Knowledge Bank

New in Knowledge Bank: Threats to sporting integrity: doping, match-fixing and corruption

Mon, 23 Apr 2012 12:52:00 +0200

With a point of departure in IOC president Jacque Rogge’s statement from 2010 that “cheating driven by betting is undoubtedly the biggest threat to sport after doping,” Catherine Ordway presents her view on corruption in sport. In her presentation, she argues that we need to focus on stamping out corruption in sport in all its forms, and not just limit ourselves to ‘match-fixing’. Breaches of the rules, such as doping and match-fixing, are threats to sport which Ordway argues are merely symptomatic of bigger corruption and lack of transparency issues. To illustrate her point, she presents a long line of cases from the International Handball Federation (IHF) arguing that the leadership by the IHF president appears to have created a culture where referees are found to have been paid off to unfairly penalise one team, teams turn a blind eye, or actively encourage, athletes to dope, and the President himself is under suspicion of having benefited from his position in irregular manners. None of these examples directly refer to betting, or to organised crime, but it is not too much of a stretch to imagine that organised criminals are lurking somewhere behind this picture. She ends her presentation by discussing the proposal of establishing an anti-corruption unit along the lines of the International Anti-doping Agency (WADA), the challenges and benefits of such a unit and how this might be put into use in the fight against corruption in sport across national borders. Read the full presentation here

The Ball Remains the Same - Leoz, Grondona and Teixeira's 91-Year-Reign

Thu, 09 Feb 2012 11:47:00 +0100

In this conference presentation from Play the Game 2011, Ezequiel Fernández Moores describes the football management in South America and how the same old men have been in power for several years. The South American playoffs for the Football World Cup in Brazil start tomorrow. South America has won 9 out of the 18 FIFA World Cups. Obdulio Varela, Di Stéfano, Pelé, Garrincha, Kempes, Maradona, Ronaldhino and Ronaldo were born there. Messi, Neymar, Alexis Sánchez and Falcao too. They are the new stars. There are always new champions in South America. What is never renewed, though, is the ruling class. South America, gentlemen, has gone through great changes over the last years. I am talking about social changes. And political changes. There are countries where for the first time there is a woman president, or an aborigine, a worker, a bishop and an ex guerilla. A lot has changed in South America. But definitely not the football ruling leaders. They are the same as ever. Let's consider, for example, Paraguayan Nicolás Leoz. He is 83 years old. His enemies say he claims to be two or three years younger. Anyway, he has been the Conmebol president since 1986. Last May he was re-elected until 2015. A record of 29 years. Ricardo Teixeira has been president of the Brazilian Confederation since 1989. As for Julio Grondona, I talked a lot in Play the Game 2005. He is already 80 years old. He has been the President of the Argentinian Football Association since 1979. No matter some last judicial interferences, I assured you that Grondona will start this year his ninth consecutive term. The three of them will be in office until 2015. Grondona will reach 36 years on the throne, Leoz 29 and Teixeira 26. The most powerful South American football trio in the world will summed in 2015 240 years, 91 of them sitting in the throne. Leoz and Teixeira, as we know, deny taking bribes from ISL. But his names have come up in a Swiss court. In the Conmebol or in Paraguay nobody criticized Leoz about this subject. Teixeira, however, comes in for severe criticism in Brazil. The Brazilian president herself, Dilma Roussef, does not trust him. Roussef wants to control the money that the State will invest in the organization of the next World Cup. Teixeira and also the FIFA got on better with former president Lula. Over the last days the arguments about the privilege law that the FIFA demands for each World Cup have become worse. Last Saturday in Brazil the rumour spread that the FIFA threatens with an alternative venue if Brazilian government doesn´t give in. Typical from FIFA. I’m sure there will be more clashes from now on. Teixeira laughs at the media accusations. He says he will only worry the day Globo TV National Journal accuses him. TV Globo is the most powerful TV network in Brazil. It is Teixeira's partner. On last August more than 20 Brazilian team supporters went to the stadiums with banners that read “Fora Teixeira”. Globo did not show any. And if Globo interferes, Teixera reschedules the start of the Brazilian matches so that they begin at the same time as the soaps, which are the rating owners. Teixeira was released yesterday from the hospital. Grondona, two weeks ago. The real bosses in the Conmebol, have been confronted this year with demands of people demonstrating in the streets and stadiums hoping that they will leave. But Teixeira wants to become the FIFA president in 2015. It is Joao Havelange, his former father-in-law, who encourages him most. Havelange was the FIFA president for 25 years. He is now 95 and enjoys excellent health. Havelange is the founder and the healthiest of the South American centenary club. He invited his friend to celebrate his centenary just before the Olympics in Rio, in 2016. Grondona no longer has the support of the Clarín group, the most powerful one in my country. As I told you in 2005, Clarín and Grondona were partners for more than 20 years. This society was a huge monopoly in football broadcasts. Do you know why Grondona did not dare break up with Clarín? Because he has found another partner who pays him three times as much and protects him more: the Argentine government. Now football is broadcast on public TV. Anybody can watch it without paying a cent. Much public criticism may be directed at Grondona. The organisation Save Football made reference to the most severe criticism against him yesterday in Play the Game because of the violence of our hooligans. In 70 years the AFA had 30 presidents. They lasted an average of a year and a half each. Grondona has been in office for 32 years. During these 32 years my country has had 14 presidents. The AFA only one. The AFA vote system is so Machiavellian that in eight elections there was only one opponent. And he had only one vote. Let´s see what has happened in Chile. Harold Mayne Nicholls was at last a fresh hope of renovation. He took over an unsuccessful Federation and a trouble national team. It classified during a great campaign for the South Africa World Cup. He multiplied its value by four. But the real owners of Chilean football wanted that business for themselves. They could not stand that Mayne Nicholls demanded the TV money was invested in infrastructure and the building of youth clubs. Chilean clubs are private corporations. And their shareholders are the most powerful business groups in the country. They own shares in all the main clubs. The list begins with Colo Colo, the most popular one. It was controlled by Chilean president, Sebastián Piñera, the richest men in the country. Hours before a decisive vote in the Chilean Federation, president Piñera himself offered to build new stadiums for small clubs. They did not care that 80% of Chilean fans were supporting Mayne Nicholls. Their colleagues have an 80% too, but of disapproval. Leoz and Joseph Blatter have been through it themselves with the tremendous hissing from football fans when they stepped into the River Plate pitch to award the prizes to the last American Cup winners. Grondona stayed in his seat. It was wise of him. Chilean Piñeira, economically Liberal and politically Conservative, is an exception. Most of the region turned, in fact, to centre-left or left governments. We know that when Hugo Chávez became president there was a radical turning point in Venezuela. I will not make a political analysis. For better or for worse, the truth is that many things have changed in Venezuela since Hugo Chávez. What in Venezuela has not changed either, though, is the president of the Federation. Rafael Esquivel has been there since 1987 and his term will finish in 2013. 26 years. He is the owner of fishing vessels, clothes shops, gas stations, cinema complexes and he is a whiskey importer. Venezuela is almost one million square metres large. Do you know where they have been building, for a decade, The High Performance Centre with the money of the FIFA Goal Project? On lands belonging to the Esquivel family. The Venezuelan Federation presided by Esquivel paid Disgamar company one million dollars for the land, which is on Margarita island. “The land- Esquivel explained a few years ago- belongs to the Federation. The FIFA should not care whose it was before”. And in our neighbouring Colombia? Well, there, we know that the clubs belonged, for years, to the narco Cartels. Pablo Escobar, the Medellin Cartel boss, was the owner of the Atlético Nacional. Brothers Miguel and Gilberto Rodriguez Orejuela, Cali Cartel bosses, had the America. Gonzalo Rodriguez Gacha had Millonarios. In the 80's they blackmailed or killed referees. They controlled that great National Team which classified for three World Cups running. Valderrama, Asprilla, Higuita, Rincón. The narcos paid none other than the president of the Federation, Juan José Bellini, who went to prison. I recommend the documentary “Los Dos Escobares” by Jeff and Michael Zimbalist brothers. It shows the national team players going to play football in the narco prison Pablo Escobar. “If Vito Corleone calls me – former trainer Orlando Maturana said – I will go”. We already know that Colombia managed to get rid of those narco bosses. Their executors were the “paras” of the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia. The cocaine business is now theirs. And, apparently, so may be the football business. The Autodefensas accountant was killed last year. He was auditor of the Federation. The president of the Federation is now Luis Bedoya. But the real influential man is Alvaro González Alzate. He has been in Colombian football for 40 years. There have been narcos and the “paras” will no longer be. Not González Alzate. He will stay. And Peru? Manuel Burga is the boss there. Former government wanted to get him out but the FIFA, as usual, threatened with sanctions. Once the same thing happened with Esquivel in Venezuela. And, let me warn you, it will happen again with Grondona and with Teixeira. Burgos has been in the Federation for two decades, one as president. 92% of Peruvians reject him. “The remaining 8% - he said very seriously – is a big number”. He was summoned by judges, prosecutors and they have initiated Parliamentary commissions. He still has three pending judiciary proceedings. When he appeared, he meant hope for change. Now newspaper El Comercio called him Reverend Jones, like the one in Guyana, because he is also on the road to self-destruction. Some Federations in the Andean region did manage, at least, to voice criticism about the Traffic business in the Conmebol. Traffic is a Brazilian production company, friend of Teixeira's. It made a lot of money out of TV rights. And Traffic gave the Conmebol only peanuts. For this reason Mr Paco Casal is now going to be part of the business. And there wasn´t a public bidding. Paco is the most powerful man in Uruguayan football. He has a TV channel, players, contacts in Europe, runs clubs and controls journalists. Before he was also the owner of the National Team. He only allowed journalists who did not criticize him to get on the plane. The new president of the Uruguayan Association, Sebastián Bauza, also represents an attempt of change. He seemed determined to limit Paco Casal´s power. He will not find this easy, though. This year Paco has been seen in pictures with Uruguayan president, Pepe Mujica, an ex-guerrilla who was in prison and was tortured during the time of the dictatorship. Paco introduced Florentino Pérez to Mujica. The president of the Real Madrid promised investments. Two days ago, Casal won, once again, the National Team TV rights. Bauza and Mayne Nicholls represented hope for change within the Conmebol. But my sources tell me that when Leoz leaves, he will be replaced by vice-president Eugenio Figueredo, 79 years old, an Under-80 of the old guard. In 2005, Figueredo had to leave the Uruguayan Fraud Association, as many fans called the Uruguayan Football Association. In 2005, journalist Ricardo Gabito published a devastating article in “La República”. Legal charges, falsification of records, legal violations, favouring businessmen like Casal. The agents are rich. The clubs always are poor. Uruguay was semi-finalist, the best South American team in South Africa. Do you know how much money a small club has received monthly this year for TV rights? 10,000 dollars. Yes! That is what Cristiano Ronaldo earns for signing an autograph. Minister Héctor Lescano has publicly asked for washing the AUF with lots of water, soap and a wire brush. Figueredo had to leave. 85% of the people were against him. If we go out of South America, Mexico is the other powerful team in Latin América. In México, the FIFA allows a single owner to have several teams. The television network Televisa owns three first division teams: América, Necaxa and San Luis. Azteca TV has other two: Morelia and Jaguares. Sometimes I think that when the old South American football ruling leaders leave, all the clubs will belong to the television like in Mexico or will be private corporations controlled by the economic power like in Chile. And maybe for that reason, politicians, even if they are innovators, will prefer to negotiate with the old leadership. The permanence is not an exclusive issue of the Conmebol. The NBA, which boasts being one of the most innovating sport organizations, now in problems because of the lockout, has had the same commissioner for 27 years: David Stern. But, in South American football, it's been decades of corruption accusations, lack of transparency and incompetence. We have fantastic players. The jewels of the crown. But our clubs are always poor. You should have seen Figueredo, Teixeira, Grondona, Blatter, on May 1st last, on the occasion of Leoz' last re-election happily strolling around the brand new five-star Bourbon Conmebol Convention Hotel. The hotel cost more than 20 million dollars. It has 168 rooms, a swimming pool, a spa, a gym and a museum. The Conmebol leaders will have their own suites. In 15 years the Conmebol will be the hotel owner. That will happen in the year 2026. When we go in, Leoz, Grondona and Teixeira may still be there opening the door for us. And in the saloon we may find Joao Havelange. Celebrating its 116 years old.

