourism and solar-energy projects, including a spa resort based on a former Arab settlement near Granada, Wadi Ash. Granada was Muslim-controlled when Spain was ruled by Muslims from 711 until the inquisition in 1492. German companies are big winners in the massive $65 billion business to prepare Qatar for the World Cup. Qatar has allocated on average 40 per cent of its annual budget to infrastructure, including nine stadiums, for the next five years and German companies have or expect a significant chunk of the associated business. Cultural changes in the wake of Arab acquisitions
Fans have so far been willing to accept cultural changes that accompany the Arab acquisitions such as Sheikh Abdullah’s replacement of bookmaker William Hill Plc as Malaga’s jersey sponsor because gambling is banned under Islamic law with United Nations culture agency UNESCO and Royal Emirates plans to set up a pavilion about Arabic culture at Getafe’s stadium. Nonetheless, Real Madrid’s recent decision to remove a Christian cross from its official logo in what it described as the cost of doing business in a globalized world has sparked ire, particularly among anti-Muslim right-wingers. The removal came as Real Madrid embarked on the construction of a $1 billion sport tourist resort in the United Arab Emirates scheduled to open in 2015. Critics argue further despite Manchester City’s successes that Arab oil money is unlikely to quickly produce trophy winners. “If a club spends a lot of money quickly, it takes time for the team to settle down. There’s no easy way of winning the Premier League. You have to deserve it,” legendary former Manchester United goal scorer and Manchester United board member Sir Robert ‘Bobby’ Charlton told The Daily Mirror last year. Sir Charlton contrasted efforts to fast track success on the back of Arab financial muscle with Manchester United manger Sir Alexander Chapman "Alex" Ferguson’s strategy of nurturing players from a young age. He said Manchester United had several promising young players. “Alex keeps them right until the exact moment he thinks that they’re ready for it, and then he’ll put them in. We've had more than our fair share of good young players and we've invested in a lot of young players too.” Sir Charlton went on to argue that “you get a bit of an affiliation with a football club when this sort of thing is taking place, and not just piling loads and loads of money in,” a reference not only to Arab investments in Europe but also to the failure of the Middle East’s authoritarian regimes to develop soccer talent at a young age. Some European clubs have learnt that deep pockets do not necessarily mean long-term commitment. Barely three months after acquiring Portsmouth FC, Sulaiman Al-Fahim, United Arab Emirates, sold the bulk of his stake to Saudi property tycoon Ali Al-Faraj amid reports that his flagship Hydra Village project in Abu Dhabi was floundering. Mr. Al-Faraj too had no intention of staying involved for long. Soon after the takeover, he announced that he was selling the club. But with no buyer on the horizon, Portsmouth FC went into receivership. Geneva’s Swiss Super League club Servette FC and Austria’s Admira Wacker haven’t fared much better. Servette is on the brink of collapse after Iranian businessman Majid Pishyar who acquired it in 2008, filed for bankruptcy earlier this year. Mr. Pishyar, who managed the club on a shoe string, tried unsuccessfully to attract government funding by last year appointing Robert Hensler, a former top civil servant for the canton of Geneva, as vice-president. His earlier efforts to salvage Admira, his first European acquisition, failed too. Servette’s problems come on the heels of the bankruptcy in January of Neuchatel’s Super League team Xamax whose Chechen owner was arrested on charges of fraud and financial mismanagement. Risk in association with autocrats
Similarly, there is risk inherent in association with Middle Eastern autocrats. That risk is particularly acute at a time that autocracy is being challenged by a wave of popular revolts sweeping the Middle East and North Africa. Nevertheless, for some European soccer clubs seduced by the lure of petro dollars, nothing is a bridge too far. Take the career of Al-Saad Gadaffi, the wanted son of the deposed mercurial Libyan dictator Moammar Qaddafi who engineered his country’s 7.5 per cent stake in Juventus FC. Al-Saad signed ten years ago with Maltese team Birkirkara F.C., but never showed up. Three years later, he joined Italy’s Perugia instead, but was suspended after only one game for failing a drug test. The incident earned him the reputation of being Italian Series A’s worst ever player. Al-Saad’s dismal performance didn’t stop him from enlisting in 2005 with Italy’s Udinese where he was relegated to the role of bench-warmer except for a 10-minute appearance in an unimportant late season match. That didn’t deter Samdoria president Riccardo Garrone, head of oil company Erg, from inviting him to train with his team in the dashed hope that it would open the door to Libyan oil contracts.