New in the knowledge bank: The need for reform in FIFA

Fri, 09 Dec 2011 09:47:00 +0100

In principle, the outcome of the reform process in FIFA should be simple, Bonita Mersiades concludes in a new contribution to Play the Game’s knowledge bank. “We want an international governing body that has the same level of transparency and accountability that we expect of our governments, major institutions and organisations. We want an organisation that is responsible to the many millions of people who play the game, the billions who are fans and one that meets standards befitting of its $1.3 billion turnover,” Mersiades writes. The article is based on a recent presentation to the Chartered Secretaries Australia Conference in Sydney and gives a good overview of the corruption allegations engulfing FIFA. The former head of corporate and public affairs in Football Federation Australia also describes how the crisis is seen from an Australian point of view, discussing the Australian football federation’s position. According to Mersiades, FIFA has grown to become an international commercial giant at the expense of world football’s reputation – and she does not have much confidence in FIFA’s willingness and capacity to change. But FIFA needs a ‘clean slate’, she argues, which calls for a reform process involving all stakeholders including players and fans. “Players and fans have a right and responsibility to shape the local as well as international football environment. We have the right and responsibility to champion reform – rather than passively accepting FIFA’s flawed governance. And we have the right and responsibility to be part of the main game. Read the full article here.

Bonita Mersiades is an Australian strategy and communications consultant and writer. She has been team manager for the Australian national men’s team, the ‘Socceroos’ and head of corporate and public affairs in Football Federation Australia (FFA) until her departure early 2010. Read more here.

New in the knowledge bank: Article on curious draws at Grand Slam tournaments

Fri, 11 Nov 2011 11:32:00 +0100

The summary Facts and statistics strongly indicate that draws at the Grand Slam tournaments 2008-2011 might have been fixed at the very top of men's tennis. Namely, in 12 out of 12 Grand Slam tournaments played on hard and grass courts between 2008 and 2011, Federer and Djokovic were always drawn to the same half of the draw, while Nadal and Murray were drawn to the other half. In addition, in five of those 12 tournaments Murray was not among the first four seeded players, so his draw was conducted separately five times. Thus, the statistics are as follows: to get the same result 12 out of 12 times, probability is 1 in 4096. For the case of Murray's separate draws which produced the same result 5 out of 5 times, it is 1 in 32. Therefore, the probability to obtain draw results as obtained at the 12 grand slam tournaments is 131072 to 1 (4096 x 32 = 131072). Combined with a study conducted by ESPN on the draws of unseeded players at US Open it reaches 1 in many billions.
Read the full article here. A Facebook page on this issue with more details is available here.

Katarina Pijetlovic is a lecturer in EU law at Law School of Tallinn University of Technology and a researcher at the University of Helsinki.

Sport: A battlefield for value fighters

Wed, 27 Apr 2011 11:27:00 +0200

It may seem unfair that sport more than any other cultural phenomenon must constantly explain its human and social values. Could you imagine that Metallica, the New York City Ballet or Olafur Eliasson were constantly questioned about their own moral standards and how their art contributed to create a better living for the general population? There are however some very good reasons to demand a little more from sport than from other activities. One obvious reason is that the sports leaders themselves, on every level from the local club leader to the international federation president, claim over and over again that thanks to sport, we can create a healthy, peaceful and harmonious society. This tune has proven efficient in the search for financial and political support for sport, also in cases where evidence does not fully support the claims. Another good reason is that sport does reach out to even the most remote corners of the globe. As practitioners or as spectators, we are involved in massive numbers. But on top of this, sport is held accountable to its values because it contains some potentially dangerous emotions: anger, frustration, aggression. The very idea of having rules in sport is of course that we do want to keep these feelings under control, so the boxing fight or the hockey game does not end up in violence, even death.

Add to this that we are often practising or following sport in teams or crowds with the increased impact that mass affiliation provides. Last, but not least, sport’s inner meaning is to produce images of the norms and ideals that we search to guide our lives as individuals and communities by. When practising sport, norms and ideals are marked in our bodies and minds with a force much stronger than in front of the TV. But also the TV screen offers a wonderful platform for propagating ideas through sport thanks to its global outreach. And it works: Look to the amount of politicians and companies that rush to be seen in the context of an international sports event. If you think that a ball game is merely a game about a ball, you may have got it wrong. Sport as a whole is an intense, never-ending battlefield about the values that guide our lives. This is why those who define and decide about these values have a tremendous power. At Play the Game, we believe the definitions and decisions are much too important to leave in the hands of small groups in the international political, sports or media elite.

We believe that every sports participant is entitled to decide about her own sporting life and enjoy the fullest possible freedom to choose and realise the values that she believes, on her own, in a team or in communities. In principle, this means that the public and sporting authorities must ensure a variety of sports activities to choose from – and of course leave room for the athletes themselves to develop and innovate their activities. The ultimate responsibility for practising this freedom of choice of course rests with the athlete herself and must be carried out with due consideration for others. But the clubs, federations and governments must ensure that there is space for movement. This is why the core values of Play the Game are democracy, transparency and freedom of expression. Democracy, because every athlete must be empowered to influence the sport she exercises. In theory, there is a direct link between the individual athlete and the president of the international federation through a system of representative democracy. In practice, the international federations work independently from their members, flexing their impressive financial and political muscles in headquarters covered with mirrors on the inside and the outside. They are very rarely held accountable for their practices. Not by the media that have a century-long tradition for supporting sport as fans and often have own commercial interests in a conflict-free image of sport. Not by the public authorities and politicians who often see sports organisation as much too powerful to confront, fearful of losing the opportunity to be granted the next important mega-event. And they are even less controlled by their own democratic constituencies – the national federations – who show happy disengagement in the way the sport is governed, as long as the money keeps flowing out from the international to the national level. It may be too much to demand a perfectly working democracy from the top to the grass-roots, but most federations do not even bother to try. It is a paradox that the International Olympic Committee, which in its structure is the least democratic of all major sports organisations, has over the past ten years been in sport’s forefront by democratizing its activities, inviting representatives of national committees, international federations and Olympic athletes into its legislative assembly, and displaying a notable degree of transparency. Transparency is another key requirement, a value that all sports federations share – at least in theory. When accounts are falsified such as it happened in the International Volleyball Federation (FIVB), everybody can see that change is needed (except the volleyball leaders themselves). But also FIFA is a great example of talking transparency, but showing secrecy. One of our regular guests at Play the Game, the British reporter Andrew Jennings, has repeatedly dragged top secret documents out of FIFA’s headquarters that give evidence about mismanagement and manipulation. The response? FIFA has banned Andrew Jennings from all its activities and so far decided never to accept invitations to speak at the Play the Game conferences. So it is not with the help of FIFA that the world’s largest corruption scandal so far has been brought to light: The payment of bribes worth 140 million CHF – over 100 million dollars – to sports officials in mainly FIFA in return for tv and marketing contracts to the former market giant ISL. It would be unfair to blame FIFA alone for only practising transparency when a glittery and happy facade can be shown. Like few other values, sports organisations always stress the family values: The Olympic family, the football family, the basketball family etc. etc. This may produce good feelings in the corridors of power, but is not as innocent and heart-warming as it may seem. The family unity is also used as a shield against open internal debates. In a family we are loyal to each other. We do not have any real conflicts of interest. We do not hang our dirty laundry out in the open. Perhaps we could add: And at the end of the day, papa knows what is best for us… If sport was regarded as a community rather than a family, conditions for the debate would change radically. At Play the Game, freedom of expression is perhaps the value that we have had the greatest success in promoting. You might find it exaggerated to demand freedom of expression in a world of leisure activities. After all, the leaders of world sport do not send hitmen out to take down their critics. This is true: we must keep things in proportion. But 14 years in the international sports debate and six international conferences have taught us that speaking out can have very serious consequences. We have had the privilege to meet a number of courageous, intelligent and very well-informed people who all had one thing in common: They were fired, expelled, sued, marginalised, ridiculed or threatened because they told the public of events and facts that their conscience did not allow them to keep to themselves. Take for instance the Italian athletics coach Sandro Donati who for more than a decade fought a lonely fight against doping organised by the sports establishment itself. His own employers at Italian Olympic Committee filed 11 lawsuits against him and lost them all. Or the Argentine volleyball leader Mario Goijman who was expelled from the FIVB together with the whole Argentine federation, because he had raised criticism about the way the volleyball president Ruben Acosta cashed in millions of dollars through his sports leadership. A practice also criticised by the IOC, but never stopped. Exposing many such cases has not given Play the Game a high degree of popularity in the inner circles of international sport politics. But a growing number of international leaders recognise that the public must be involved if some important threats to sport are to be countered: The illegal doping trade orchestrated by mafia groups, the global problem of match fixing and illegal betting, fan violence, gene doping, tax evasion, trafficking… you can add a number of challenges to that list. Also, society and sport must work together to realise some of the more positive potentials of sport, for instance the use of sport in countering obesity and other lifestyle diseases. It is often overlooked that around half of Play the Game’s agenda is completely non-controversial and focused on how sport can be developed to benefit more people than today. Instead, many sports leaders wrinkle their nose and turn their face in disgust as soon as they see that the fight against corruption, exploitation and other forms of abuse is also put forward on our open agenda. Sport in general has a tendency to see criticism as something evil and obstructive, although anyone who lives in a relationship knows that constructive criticism and love can go very well hand in hand. If Play the Game and our hundreds of speakers have sometimes criticised sport, something we cannot deny, it is not because we want to damage or destroy sport. It is because we believe that open and honest dialogue is the only way to healthy and sustainable development. It is because the future must build on a truth that we can all recognise, and this truth is approached only by hearing contrasting voices. It is not because we hate sport, but because we love it.

Slightly updated version of text first published in “Du brauchst Bewegung - Sport zwischen Bildung, Bodykult, Doping und Wertevermittlung”, 2009, Hofmann Verlag, Stuttgart, Germany.

Handball clubs on the brink of insolvency

Wed, 16 Mar 2011 14:28:00 +0100

Despite success for the Danish male national team at the 2011 World Championships in Sweden, the financial development in the Danish men’s and women’s Leauge clubs is worse than ever. Talks on financial fair play have to reach the agenda in professional handball just as they have come in European soccer recently. Losses associated with professional team sports seem to be a common problem across Europe. Most recently UEFA released its annual report on the economy of European club football. ‘The European Club Footballing Landscape - Club Licensing Benchmarking Report Financial Year 2009 '. The report figures showed a football branch filled with red numbers. Other European pro-sports, however, are also suffering from financial problems.
Team handball, the second most commercialized sport in Denmark, is an example hereof as it is facing its worst financial crisis since the commercialization of the game started in the mid-1990’s. As with the European football clubs, the Danish team handball clubs have persistently overspent on players now resulting in a record high average deficit. An analysis conducted by the Danish Institute for Sports Studies reveals a very dire situation. Management in need of revision
While several clubs struggle to survive, one of the leading Danish clubs, the Fynen based, GOG TGI Svendborg A/S, folded due to insolvency in the 2009/2010 season. Several clubs only survive as creditors or sponsors steps in to secure future funding. Seen from a sound financial perspective, the financial management of the Danish team handball clubs is in need of revision. As can be seen from the below figure revenues fell significantly in the 2009/2010 season. Prior to these two years a successive increase in revenues had persisted in the 1993-2007 period. However, this was put to a sudden hold when the global credit crunch crisis struck the Danish economy in 2008. Today the average revenue of a League male or female team handball club is 11.3 million Danish kroner (approx. € 1.6 mill.) At its highest point in 2007/08, the average revenue hit a record of 16.5 million kroner (approx. € 2.2 mill.). Even though all clubs have reduced their respective costs, losses continue to grow. In 2007/08 the average club loss turned out to be 1.9 mill. Dkr (approx. €256.000) only to be followed by increased losses in the season 2008/09 and 2009/10 reaching 2.5 mill. Dkr. and 2.8 mill. Dkr. (approx -€335.000 and -€375.000). 16 out the 20 club audit reports that have been accessed in order to draw up the above figures, report losses. A closer analysis reveals that several clubs have been rescued by creditors that have waived their debt portfolios. Average revenue and profit/loss in Danish Team Handball Leauge clubs, 1993-2010 (mill. Dkr.)
________________________________________ The figure plots average revenue (red line) and average result (blue line) for men and women Leauge teams during the 1993 to 2010-period. ________________________________________

Pressure mounts for regulation
The numbers revealed above show a dire development of Danish Team Handball in financial terms echoing the problems of the larger European pro-football Leagues. As a reaction to the situation, some club CEOs and board members have stated that even though the Danish Handball Federation already has some financial regulation in place, tighter control, such as a financial fair play program currently being implemented in European professional football, is needed in order to bring the Danish clubs back on track. In addition, experts – referring to the initiatives taken by UEFA – argue that overspending is a game of moral hazards, meaning that if many clubs more or less irresponsibly gamble with money they do not have in order to stay competitive, then clubs that are making an effort to balance their books are punished in terms of their results on the field. Subsequently this punishes them economically as well, as they cannot obtain the economic rewards associated with sporting success. So far, however, new regulation initiatives have mainly been rejected as a sound way to control the clubs. According to the Danish Handball Federation, the clubs must learn to balance their books themselves. This being said, much evidence still points to the necessity of pushing the clubs towards better financial management. Even if new regulation is not put in place shortly, the Danish Leauge Clubs could learn from the UEFA initiatives and discus what appropriate steps are in need of being taken.

Methological note
In the 2009/2010 audit reports some clubs have had debt cancelled that is reported as income. To give a picture of the clubs' real life, these amounts, however, pulled out of both turnover and profit. Some clubs does not report net income. In case the net income could not be obtained from the clubs directly, it has been estimated. The real revenue average can thus vary a bit from the displayed figures.

Due to insolvency proceedings for GOG TGI Svendborg A/S and the folding of FCK Håndbold and AaB Håndbold audit data could not be obtained from these three clubs. Should they have been added to the data base, the overall picture would have been worse.

The Beijing Olympiad's achievement and legacy in global perspective

Mon, 24 Jan 2011 11:22:00 +0100

Introduction It is widely recognised and broadly agreed that the clearest example of a mega-event, sporting or otherwise, is provided by the modern Olympic Games, with another sporting spectacle, the FIFA World Cup [1] coming in second. There is nothing like the same consensus over what else, if anything, qualifies as a mega-event, how to identify mega-events, or how to basically characterise, distinguish and define ‘mega-event’. Still, the agreement which does exist provides a benchmark for categorising all events as ‘mega’ or otherwise, for deciding on the basic, or defining, characteristics of mega-events, and so for conceptualising ‘mega-event’ in general, or abstract, terms. Olympic Games are an appropriate starting point for coming up with the most useful notion of ‘mega-event’ for sociological, analytical and explanatory purposes. While, of course, there cannot be a correct definition of ‘mega-event’ (just as there cannot be a correct definition of anything), there may be a most useful one. There may be a most helpful, beneficial and productive way of defining ‘mega-event’ for the purpose of distinguishing and identifying mega-events, the first step in the process of studying, analysing and making sense of any particular example and of the phenomenon in general.
The Globalisational Approach
Well before the start of the twenty-first century, Olympic Games were mega-events, or more precisely mega-social events. As with social events broadly speaking, Olympic Games display three principal, or fundamental, dimensions: the economic, the political and the cultural; and as befits an event which warrants the label ‘mega’, Olympic Games have assumed for several decades a big, great, or abnormally large, economic, political and cultural presence [2]. What is more, and crucially, Olympic Games have not only been big, but also assumed the mantle of the biggest, perhaps the biggest possible [3], and perhaps even the biggest conceivable of all social events anywhere in the world. Olympic Games as mega-events will display certain basic, defining characteristics which they share with not only all other mega-events, but also all other mega-social phenomena, such as mega-cities, the significance of which has been indicated in one study as follows:

This paper examines the transformation of urban space in the peri-urban areas of Latin American mega-cities, further exacerbating the multi-jurisdictional political divisions that cover a single urban entity […]. It argues that previous approaches have failed to recognize that globally and nationally-derived economic development processes are often vested in these meta-urban peripheries […]. Much of the contemporary vibrancy and dynamics of Mexico City’s metropolitan development are occurring in ‘hot-spots’ in the extended periphery, which, to date, have rarely been considered an integral part of the mega-city. Yet these areas are also some of the principal loci of contemporary globalization processes. [4]

According to this, mega-cities, and especially ‘hot-spots’ within the extended periphery of them, are some of the principal loci of globalisation processes. Globalisation has been defined, of course, in many ways, some of the most cited and influential of which lend themselves, it seems to me, to the following distillation:

Globalization is the set of processes, whereby – facilitated by enhanced global flows of such things as industry, investment, individuals and information (Ohmae, 1990, 1995) – the world is becoming structurally (economically and politically) more integrated (see Baylis and Smith, 2004) and culturally (ideationally) more homogenized (cf. Berger and Huntington, 2002). The world is becoming, in other words, a ‘borderless’ (Ohmae, 1990), ‘single place’ (Robertson, 1992; Scholte, 2000). [5]

For me, globalisation is the process, or set of processes, through which the world is becoming a single global social (economic, political and cultural) place, or space [6]. The origins of globalisation lie in the West (or, more specifically, in Europe); the evolving globalised world is highly Westernised around (economic) market capitalism, (political) liberal democracy, and (cultural) individualism [7]; and the resulting single global social space is likely to be dominated by these features and their affiliated Western traits, albeit not necessarily in an unqualified manner:

Ideationally, globalization is the vehicle whereby the ‘Western cultural account’ [Axford, 1995; Meyer et al., 1987] is being globally diffused, if somewhat unevenly and erratically. Western cultural forms, expressions and items are being adopted, albeit at different speeds, more or less everywhere including throughout East Asia […]. The growing popularity of football (otherwise known as soccer) in East Asia matches what is occurring elsewhere in the world, and provides a highly instructive example of how the Western cultural account is being presented, or purveyed, to and acquired by a significant non-Western Other [. . .]. In East Asia as elsewhere, the Western cultural account is interacting with local cultures [. . .]. The results are syntheses of the global and the local [. . .]. [8]

Globalisation, market capitalism, liberal democracy, the Western cultural account, individualism and much else associated with the West, and especially with what some regard as continuing Western hegemony, imperialism and decadence (including such Western offerings as ‘excessive individualism’, consumerism, ‘the commodification of everything’, the Olympic Games, the Olympic Movement, and Olympism) are enjoying far from completely smooth, wholly uniform and universally endearing progress. While globalisation is probably inevitable and unstoppable, in the sense of a process which is leading to a single global social space, the content of globalisation is unsettled, as is therefore the economic, political and cultural character of the eventual single global social space. Economic globalisation appears to be proceeding at a faster rate than its political and cultural counterparts, notwithstanding any setbacks due to the global financial crisis which sprung up in 2008 and how globalisation, overall or in part, is facing widespread resentment, rejection and resistance. Globalisation is being constantly impeded and amended, not least because of the shifting, or declining, economic, political and cultural weight of theWest relative to the rest, and especially in comparison with those parts of the world centred on the BRIC Economies - those of Brazil, Russia, India and China [9]. Globalisation entails and depends upon acceptance, compliance and conformity at the local level, but the content of globalisation is in flux, and is being constantly shaped and re-shaped in interaction with the local – under the influence, impact and weight of local economics, politics and culture. Of course, not all local economics, politics and cultures have equal weight and so equal influence and impact on the content of globalisation. None the less, the West is not the only player involved, and its relative weight after all is declining. The content of globalisation is not singularly ‘Western’, and it is likely to become less and less so. Globalisation is being modified, revised and transformed at the local level – through accommodation, adaptation and ‘localisation’, ‘global localisation’ or ‘glocalisation’ – and at the global level itself through playback, feedback or interference from the local level. This is perhaps especially applicable to East Asia, and is perhaps especially apparent in matters surrounding mega-events. The statement above by Close and Askew about cultural globalisation, East Asia and football (the origins of which, of course, lie in the West, and more specifically in England) was made with regard to the 2002 FIFA World Cup finals, which were held in Japan and South Korea. But, it might have been made about globalisation overall, China and the Olympic Games vis-à-vis the 2008 Beijing event. It is to be expected that the distinctive ‘local’ culture, or cultures, of China will be far from simply swept aside and away by globalisation and the Western cultural account with the assistance of the Beijing Games. Instead, the ‘local’ will have made an appearance at, will have made its presence felt during, and will have imposed itself upon this sporting extravaganza; will have ensured that the Western cultural account content of globalisation is somewhat localized; and will to some extent be played back on, influencing, globalisation through the process of glocalisation. Still, this does not detract from the view of globalisation, as alluded to by Aguilar et al. (above), as the exemplar par excellence for illustrating and identifying mega-social phenomena in particular cases and in general, of whatever type or sub-type, due to its status as the supreme manifestation of the mega-social genre and, connectedly, its association with other major examples, including such mega-events as the FIFA World Cup, such mega-organisations as FIFA and the International Association of Athletics Associations (IAAA), and mega-cities. Not only mega-cities like Mexico City, but also mega-events like Olympic Games and the FIFA World Cup may act as principal loci of globalisation processes [10]. It may be that globalisation and Olympic Games as mega-social phenomena not only share certain basic, defining characteristics, but also share a close mega-social (economic, political and cultural) relationship, whereby each shapes and sustains, feeds into and feeds off the other; and whereby Olympic Games as principal loci of globalisation processes can be used to investigate and illuminate globalisation. This seems to be what John Short has in mind when he says:

The existence, extent, meaning and measurement of economic, political and cultural globalization have provided a rich and argumentative agenda for contemporary social theorising [see Short, 2001]. A discussion of the Games provides an opportunity to consider a very concrete example of globalization. The Games not only actualize some of the forces and many of the paradoxes of globalization, they also exemplify the complex intersections of cultural and political, as well as the more commonly studied, economic globalization. [11]