Selected major Middle Eastern investments in European soccer

James M. Dorsey is a senior fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies at Nanyang Technological University in Singapore and the author of the blog, The Turbulent World of Middle East Soccer.

EASM 2012 – extended deadline for abstracts/papers

Thu, 12 Apr 2012 09:27:00 +0200

Almost 300 abstracts have already been submitted to the EASM 2012 conference in Aalborg, Denmark on the 18-21 September 2012. Following the great demand, the organisers have decided to keep the option to submit an abstract/paper open until 16 April 2012.

EASM cordially invites you and your colleagues/peers to submit a scientific or practical abstract/paper or poster to be considered for presentation at the conference.

Young researchers are invited to submit a scientific paper for the New Researchers Award (NRA). Completed research or research in progress is welcomed.

The new submission deadline will be 16 April 2012

Read the full Call for Abstracts/Papers here
Submit your Abstract/Paper here
The EASM 2012 program structure will consist of the following session types: The official EASM conference programme with scientific and professional practice abstract/paper presentations in:

Topical sessions (abstracts only).
Workshops (abstracts and/or papers where specified).
Poster presentations (abstracts only).
Keynote sessions (invited speakers).

Topical Sessions:
In the topical sessions topics of interest for abstract submission include, but are not limited to, the following: 1. Opportunities, challenges and trends in sport management.
2. Leadership issues in sport organisations.
3. Tourism and leisure sport management.
4. Global sporting events.
5. Critical sport management issues.
6. Sport fans.
7. Sport for good.
8. Marketing in and through sport.
9. Sport policy.
10. Governance in sport.
11. Volunteering in sport.
12. Participation in sport. Strategies and challenges.
13. Operation and management of sports and leisure facilities.
14. Sport, media and journalism.
15. Other sport management related issues. When writing your abstract, it is recommended that you consider the topics listed under the topical sessions (or workshops). However, the Scientific Committee reserves the right to decide on final topic grouping upon abstract selection. Workshops:
Abstracts/papers are invited for the following workshops: A. The contribution of science to practice in football. [read more]
B. Elite sport organisation and management for world class. [read more]
C. Sport policy: the significance of government. [read more]
D. Sport policy and ‘hard’ times. [read more]
E. London 2012: success and failure of national elite sport policies. [read more]
F. University teaching sport management. [read more]
G. Governance in international sports organisations. [read more]
H. Volunteering in sport. [read more]
I. ESMQ Special Issue: value co-creation in sport management. [read more] The following workshops are open to participation but do not in all cases require abstracts/papers: J. ESMQ Editors’ workshop. [read more]
K. Play the Game symposium. [read more] Read more about the workshops here
Submit your Abstract/Paper here

Questions about Abstract/Paper submission can be directed to:
Lau Tofft-Jørgensen
Lau.tofft@idan.dk
phone: +45 51 90 61 05
mobile: +45 32 66 10 38

Website on Good Governance in International Sports Organisations calls for your contribution

Wed, 11 Apr 2012 14:31:00 +0200

The credibility of international sport is challenged almost on a daily basis by reports on corruption and mismanagement, whitewashing, match-fixing, embezzlement and other forms of cheating. Many of the stories are directly or indirectly related to the international organisations that represent hundreds of millions of athletes. How can we improve the governance standards of these organisations? This is the question that Play the Game/the Danish Institute for Sports Studies is addressing in cooperation with six European universities and the European Journalism Centre. The theme page www.aggis.eu has been set up as a forum for insights and ideas for good governance in sport and for sharing the findings of Play the Game’s EU funded project ‘Action for Good Governance in International Sports Organisations’ (AGGIS). You can already now find information about the project, relevant articles on the fight for better governance, links to selected institutions and reports on good governance in international sports organisations and information about similar good governance projects. Play the Game and the project partners invite you and everybody with an interest in governance in sport to give your input to the page by submitting your thoughts, experiences, articles and reports, links or any other material related to the issue by writing to governance@playthegame.org. You can also visit the project on Facebook and add your comments, thoughts, ideas or links. You can find the page on www.aggis.eu or on www.playthegame.org/aggis