Globalisation, the Olympic Games and the social relationship, or interaction, between globalisation and the Games are mega-social phenomena, each of which is built around the three principal, intersecting dimensions of social life. The economic, political and cultural dimensions of Olympic Games intersect in a complex manner, especially so due to the way in which the Games ‘are embodied in at least three scales: global, national and local’, while having become since ‘their inauguration in 1896, […] increasingly global’ [12]. Short is primarily interested in how the ‘modern Summer Olympic Games are global spectacles, national campaigns and city enterprises’, at one and the same time; and thereby in how the Games are loci, or sites, of ‘connections between the global and the local’ in an era of globalisation [13]. The challenge for anyone trying to study, analyse and make sense of Olympic Games will be to clarify the complex intersections of their economic, political and cultural dimensions at and between the different levels of their embodiment, while taking into account how – reflecting the progress of globalisation – they have become and are becoming more globalised. Guided by Short, Olympic Games as social events occur, or are embodied, not only at the local level (of the city, the nation-state or whatever), but also at the global level, and as such are sites not only from which the local interacts with the global, but also at which this interaction takes place. Olympic Games are not only local social events, they are also global social events, or spectacles, and so entail an interaction between the local and the global at the local level itself. Olympic Games facilitate the presence of the global at the local level, the interaction of the global and the local at the local level, and consequently the direct, immediate influence and impact of the global – and so of globalisation – on the local at the local level (which is not to ignore how Olympic Games may also facilitate the influence and impact of the local on the global, and so on globalisation – see below). From this, certain questions arise. While Olympic Games are necessarily local events, are they necessarily global events? While currently, Olympic Games are global events, and under globalisation are assuming a greater and greater global presence, have they always been global events – even in this era of globalisation? And, what are the substantive, empirical and conceptual relationships between Olympic Games as global events, on the one hand, and the Games as mega-events, on the other? While currently Olympic Games are global spectacles, it does not necessarily follow that they have always qualified as such. Olympic Games may have only become global spectacles under globalisation, and perhaps only relatively recently under this process. Of course, while some Olympic Games may not qualify as ‘global’, they may none the less qualify as ‘mega’, depending on the meaning attached to the latter. However, it seems to me that if and when Olympic Games are global spectacles, then they might usefully - for sociological, analytical and explanatory purposes - be distinguished as ‘mega-events’; while, on the other hand, if and when Olympic Games are not global spectacles, then they might usefully be regarded as falling short of ‘mega-event’ definitional requirements. That is, it may be analytically useful to define ‘mega-social event’ in global terms; to distinguish a ‘mega-social event’ as one which is (by definition) necessarily global; to identify mega-social events with reference to their global presence, spread, or reach. This approach would be consistent both with viewing globalisation in particular as the primary example of a mega-social phenomenon, and with accounting for mega-social phenomena in general in terms of the advent and subsequent advance of globalisation. Thus, what I will call the globalisational approach to mega-social events hinges upon defining and distinguishing these occasions as global, global reach, or globalised economic, political and cultural phenomena; upon recognising the way in which they are principal loci, or sites, of globalisation, with which they have a close, intimate and mutually-shaping social relationship; and upon acknowledging the way in which they are major vehicles for the progress of globalisation, as well as (methodologically) for studying, analyzing and making sense of globalisation. The globalisational approach to mega-events in general and to Olympic Games in particular can be compared and contrasted with the alternative approaches of a range of prominent contributors to the study of the Games, some of whom none the less have hinted at the globalisational approach. Among the most notable writers in this regard is Maurice Roche [14]. In Mega-events and Modernity, Roche ‘explores the social history and politics of “mega-events”’ from the late nineteenth century to ‘the current crisis of the Olympic movement in world politics and culture’ by examining, for instance, ‘the ways in which these kinds of events have contributed to the meaning and development of “public culture”, “cultural citizenship” and “cultural inclusion/exclusion” in society, at both the national and the international levels’ [15]. For Roche:

The concept of ‘mega-events’ refers to specially to constructed and staged international cultural and sports events such as the Olympic Games and World’s Fairs (hereafter Expos). Mega-events are short-lived collective cultural actions (‘ephemeral vistas’; […]) which nonetheless have long-lived pre- and post-event social dimensions. They are publicly perceived as having an ‘extra-ordinary’ status, among other things, by virtue of their very large scale, the time cycles in which they occur, and their impacts. [16]

While Roche’s definition of ‘mega-event’ is a useful starting point for studying the phenomenon in general and Olympic Games in particular, it presents considerable operational difficulties given the issue of measuring ‘very large’, or for that matter ‘large’, and an event’s publicly perceived extra-ordinary status. Because of this, Roche’s definition is not readily amenable to distinguishing and identifying mega-events in practice, and therefore to studying, analysing and making sense of them. Still, Roche alludes to a way of obviating this impasse when he tells us that mega-event ‘genres have had an enduring mass popularity in modernity since their creation in the late 19th century and continue to do so in a period of globalization’. Roche draws attention to the relationship between mega-events and globalization by way of the temporal aspect of mega-events and their functional character, relevance and importance. For Roche, ‘the mega-event phenomenon’ pre-dates globalisation, while subsequently enduring under globalisation, in relation to which – along with such accompanying phenomena as ‘contemporary society’ and ‘modernity’, and in particular ‘late modernity’ – it is functional [17]. Roche argues that mega-events, due to especially, ‘but not exclusively, their temporal characteristics and what can be called their “dramaturgical” features and appeal’, constitute ‘resources for sustaining personal time structure in contemporary conditions that threaten this’. For Roche, ‘the main structures of meaning that continue to be associated with mega-events in modernity’ are functional in relation to personal and interpersonal ‘identity’. Roche claims that these structures are highly ‘relevant to the understanding of mega-events’ in that they help account for how mega-events functionally relate to, facilitate and support the ‘microsocial’ processes of ‘what phenomenological sociology refers to as the “life world” ’, on the one hand, and the ‘“macrosocial” systems’ that entail, for instance, globalisation processes, on the other. Mega-events have become functional in relation to both, and so bridge the microsocial and macrosocial spheres from within the intermediary ‘“mesosocial” sphere in contemporary society’ [18]. Roche tells us:

Mega-event genres were born in the late 19th century during a period of national building and empire building in the industrializing capitalist societies of the USA and Western Europe. This period has been [. . .] portrayed by Eric Hobsbawm [Hobsbawm and Ranger, 1992] as being characterized by a wave of ‘inventions of tradition’, and he refers to sports and expositions as leading examples of such cultural invention [. . .]. [The] enduring popularity and institutionalization of mega-event genres in national societies and in international and global society since that ‘early modern’ period derives from their social functions for elites and mass publics [. . .]. [The] periodic production of particular mega-events can be usefully understood as the production of intermediate ‘meso-sphere’ processes, involving socio-temporal ‘hubs’ and ‘exchanges’ in the economic, cultural and [other] ‘flows’ and ‘networks’ which can be said to contribute to the current development [. . .] of culture and society at the global level. It is on this basis that [. . .] mega-event movements such as the Olympic [Movement] can be usefully understood as [having] important [. . .] roles in the cultural aspects of contemporary global-level governance and institution building [see Roche, 2000, Chapter 7]. [19]

The ‘“mesosocial” sphere in contemporary society’ is ‘the intermediary sphere through which the life world, and its “microsocial” processes, is connected with “macrosocial” systems [. . .] and change’, where the ‘life world’ is the sphere of in particular ‘personal identity formation’ [20]; and the macrosocial sphere includes the activities and processes of ‘global-level governance and institution building’ as befits ‘global society’. Within the mesosocial sphere, mega-events constitute exchange hubs in the economic, political and cultural networks and flows of social life within and between the microsocial sphere and the macrosocial sphere. However, in so far as mega-events will not be the only exchange hubs within the mesosocial sphere, the question arises of how to distinguish them from the rest. Guided by Roche, mega-events can be identified by their very large scale and publicly perceived ‘extraordinary’ status [21]. But, if only because these two indicators, or measures, are difficult to operationally interpret and apply, what about instead taking mega-events to be the largest events, or to be extraordinarily large events, or to be events that are so large as to have a global presence, spread or reach? If mega-events are defined, distinguished and identified as being those events which have global reach – have been globalised – then they will be the only mesosocial sphere events which will also have a presence within the macrosocial sphere. Mega-events defined in accordance with this approach – the globalisational approach - will link the microsocial sphere and the macrosocial sphere by being present in both, and therefore will do so directly and immediately. Moreover, mega-events will not merely accompany globalisation, but will be instead integral features of this process. The globalisational approach to mega-events has been inferred by a few recent writers, including John Horne and Wolfram Manzenreiter in their assessment of the impact of the 2002 FIFA World Cup finals on the host countries, Japan and Korea [22], and Alan Tomlinson and Christopher Young in their account of the relationship between politics, culture and national identity, on the one hand, and what they refer to as global sports events, in particular the Olympics and the World Cup, on the other [23]. Horne and Manzenreiter focus on ‘the specific regional political economy of the 2002 World Cup; the role of sports mega-events in identity construction and promotion; and how such events are both constituted by and constitutive of globalization’ [24]. Presumably, if a mega-event is constitutive of globalisation, then it will be a global-reach event, or that is a ‘global event’ [25]. A mega-event will have simultaneously both a global and a local embodiment; and, while being a mesosocial sphere phenomenon in the first instance, a mega-event will have concurrently both a microsocial and a macrosocial presence. However, adopting the globalisational approach to mega-events may result in some of the events that Roche takes to be mega-events being left out of the frame. It may mean excluding all Expos as well as some FIFA World Cup finals, and even some Olympic Games. It cannot be assumed that a particular event will qualify as a mega-event merely because of its very large scale and publicly perceived ‘extraordinary’ status [26]; because of aspirations for it to qualify; or because its predecessors or successors qualify. From the globalisational standpoint, the earliest Olympic Games were not mega-events in that they did not attain the required global social reach. Indeed, even when judged with reference to Roche’s operational criteria, the earliest Games will not qualify as mega-events. Thus, for John Short, it was only at the 2000 Sydney Games, when there were athletes from 199 countries (or countries and territories [27]), and so ‘most countries of the world competed’, that the Olympic Games had become ‘truly global’ [28]. Although the first modern Olympic Games ‘was an important national event’, it ‘had limited international impact’. In the early years, the Games were not ‘a global phenomenon’, an ‘early limiting factor to the global diffusion of the Olympic Games [being] the cost and difficulty of international travel’. According to Short, it ‘took a long while for the Games to become global spectacles and the process is intertwined with [the] development of mass media, particularly television’. For Short, the ‘increasing globalization’ of the Games is closely connected with expanding television coverage. In 1960, when the Games were held in Rome, ‘CBS paid $660,000 for the right to fly film from Rome to New York, while Eurovision transmitted the first live coverage of the Games’. A total of 21 countries and territories received television coverage, a figure which increased ten-fold to 214 for the 1996 event held in Atlanta. In 2000, when they were held in Sydney, over 3.7 billion people watched the Games in 220 countries and territories. The ‘typical viewer’ watched the Games on eleven occasions, ‘resulting in a combined viewing audience estimated at 36 billion’. In 1972, when the Games were held in Munich, ‘less than 10% of the revenue of the Games came from television companies, but by Atlanta in 1996 this had increased to almost 40%’. Television coverage revenues have increased by an average of 30 per cent between events, ‘from $40 million in 1972 to $556 million in Atlanta. In a package deal, the NBC paid $3.5 billion to cover the Sydney Olympics, Athens, and Beijing as well as the winter Games of 2002 and 2006’. By the 2000 Games, television revenues constituted 55 per cent of all IOC’s total marketing revenue, with US television companies accounting for 60 per cent of all world-wide rights. In effect, the ‘Summer Games are now thoroughly corporatized, providing a huge global audience of consumers and a global opportunity to sell goods and services around the world’ [29]. The Olympic Games have acquired a huge global audience, which provides an attractive opportunity for corporations to increase their sales of goods and services and so profits. This provides in turn an incentive for corporations to invest – to become (highly influential, or indeed powerful) stakeholders – in the Games and the Olympic Movement. The huge global audience now provided by the Games has meant a boost not only for the marketing revenues of the International Olympic Committee (IOC), but also for the global economic presence, weight and clout of the Games and the Olympic Movement; while the same audience provides an attractive opportunity not only for economic players of various kinds and at various levels (such as at the nation-state level), but also for political players, perhaps especially at the nation-state level - for political regimes, governments and so on at this ‘local’ level of social life. Consequently, the Games’ huge global audience and corporate and political appeal have been rounded out by the Games’ global political presence, relevance and importance. If the early modern Olympic Games fell short of qualifying as mega-events, then this may reflect how globalisation either had still to get underway (as inferred by Roche) or was still in its early stages. It may be argued that globalisation has a long, centuries-old history, but none the less took off and rapidly progressed on a significantly higher plane during the 1960s, which therefore mark the advent of the distinctive era of globalisation. If so, then the earliest mega-events, sporting or otherwise, will have occurred at around the same time, during the 1960s. The first mega-event of any type may have been the 1964 Tokyo Olympics, the first Games to be staged in Asia; and the second mega-event may have been the 1966 FIFA World Cup finals, which were staged in England. Moreover, it could be that Olympic Games and the FIFA World Cup finals remain the only events that can be categorised as ‘mega-events’. While Olympic Games are probably the biggest (multi-sport) mega-events, World Cup finals are undoubtedly the biggest single-sport mega-events. Indeed, there is a good chance that the 2008 Beijing Games will be the greatest mega-event of all time, perhaps not only for now, but also for a long time to come (see below). Having said this, however, there is another contender for ‘the greatest mega-even of all time’ accolade. It is the Beijing Olympiad, depending on whether the socio-temporal [30] boundaries around the Olympics are re-drawn by looking beyond the spectacle and glare of the Games themselves to the pre-Games build-up, and perhaps in particular to the period following the close of the previous Games, given the social (economic, political and cultural) intimacy and integration entailed. According to Roche, mega-events are short-lived but have long-lived pre-event and post-event social dimensions [31]. But, this presumes too much, and perhaps imposes artificially exaggerated stages within what might otherwise - and more appropriately and usefully - be regarded as relatively long-lived mega-events. It precludes the possibility of mega-events being long-lived by covering more than the short-lived spectacles, extravaganzas and the like upon which they may well be centred. This possibility has been indicated in the case of Olympic Games:

A mega-event strategy unfolds over a considerable period of time; typically there is a decade between launching a bid and the closing ceremonies and, of course, the legacy of the event can last for many more years. To facilitate comparison [. . .], we divide the Olympic mega-events into three periods: the bid process, the organization period, and the legacy of the Olympics. [32]

An Olympiad is the four-year period between the close of one modern Summer Olympic Games and the close of the next, as exemplified by the interval between the closing ceremony of the 2004 Athens Games and the closing ceremony of the 2008 Beijing Games. If Olympiads rather than just the Games of Olympiads are regarded as mega-events, then this will mean of course that Olympic mega-events will follow on from each other in tandem, as an unbroken chain of abutting sporting mega-events, at least in so far as and for as long as (in accordance with the globalisational approach to mega-events) Olympiads remain global in stature. This is not to ignore how Olympiads do not follow on from each other in a neatly demarcated fashion, but instead flow into each other in various ways, in particular via the economic, political and cultural dimensions of social life through which they are inter-meshed. Following John Short (above), an indication, or measure, of the mega-even status of any Olympic Games or its encompassing Olympiad will be the number of competing countries and territories involved, there being 199 at the 2000 Sydney Games [Short, 2003]. Since 2000, there has been a significant increase in number that are eligible to send teams of competitors to Olympic Games through the IOC membership of their National Olympic Committees (NOCs), the result being that as of 2009 all the Member States of the United Nations had become eligible. Consequently, every UN-recognised (independent, sovereign) nation-state except for the Holy See has acquired the (albeit still conditional) right to send a team to the Games. There are 205 NOC members of the IOC, covering all 192 UN Member States plus thirteen other territories: Taiwan, or the Republic of China (ROC), which the IOC calls Chinese Taipei; the Palestinian territories, which the IOC calls Palestine; four US overseas territories (American Samoa, Guam, Puerto Rico, and United States Virgin Islands); three UK overseas territories (Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, and Cayman Islands); two Netherlands consitutent territories (Aruba and Netherlands Antilles); Hong Kong, a Special Administrative Region (SAR) of the People’s Republic of China (PRC); and Cook Islands, an associated state of New Zealand. Three NOCs joined the IOC during the 2004-8 Beijing Olympiad, these being from Marshall Islands (2006), Montenegro (2007) and Tuvalu (2007). Through the 205 NOCs, almost every (geo-politically defined) nation-state, country and territory and every (ethnically defined) nation was at least formally represented by a team of competitors at the 2008 Beijing Games. On these ground, it is reasonable to claim that the IOC, the Olympic Games and the Olympic Movement have reached global saturation point [33]. The clear signs are that the Beijing Games and Olympiad are mega-events; are the greatest mega-events of all time; and will remain the greatest mega-events for the foreseeable future. In particular, they are likely to be far greater mega-events than the follow-on 2008-12 London Olympiad and Games, although not so much because of the number and global coverage of the competing teams as of another consideration - that of the coming-out character of the Beijing Olympiad and Games. The Asian discourse on the Olympics, as discussed in The Beijing Olympiad: the Political Economy of a Sporting Mega-Event [34] focuses on the three Games that have been hosted by Asian cities - Tokyo (1964), Seoul (1988) and Beijing (2008) – and their three encompassing Olympiads, distinguishing these events from all others given the way in which they have certain similar and special features. The three Asian Olympic Games have been viewed as coming-out parties [35], and with some justification [36]. For me, each of the Asian Olympic Games and Olympiads can be regarded as a coming-party party in the sense of a coming-of-age celebration and rite de passage, whereas all other Olympic events, including the subsequent London ones (Olympiad and Games), for example, cannot. What is more, the Beijing Olympiad and Olympics as coming-out celebrations assumed far greater proportions than the earlier Asian Olympic events, in particular because of their global ramifications. The Beijing Olympiad and Games constitute a mega-event, a global-event and a coming-out party which is unprecedented, and which is unlikely to be matched, never mind superseded, for the foreseeable future, if not forever. The Tokyo and Seoul Games were about celebrating, showcasing and augmenting Japan’s and then South Korea’s economic development and maturation. The Beijing Olympiad and Games were about doing the same things vis-à-vis the surge of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), but in a more inclusive and more globally pertinent way than applies to either Tokyo or Seoul. As Jörn-Carsten Gottwald and Niall Duggan have put it:

the Beijing Olympics are a political spectacle which intends to create a facade of sustainable and equal economic growth in China which has created a new world power. However, looking beyond the smokescreen of ‘China’s coming out party’ you will see that many of the institutional structures needed to maintain this impressive growth such as a strong and independent media and legal system are absent or at best very weak. Beijing 2008 was an excellent opportunity to create or strengthen these much needed institutions. Unfortunately, this opportunity looks destined to be a missed opportunity. [37]

The Beijing Olympiad and Games were about celebrating, showcasing and augmenting the PRC’s emergence as a new world super-power, to paraphrase Gottwald and Duggan, or - to put it yet another way – as a new world order super-power [38]. The Beijing events were a celebration of the PRC’s coming out - or emergence - from its rigid socialist (Marxist-Leninist-cum-Maoist) shell, and of its re-emergence, re-birth or metamorphosis as a capitalist social formation and (political-economy) super-power within the post-Cold War new world order. One way of looking at the 2008 Games is that they were awarded (by the West) to Beijing as a reward for the PRC both coming outside and coming onside as a capitalist social formation; for the PRC having embraced mainstays of the Western cultural account and, above all, of Western-style capitalism (albeit with Chinese characteristics); for the PRC having peacefully, even meekly, given up its ideological struggle against capitalism and Cold War stand-off with the (victorious and vindicated) West; and for the PRC having more or less sealed the historical fate of historical materialism, the old world order, and the second phase of globalisation. The first phase of globalisation began with the imperialist expansion of the West (or, more accurately, of Europe) including into East Asia. The first phase gave way at around the time of the 1960-64 Tokyo Olympiad to the second phase, during which globalisation took off while, however, being constrained by the Cold War old world order. This second phase was a bridging stage, which gradually led during the 1984-92 Seoul to Barcelona Olympiads into the current third stage. The second phase of globalisation is perhaps most notable for the concluding, 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union. However, it also entailed the PRC’s Era of Reconstruction (1976-89), the PRC’s Dengist reforms (around the four modernisations), and Beijing’s decision to make its first bid to host an Olympic Games. The advent of the third phase of globalisation coincided with Beijing’s 1993 loss to Sydney of the right to host the 2000 Games. Beijing lost to Sydney by just two votes (out of a total of 88) in the final round of voting, after having won in the previous three rounds [39]. Eight years later, in July 2001 in Moscow, Beijing became the clear winner to host the 2008 Games, securing 44 of the 102 votes in the first round and 56 in the second and final round (when Toronto attracted 22 votes, Paris 18 and Istanbul nine). As inferred, what makes the 2004-8 Beijing Olympiad so extra special and such an extraordinarily huge mega-event is that it was a coming-out party not just for the PRC, but also for the world as a whole; for the so-called international community; and for the emerging global community. It was a celebration of the peaceful transition to the (if not completely peaceful and orderly) new world order in conjunction with that to the third stage of globalisation – the current stage. This third stage is marked by the way in which the Western-led drive towards a single global social (economic, political and cultural) space has been greatly assisted and far more firmly secured by the Eastern-socialist bloc’s – including the PRC’s – embrace in varying degrees of market capitalism, liberal democracy and the Western cultural account centred on individualism, that doctrine which underpins the global human rights regime (GHRR), for instance [40]. Everyone was invited to join in the 2004-8 global community coming-out party, and to enjoy especially this mega-event’s climax, the 2008 Games spectacular. Of course, far from everyone took up the invitation. Apart from the large number of people who were unable to participate in the extravaganza even via mass media, there were many people who refused, resisted, or tried to spoil the party. In the run up to the Games, the Olympiad was used as an opportunity to draw attention to and protest about a range of internally oriented issues, including the PRC’s human rights record, treatment of minorities, lack of (liberal) democracy, suppression of separatist movements, and ‘occupation’ of Tibet. Of course, the prospective party-poopers did not stand a chance:

It may be the world’s premier sporting extravaganza, but China is turning the Beijing Olympics into the biggest security operation in history. There will be 100,000 police on duty in Beijing during the 17 days of the Games, backed by 100,000 members of China’s armed forces, 300 specialists in nuclear, biological and chemical warfare, fleets of airplanes, helicopters and warships, and 600,000 ‘security volunteers’, including retirees, students and neighbourhood committees. Surface-to-air missile launchers are already positioned around prime Olympic sites, such as the ‘Bird’s Nest’ stadium and the ‘water cube’ aquatics centre. Unmanned security drones will patrol the skies above Olympic sailors near the naval port of Qingdao. Access to Olympic Games sites will be monitored with security checks, X-ray machines, metal detectors, full-body scanners, electronic passes and biometric keys, such as fingerprint and iris scanning […]. ‘After a hiatus of 150 or more years, China is preparing once again to play on the world stage a role proportional to the importance of its size, history and geography’, said Frank Ching, a Hong Kong-based journalist and columnist. ‘The Games are now seen as the ‘coming out’ of China, serving as a rebirth, as it were, after generations of foreign dominance and domestic oppression’. And China’s authoritarian leaders are not about to let anyone spoil their party.’ [41]

But, the PRC was far from being alone in its determination to prevent its celebration from being exploited by dissidents. Lined up alongside the PRC’s state apparatus were the full gamut, weight and influence of all the other state apparatuses around the world, in unison with the world’s 205 NOCs, not to mention of course the IOC, and the whole of the Olympic Movement. In turn, the alliance of the Olympic Movement and state apparatuses enjoyed the support of the business community, both within the PRC and everywhere else. In turn again, this global-reach, political-economy social compact was able to bask in the tacit, if not active, support of the bulk of the world’s population. The spoilers put in an appearance, and perhaps added to the spectacle, but any free-Tibeters and the like were far from able to compete with the global-reach popularity of Olympic Games in general and appeal of the 2008 Beijing event in particular. The popularity of Olympic Games is simply too strong, perhaps especially so in the post-Cold War new world order. After all, where else can small (the least powerful) countries and territories, nation-states and nations, NOCs and governments so spectacularly challenge, defeat and humiliate the big (the most powerful) ones? According to John Short, while the Games ‘have broadened in participation’, both ‘athletic success and the hosting of the Games reflect the global inequalities in wealth’. Quite simply, ‘richer countries can send more athletes and can afford the necessary expenditure in sports development and training that ensures success’ [42], the outcome being their disproportionate success at the Games when judged in terms of their medals tally. Of the 927 medals won at the 2000 Sydney Games, 357 were won by just five countries: 96 by the USA, 88 by Russia, 59 by the PRC, 58 by Australia and 56 by Germany. Fifty per cent (463) of the medals were won by competitors from Europe and North America; while just over 2 per cent (50) were won by those from sub-Saharan African teams. A contributing factor, of course, is hosting the Games, as reflected in the final medal table of the Beijing Games, when the PRC came out top with 51 gold medal and 101 medals in all, beating the USA with 36 gold medals and 110 overall, followed by Russia, Great Britain, Germany, Australia, Korea, and Japan (which won just nine gold medals and 25 medals overall) [43]. In effect:

Success at the Olympic Games reflects wealth and national spending on sports. Countries with few resources and little spending are less successful [. . .]. Even as participation in the Games becomes more global, success at the Games becomes more uneven. In effect, the Games reinforce the unequal distribution of resources in the world by the unequal participation of different countries and their unequal success in standing on the medal podium. [44]

Perhaps, but measuring an NOC’s, country’s or territory’s success at a Games with reference to its medals tally without taking into consideration other factors is, for some commentators, misleading. For instance, the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) has claimed that ‘the traditional measure of medals as a “raw score” [does] not take into account the population of the competing country, a possible factor in the ability of nations to field medal winning athletes’ [45]. The ABS has published ‘an alternative view of the traditional Olympic medal tally to take into account the populations of competing nations’, and at the 2004 Athens Games the result was a remarkable turn around in favour of the smaller countries. Whereas in the raw score final medal table the USA came out top with 36 gold medals and 102 medals overall, followed by China, Russia, Australia, Japan, Germany, France, Italy, South Korea, Great Britain and Cuba (with nine gold medals and 27 medals overall), in the ABS’s medal table by world population, the Bahamas, Norway, Australia, Hungary and Cuba occupy the top five places. There is probably nowhere else but at the Olympic Games where Cuba (itself in the process of jumping on the bandwagon of giving way to globalisation and capitalism), with its population of just 11,323,000, can so spectacularly beat the USA, which – despite its population of 297,031,000 - achieved only 34th place in the ABS table. The Cuban NOC, state apparatus, government and people will have eagerly grasped the next opportunity, that provide by the Beijing mega-event, but would have been disappointed with its relatively poor showing of only two gold medals, 24 medals overall, and 28th place in the raw medal table. There is no doubt that Cuba is now looking forward to and preparing hard for the 2012 London Games, just like all the other 204 territories with NOC membership of the IOC. All the signs are that the 2012 Games will be a mega-event in the globalisational sense, while not being anything like as great an occasion as the 2008 Beijing Games, which were a coming-out party when the London Games will not be, at least not in anything like the same sense. The London Games will be a party of sorts, but will be a relatively sober, less heady affair. The Beijing Olympiad and Games constitute a mega-event, global-event and coming-out party of unprecedented and unlikely-to-be-repeated proportions, at least for a long time to come. The Beijing event was and is likely to remain extra special in that it was a coming-out party not just for China, but also for the world as a whole; for the international community; and for the emerging global community. It was a celebration of the transition to the new world order in conjunction with that to the current third stage of globalisation, marked by a major advance in the Western-led drive towards a single global social (economic, political and cultural) space. While the 2008-12 Olympiad will be mega-event in the globalisational sense, it will be conducted in the shadow of the greatest mega-event, sporting or otherwise, so far and perhaps for a very long time to come: the 2004-8 Beijing Olympiad and Games. This is not to ignore or to diminish the way in which the London mega-event will continue the work, so to speak, of the Beijing extravaganza by variously promoting globalisation towards a single global social space primarily around the Western-based doctrines of capitalism, liberal democracy and individualism, closely articulated as these are, have become and are increasingly becoming with the Olympics - the Games and Olympiads themselves, the Olympic Movement, and that other Western-based doctrine, Olympism. The Regional Legacy of the Beijing Games and Olympiad
One way of summing up the decision to award the 2008 Games to Beijing is to say that it reflects how, more generally, ‘awarding Games to facilitate or reward reintegration into the world community has been an IOC objective’ [46]. In the particular case of China, however, reintegration into the world community has been accompanied by the withering of the old world order around the bi-polar division and Cold War conflict between a Western, capitalist camp, on the one hand, and an Eastern, communist bloc, on the other. The 2008 Games were awarded to Beijing as a reward for China being especially instrumental in bringing about the transition to the new world order, and concomitantly in facilitating the current, third stage of globalisation process towards a single global social space primarily around (Western-style) market capitalism. The transition has been marked, perhaps above all, by the emergence, or re-emergence, of China as a major, pivotal political-economy player on both the regional and the global planes, replacing Japan regionally and rivalling the USA globally. As India’s Business Standard has put it:

As advertisements go, [the Beijing Games were] a barely concealed attempt to send out an unequivocal message that the Olympics are really the trumpets that herald the arrival of a new power on the global stage. China has used the occasion entirely to its advantage. There were an unprecedented 79 heads of state and governments [sic] who attended. They were there to cheer their teams, but also for China’s formal coming-out party. [47]

In my view, all those who attended, watched or otherwise celebrated the 2008 Games, the culmination of the greatest mega-event of all time, were variously participating in the world’s coming-out party – the world’s emergence from the stifling old world order stand-off. Business Standard draws a comparison between the 2008 Games and both the 1936 Berlin Games, ‘which performed a similar role for Nazi Germany (which was raising its head after the bankruptcy that followed World War I)’, and the 1964 Tokyo Games, a celebration of Japan’s rise ‘from the ashes of World War II’. Of note is how like China presently, Germany and Japan ‘had crossed into the category of upper-middle-income countries, with per capita incomes of $3,000 or more’; how similarly ‘the Soviet Union (Moscow 1980) and South Korea (Seoul 1988) were also typical upper-middle-income countries when they hosted the Olympics’; and how, furthermore, ‘Europe’s per capita income when the modern Olympic Games were born in 1896 was also about $3,000’. Business Standard concludes: ‘Clearly, there is a level of development at which countries acquire the capabilities needed to join the club of modern industrial nations, and also the ambition to show off’ [48]. This argument has been taken up by Suman Bery, for whom the ‘Beijing Olympics commemorate China’s arrival as a near-developed country’. Thus:

A glance at the World Bank’s [1 July 2008] estimates of 2007 per capita Gross National Income (GNI) […] shows China at 132nd position at $2360, while India at $950 holds a lowly 160th rank. By way of comparison, per capita GNI at purchasing power parity exchange rates from the same source reveals a figure for China of $5370 (rank 119) while that of India is $2740 (rank 152). [China] today is at roughly the same level of per capita income as other past ‘emerging’ hosts [of ‘coming out’ party Games] such as Mexico, Japan, South Korea and even Italy. [49]

According to Bery, the real per capita GDP of Germany at the time of the 1936 Berlin Games was $4451; of Italy during the 1960 Rome Games was $5916; of Japan in 1964 (Tokyo Games) was $5668; of Mexico in 1968 (Mexico City Games) was $4073; and of South Korea in 1988 (Seoul Games) was $7621. Bery tells us that by 2007, the ‘Chinese [real] per capita income […] would have been around $5375, placing it almost exactly where Japan and Italy were in the 1960s’ [50]. Referring to, in particular, ‘the four-hour opening ceremony of the Beijing Olympics’, Business Standard suggests that while it would have ‘left no one in [Asia in] any doubt […] as to what modern China is capable of’ […], most of [the USA] would have been asleep’ [51]. However, this assumption about television audiences beyond Asia appears to be misguided, or at least misleading. According to estimates by Nielsen (the marketing and media information company), the Beijing Games attracted a television a total audience of 4.7 billion (70 per cent of the world’s population) over the 17 days from 8 to 24 August 2008, ‘setting a new viewing record for an Olympic Games’ [52]. The audience for the whole of the 2004 Athens Games was 3.9 billion, and that for the 2000 Sydney Games was 3.6 billion. Of China’s 1.3 billion people, around 94 per cent watched some of the television coverage, as did 94 per cent of people in South Korea and (on the other side of the Pacific) 93 per cent in Mexico. In total, more than 2 billion people, or almost a third of the world’s population, watched the opening ceremony. The ‘highest audience […] for the opening ceremony was in the Asia-Pacific, where more than five in 10 people tuned in, followed by Europe, where 30 per cent of the population watched, and North America, at 24 per cent’ [53]. Of note is how in this account the region to which the term ‘Asia-Pacific’ refers is that region which is otherwise frequently labelled either ‘Pacific-Asia’ or ‘East Asia’ [54], and so which constitutes the Asian (or western) section of the Asia-Pacific as more inclusively demarcated by a range of alternative sources, including the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum [55]. East Asia is widely regarded as having two sub-regions, Southeast Asia and Northeast Asia [56]. Southeast Asia covers the ten Member States (countries) of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) plus East Timor (Timor-Leste), while Northeast Asia covers China [57], Japan, North Korea, South Korea and perhaps one or both of Mongolia and Russia, or at least Siberia [58]. The twenty one Member Economies (or countries and territories) of APEC include seven from Southeast Asia (Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Viet Nam); five from Northeast Asia (Hong Kong, Japan, People’s Republic of China, Russian Federation, South Korea and Chinese Taipei (Taiwan); five from the Americas, or eastern Pacific Rim (Canada, Chile, Mexico, Peru and the USA); and three from Oceania, or the southern Pacific Rim (Australia, New Zealand and Papua New Guinea) [59]. In my view, the most appropriate and useful approach to defining ‘Asia-Pacific’ is that guided by APEC’s membership, while including the whole of East Asia [60]. In East Asia, not surprisingly, ‘China had the highest percentage of people tuning into the opening ceremony’ of the 2008 Games, while 44 per cent of people in South Korea, 43 per cent of people in Greece, and a similarly high percentage of people in Australia watched. Nielsen claims that ‘Viewing levels were also impressive in the U.S., where […] 65 million people watched the opening ceremony’ [61]. According to Nielsen, the variation in viewing levels ‘across regions and markets’ was affected by ‘time zone and broadcast time differences’ [62]. However, the way in which similar proportions to the 94 per cent of Chinese that watched some of the 2008 Games in South Korea and Mexico, together with the how in the USA ‘the Summer Games ranked as the most-viewed TV event ever, with a total audience of 211 million and an average daily audience of 27 million people’, and how Australia registered a similarly high percentage of viewers for the 17 days overall [63], indicates that on both the western side and the eastern side of the Asia-Pacific region there was comparable interest in the event. Conceivably, television viewing figures may be taken as the single best indicator of the status and stature of 2008 Beijing Games as a mega-event, and indeed as the crowning of the greatest mega-event and biggest coming-out party of all time. But also conceivably, a measure of the Beijing Games and Olympiads as mega-events lies in their legacy; that is, the events’ post-Games (social) consequences and (sociological) significance. According to William Kelly:

All Games continue to exist after the fire is extinguished through the required work of completing and publishing official and unofficial records of the Olympiad (reports, documentaries, etc.), fashioning a retrospective theme and narrative, protecting and burnishing the public memories, and engaging broadly in the culminating project of legacy-making. A legacy may be a retrospective refashioning, but the end game of a Games era is a clash of competing legacies as well as a contentious accounting of the multiple after-effects […]. [64]

As if to concur, Cindy Sui, writing for New Kerela, the India-based internet news portal, suggests that whether the 2008 Games have ‘left a good or [a] bad impression depends on who you talk to’ [65], adding:

In a year or two, what people will remember might be little more than the star athletes. The vast majority of people worldwide watch the Games more for the sports than to learn about the host country or the political, human rights and other issues […]. China, however, feels the Olympics [have] been a huge boost the country. ‘The Beijing Olympic Games are a milestone in the course of the great reinvigoration of the Chinese nation’, said a commentary Saturday in the government’s Xinhua news agency. ‘The success of the Beijing Olympic Games has also reflected the great achievements China has scored after three decades of reform and opening up’ […]. ‘Through the Beijing Olympic Games, the world has had a better knowledge of what China is like - a country that makes constant progress, emphasizes friendship and harmony, keeps its promises, and respects all international rules’, said the Xinhua commentary. [66]

Echoing Xinhua’s optimism, Gustaaf Geeraerts (Professor of International Relations and Vice-Dean of the Faculty of Economic, Social and Political Sciences, Vrije Universiteit Brussel) is reported to have suggested that the ‘success of the Beijing Olympic Games has showcased China’s strong capabilities, boosted mutual understanding between the Chinese and foreign citizens, and will surely stimulate its further opening up’ [67]. Similarly, Asia One, Singapore is reported to have claimed that ‘the Olympics have helped to open up Chinese society despite reported human rights abuses linked to the Games’ [68]. In contrast, the Los Angeles Times has been less sanguine: the ‘Beijing Games are over, declared a resounding success. The question now is whether China will finally loosen up or justify its authoritarianism’ [69]; and Jaquelin Magnay, writing in the Sydney Morning Herald, has said:

These were the Coming Out Games for a prospective world power that was supposed to open up to the rest of the world. But […] China was exposed to international scrutiny of its social interactions at levels that upset the ruling Communist Party […]. Throughout all of August, the organisers were battling a Western media that was not focusing on the sport, but rather the country’s political regime, its human rights record, oppression of protesters, restrictions on reporting, brutality of photographers […]. From its initial enthusiasm of giving the Games to China to become an instrument of great social change, the [IOC] was forced to the sidelines and became a bit-part player […]. Time will tell if these Games are remembered more for […] China’s pretence of giving its citizens a voice. [70]

Interest in the legacy of the 2008 Beijing Games has concentrated on two dimensions of social change – one internally oriented and the other externally oriented. Internally, the focus of attention has been on China’s authoritarianism, citizenship and human rights. Externally, the focus has been on China’s ‘opening up’ through its relations with the rest of the world at various levels, including the individual (with foreigners), the international (or inter-nation-state), the regional (especially within East Asia), and the global. In the area of human rights, which drew considerable attention before and during the Games, there is broad agreement among observers at least outside China that the Games have had little or no effect [71]. The consensus is that the Games themselves have not had much of an impact on China’s human rights profile, nor consequently on that of East Asia or on the global human rights regime (Close and Askew, 2004). Of course, this does not mean that there are no signs whatsoever of a shift in China’s human rights record, only that the Beijing Games and Olympiad have made little difference. After all, as of 16 November 2009, of the 18 UN human rights instruments that are available for ratification by Member States, the PRC had ratified eight - International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD); International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR); Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT); Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW); Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC); Optional protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict CRC-OPAC; Optional protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography CRC-OPSC; and Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD). This number compares with only five ratifications by the USA, which is just one more than North Korea’s tally, the same number as Somalia’s, one less than Iran’s, four less than Japan’s, and eight less than South Korea’s [72]. Still, while the citizens of China may have scarcely benefited from the 2008 Games in terms of their human rights, they may have benefited in another way, in that ‘Beijing Olympic organizers say they made a profit out of hosting [the] Games’. According to figures released ‘by the government audit bureau, $2.8 billion was spent on organizing and staging the Games, including the Paralympic Summer Games that followed’, whereas by approaching a year later the Games had generated an income of $3 billion, ‘leaving a profit of $176 million.’ [73]. At the same time, however, some both inside and outside China will have benefited far more than others in economic terms: ‘Sponsors of the Beijing Olympics have spent hundreds of millions of dollars for 16 days in the spotlight and they reckon it was money well spent to get a foothold in the huge Chinese market’ [74]. None the less, there appears to be broad agreement that, apart from what might be called short-term revenue gains, there will be little or no ‘long-term economic impact of the Games on Beijing and China overall’ [75]:

Virtually every country that has hosted an Olympics since World War II saw its GDP growth drop - in some cases, sharply - in the year following their respective Olympics […]. Most economists, however, argue China will avert the Olympics curse. ‘Fears of a post-Olympics slump are overblown’, says HSBC economist Frederic Neumann. ‘China is a $4 trillion economy, and in the larger context, the games aren’t terribly important for the economy as a whole. We don’t foresee a slump by any means’. Beijing’s contribution to national GDP, and its population as a proportion of national population are insignificant, particularly when compared with other Olympic host cities in recent decades […], points out UBS economist Jonathan Anderson. [76]

As Dinah Gardner has put it, the Olympic Games were ‘only a small blip in China’s grand scheme - now it is simply back to business as normal’ [77]. That is, argues Xiao Gongqin, a Shanghai Normal University professor of history, the Games were ‘a driving force to push China forward but it is still within the scope of [the] existing development system’ [78]. Economics aside, however, the people of China were ‘enthused with a vibrant sense of national pride’ [79], and consequently Xu Wu (a professor of journalism at Arizona State University) has prophesised, ‘Post-Olympics China, at least in the first one or two years, will be marked with triumphant glory and renewed ambition’ [80]. Accordingly, on ‘the political front there is a general consensus with both Chinese and foreign observers that the success of the Olympics has significantly bolstered domestic support for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)’ [81], as a result of which, Xiao Gonqin suggests, ‘the Chinese government’s credibility, prestige and authority will reach the highest point ever’ [82]. China’s Olympic fever has been used to help account for how a Pew Research Centre survey a few weeks before the 08 August 2008 opening of the Beijing Games found that 86 per cent of Chinese people had ‘a positive view of their country and the economy (and thus the government) – ranking China the most satisfied out of 24 nations’ [83]. Gardner reports how in the survey, 93 per cent of Chinese people believed the Olympics would ‘improve China’s international image’, notes how Xu Wu has argued that through ‘the Olympic mirror China certainly saw a strong, proud, and magnificent image of itself’, an ‘image [which] will bury a long-endured painful memory’. For Xu Wu, the ‘collective sentiment of post-Olympics Chinese will be more redeemed, more relaxed, and thus more “normal”’ [84]. In particular, Xu Wu suggests, the Games provided ‘a confidence boost that may help China open up further’. In Gardner’s view, China successfully used ‘the sports extravaganza’ as ‘a gateway to gaining international recognition’:

‘We used to have a very sad nationalism because we struggled through a lot of humiliation and setbacks during the last 100 years’, says Xiao [Gonqin]. ‘And that is not healthy because it has made us unconfident and overly sensitive. The Olympic games shows that China has already been accepted and acknowledged internationally […]. Chinese people’s confidence is boosted and our nationalism has become more optimistic, healthy and mature’. On a global scale, the Olympics have also fuelled the government’s world power aspirations, says Professor Edward Friedman, a China expert at the University of Wisconsin. ‘The goal of the CCP internationally is to establish China as a great power at least the equal of the US’, he says. ‘So far, the [Party] should feel that the Beijing games, from the facilities to the Chinese team’s performance, have succeeded in moving China ahead in its preferred direction’. [85]

The boost provided by the 2008 Games to China’s national pride, confidence and assertiveness appears to have had not only internal, but also external ramifications. Externally, it has had an impact at both the regional and global levels, in particular through its spill-over effect on the Olympic Movement itself. As William Kelly has put it:

the Olympic Movement is a global formation of governance, events, and political economy […]. The Olympic Movement is really a crucible of localism, nationalism, regionalism, and globalism. Struggles to define and direct Olympic aims, events, properties, and agendas take place within and among cities and national sports federations, among nation-states of world regions, and across the IOC membership. In the case of Japan, the support for its bid has been shored up by a national anxiety about the political and economic challenge of its rival East Asian superpower, China. [86]

The legacy of the Beijing Games has included the impact of this mega-event on Tokyo’s bid for the right to host the 2016 Games [87]. In the run up to the IOC’s decision in October 2009 on the 2016 Games, William Kelly examined the circumstances surrounding and background to the Tokyo bid [88]. He has emphasised the bid’s ‘embeddedness’ both in the ‘jockeying for global city preeminence’ and in ‘East Asian regional politics’, and claims that in the build-up to the result of the bid the Japanese people were ‘feeling anxious about the balance of power and prestige in both spheres’ – in, that is, both the global sphere and the regional sphere. For Kelly, any applicant or candidate city must be attuned ‘to ongoing Games cycles’, which in the case of Tokyo’s 2016 bid ‘required a triangulation between’ the ‘long and fraught Sino-Japanese relationship’ and the competitive London-Tokyo relationship over each city’s global financial centre ambitions. He argues that Japan viewed the 2008 Beijing Olympics ‘with one eye towards the upcoming Games in London and the other towards its own bid to return the 2016 Summer Games to Tokyo’. Japan’s reactions to the Beijing Games were ‘decidedly mixed’, ranging ‘from admiration to anxiety’. This was in part ‘based on the deeply ambivalent Sino-Japanese relationship, which some Japanese leaders feel is replacing the US-Japan relationship as the country’s most problematic bilateral relation’. The Beijing Games, precisely because of their success and impact on China’s self-confidence in relation to the rest of the world, caused concern in the East Asian region, and perhaps above all in Japan. The Japanese people responded ambivalently to the Beijing spectacle:

Forty-four years after the first Asian Olympic Games in Tokyo, Japan still feels that the region is less than fully acknowledged by the IOC and the Olympic Movement, and the country took satisfaction in a third Asian nation [following Japan in 1964 and South Korea in 1988] joining the host list. Japanese popular and press coverage of the Opening and Closing Ceremonies was glowing, and the architecture and organization of the Games were generally well-reviewed. But the massive economic resources and the oppressive political coordination of the Chinese government drew harsh criticism and stirred deep nervousness about Japan’s ability to contend with China’s growing clout in the region. [89]

On the one hand, Japanese people tend to share an Asian identity with China in relation to the rest of the world, as a result of which they were well disposed towards Beijing hosting the 2008 Games, and were then highly impressed with the event itself. Thus, ‘the statements by Japanese officials and the coverage by the Japanese media [indicate] a genuine admiration for the smooth logistical efficiencies of the overall production of the Games and the beauty of architecture and performances that foreground Chinese but more generally East Asian competencies and aesthetics’ [90]. On the other hand, the award of the 2008 Games to Beijing followed by the August 2008 extravaganza itself served to sharply emphasise China’s growing presence and power on the world stage, and associated power within (East) Asia, in particular in relation to Japan. Consequently, Japanese people’s admiration for China and the Beijing Games was tempered by their sense of nervousness over China’s growing political-economy weight and military might [91]:

Japanese public opinion and media commentary […] understood the subtext of China’s sloganeering of a ‘one hundred year dream’ to mount the Olympics. To many Japanese, the phrase was a thinly veiled code for an end to ‘one hundred years of national humiliation’ and a clear reference to the Western and Japanese aggressions that preceded the PRC era. At the same time, the implied belligerence stirred deep anxieties in Japan about its ability to respond to the growing economic and [political] power of China. [92]

According to Kelly, in any Games timeline, or stages through which all Olympics pass, ‘there is interplay of at least four levels of political and economic interests and ideologies that shape the direction and eventual outcome of bidding and hosting’:

There are local agendas, nationalist sentiments, regional rivalries, and global ambitions. All [were] on display in the case of Tokyo’s efforts to secure the 2016 Games […]. At the local level, the bid [was] deeply enmeshed in the political economy of metropolitan development and in the populist bravado of [Tokyo’s mayor Ishihara Shintarō]. [93]

Thus, the Tokyo bid was ‘shaped by - and buffeted by - the local politics of metropolitan development’, while also there was ‘an effort to create an Olympic narrative with strong nationalist undertones’ [94]. Kelly explains:

The current malaise in Japan is wide and deep. It is felt by the most fanatical rightwing militants who rue Japan’s pacifism and weak patriotism, by the broad mainstream population who are losing confidence in government competence and are facing massive retrenchment in secure employment, and by progressives on the left, who are gravely concerned about the spectrum of social problems, rising militarism eroding the Constitution’s peace provision, and lack of national political vision. [In the wake of] the collapse of the speculative bubble in [1991, the] 1990s were tagged the ‘lost decade’ but [this] decade […] is reaching twenty years in duration, and the country has yet to find its way out of its collective angst. [95]

Kelly notes that the 1964 Tokyo Olympic Games stand out ‘in national memory as a peak moment of collective accomplishment’. They are a poignant reminder of Japan as a ‘nation rising from the material and moral devastation of wartime defeat and mobilizing to produce a mega-event that symbolized domestic resolve, national recovery, and international acceptance’. In the case of Tokyo’s bid for the 2016 Games, there was a ‘very pointed deployment of a rhetoric of “reviving the 1964 Olympic spirit” in order to resuscitate national confidence and redress the widespread pessimism of the present moment’. At the time of the bid, there was a ‘sense of decline’, which moreover was ‘aggravated by fear of China’s dynamism, on the one hand, and a frustration with lingering subordination’ to the U.S.A., on the other. While many Japanese found the ‘strident neo-nationalism of mayor Ishihara […] repugnant’, most harked ‘back nostalgically to the legacy of 1964 as impetus for a renewal of the same national spirit and international acclaim’. Kelly argues that the supporters of Tokyo’s bid for the 2016 Games were ‘gambling that the potential gains at the local and global levels [would] justify the enormous costs to the national government and the risks of aggravating East Asian regional tensions by an “Ishihara” Tokyo Games’. These tensions are far from being confined to the relationship between Japan and China:

much of the nationalist sentiment that fuels Japanese supporters of Tokyo’s bid is embedded in the long-term and contemporary rivalries in East Asia – vis-à-vis China, but also in response to the serious tensions on the Korean peninsula. At least since the 1950s, when the IOC confronted the two-China issue, the politics of East Asia have been played out in the Olympic Movement. Although it is often said that the East Asian countries have only recently been given proper standing and importance in the Olympic Movement, it has long been the world region that most directly confronts the IOC with the fundamentally political nature of its mission. As national entities, as national sports federations, and as host cities, Japan, South Korea, North Korea, China, and Taiwan have been locked in a wary embrace, allies in their quest for Olympic parity, but often bitter rivals in their competition for Olympic acknowledgement and prestige. Thus, the Tokyo Bid Committee [was] at pains to distinguish its application from the [2008] Games even as it [appealed] to the growing significance of East Asia as a region, economically and ideologically, in the IOC’s vision of the Olympic future. [96].

It is the tension, conflict or contradiction between, on the one hand, Japan, China and the rest of East Asia increasingly sharing a distinct identity and sense of common, collective destiny in relation to the rest of the world and, on the other hand, the way in which the same political-economy players are locked in deeply rooted rivalries and antagonisms that provides the key to understanding much about decisions and developments within East Asia and the Asia-Pacific, including much about Olympic bids and prevailing levels of regional coherence and cohesion, regionalisation and regional integration. William Kelly suggests that from the ‘perspective of IOC geopolitics, the sequence of Sydney 2000, Athens 2004, Beijing 2008, and London 2012 leads prevailing wisdom to assume that the 2016 must be in the Americas - either Chicago in the north or Rio de Janeiro in the south’. Indeed, Tokyo was unsuccessful in its bid to host the 2016 Olympic Games. This honour went to Rio de Janeiro. It went for the first time to a South American city, and for first time to a country in the southern hemisphere other than Australia, but none the less to yet another (like China) rapidly emerging market in yet another (like East Asia) rapidly emerging region within the global political economy. The choice of Rio fits into a pattern also in so far as, to paraphrase William Kelly, awarding Games to reward or facilitate integration into the world community, or global political economy, is an IOC objective, one result being that Games become coming-out parties. The 2012 London Games aside, it is as if the Olympic torch has been passed from one coming-out party (the 2008 Beijing Games) for one BRIC economy (the PRC) to another (the 2016 Rio Games) for a second BRIC economy (Brazil) [97]. In the mean time, in 2010, South Africa hosted the biggest single-sport mega-event, the FIFA World Cup finals, awarded to South Africa as if in recognition of the country’s rapid development among the BRICSAM nation-states (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, ASEAN and Mexico) [98]. Perhaps, in effect, the way is being prepared for South Africa to host the Olympic Games, even as early as 2020:

organizers of South Africa’s 2010 World Cup think a successful tournament could lead to a bid for the 2020 Summer Olympic Games […]. Organizing committee chief executive officer Danny Jordaan [has said] ‘the IOC decided to give South America its first Olympics, so the only continent now without an Olympics is the African continent and therefore I think it’s something that the IOC certainly will have to begin to think about’. Jordaan said he could envision Johannesburg, Cape Town or Durban bidding along with Egypt for the 2020 Games. [99]

As well as a bid from a South African city for the 2020 Games, a bid has been signalled on behalf of Tokyo [100]. However, Tokyo may well be disappointed again if Danny Jordaan has his way, and in so far as a South African Games would have the lure of a further coming-out party, a further reward for – as well as to further facilitate – South Africa’s integration into the global political economy, and doing so as if lighting the way for the rest of Africa.
Conclusion
Whatever motivates and shapes any bid by Tokyo for the 2020 Games, Tokyo’s bid for the 2016 Games was affected by (if William Kelly is to be believed) Japan’s anxiety about China, fuelled as this was by the 2008 Games. Still, it is likely that neither the Beijing Games nor any subsequent Olympics-related event will have much influence in the long-term on the course of Sino-Japanese relations, largely dependent as these are on what are regarded on both sides of the East China Sea as more important considerations. It is these considerations that lie behind how China and Japan in concert with most other East Asian political economy players – including the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) – appear to be increasingly ensconced in strengthening their network of intra-regional bilateral and multilateral ties, including through both de facto and de jure regionalisation and regional integration, processes which in the view of many policy-makers and others in East Asia are inexorably leading to the creation of an East Asian Community (EAC), perhaps somewhat akin to the European Union (EU) [101]. In the midst of these processes and what is driving them, any Olympic-related matters are likely to have little influence on Sino-Japanese, East Asian or Asia-Pacific relations, while any influence had is likely to be affirmative vis-à-vis regionalisation towards an East Asian Community, in particular through their boost to the formation of a distinct East Asian regional identity in relation to the rest of the world. Perhaps above all, the value of hosting an Olympic Games in East Asia, the Asia-Pacific or any other region, such as South America or southern Africa, lies in how the Games put all competition, rivalries and anxieties in perspective - in their place - in particular in comparison with and in relation to each another. Any Olympics-related competition, rivalry and anxiety will pale relative to what will stand out as far more important, fundamental and vital considerations, concerns and interests. What will appear more important in East Asia and the Asia-Pacific is the prevailing and rapidly growing competition from political economy players in other regions, including India in South Asia, Brazil in South America and South Africa in southern Africa, and the advantages of confronting this competition in a collective, organised manner. What will appear more important is how external nation-states are increasingly turning for competitive purposes to regional integration and organisations, exemplified not only by the European Union (EU) and North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), but also by the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), and the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC). The part played by and relative importance of the Olympics in East Asia and the Asia-Pacific in the future will depend largely on the degree to which the Games (wherever they are held) will help enhance regional identity and robustness in confronting external challenges in the interregnum prior to the construction under globalisation of a single global social space. On these grounds, it might be anticipated that the appeal of the Olympics in East Asia and the Asia-Pacific will remain strong, and indeed will become stronger.
Notes
1. FIFA, the Fédération Internationale de Football Association (or the International Federation of Association Football) is the international governing body of association football. It is responsible for organising football’s major international tournaments, above all the FIFA World Cup. It has 208 member associations, 16 more members than the UN and three more than the IOC, but five fewer than the International Association of Athletics Federations (IAAF).
2. The prefix ‘mega-’ comes from the Greek word megas, meaning great (Peasall, Concise Oxford Dictionary, 2001, 886). It means ‘abnormally large’ (Medicine Net, 2009), or denotes surpassing other examples of its kind’ (Answers, 2008).
3. What comes to mind is the word ‘elephantine’, meaning of extraordinary size and power (Answers, 2009).
4. Aguilar et al., ‘Mega-city Expansion in Latin America’, 2003.
5. Close et al., The Beijing Olympiad, 2007, 34.
6. Close, ‘Regional Integration the East Asian Way’, November 2008.
7. Ibid.; see also Close, ‘Regional Integration the East Asian Way’, December 2008.
8. Close and Askew, Asia Pacific and Human Rights, 2004b, 243–4; Close et al., The Beijing Olympiad, 2007, 35.
9. See Wilson and Purushothaman, ‘Dreaming with BRICs’, 2003; Jain, Emerging Economies, 2007.
10. See also Andranovich et al., ‘Olympic Cities’, 2001.
11. Short, ‘Going for Gold’, 2003; see also Axford, The Global System, 1995; Baylis and Smith, The Globalization of World Politics, 2004; Held et al., Global Transformations, 1999.
12. Short, ‘Going for Gold’, 2003.
13. Ibid.
14. Roche, Mega-Events and Modernity , 2000; ‘Mega-events, Time and Modernity’, 2003; ‘Mega-events and Modernity Revisited’, 2006.
15. Roche, Mega-Events and Modernity, 2000, 1.
16. Roche, ‘Mega-events, Time and Modernity’, 2003, 99.
17. Ibid., 99-101.
18. Ibid., 100-1.
19. Ibid., 100–1.
20. Ibid., 100.
21. Ibid., 99.
22. Horne and Manzenreiter, Japan, Korea and the 2002 World Cup, 2002.
23. Tomlinson and Young, National Identity and Global Sports Events, 2005.
24. Horne and Manzenreiter, Japan, Korea and the 2002 World Cup, 2002, 187.
25. Short, ‘Going for Gold’, 2003.
26. Roche, ‘Mega-events, Time and Modernity’, 2003, 99.
27. John Short refers to 199 countries (Short, ‘Going for Gold’, 2003), but he might have referred to 199 countries and territories.
28. Short, ‘Going for Gold’, 2003.
29. Ibid.
30. Roche, ‘Mega-events, Time and Modernity’, 2003, 100–1.
31. Ibid., 99.
32. Andranovich et al., ‘Olympic Cities’, 2001, 118.
33. All NOCs apart from one, that of Brunei, participated in the 2008 Summer Olympic Games.
34. Close et al., 2007.
35. Ibid., pp. 21-44.
36. On the coming-out view of Asian Olympic Games, see Black and Bezanson, ‘The Olympic Games, Human Rights and Democratisation’, 2004; Gottwald and Duggan, ‘China’s Economic Development’, 2008; Levine, ‘A Golden Opportunity’, 2008; Manheim, ‘Rites of Passage’, 1990, 279-95.
37. Gottwald and Duggan, ‘China’s Economic Development’, 2008, 339.
38. See Close and Ohki-Close, Supranationalism in the New World Order, 1997.
39. See Games Bids, 6 February 2009.
40. See Close and Askew, Asia Pacific and Human Rights, 2004a.
41. National Post, ‘China Leaves Nothing to Chance’, 2008.
42. Short, ‘Going for Gold’, 2003.43. See Skye Sports, ‘Medals Table’, 2008.
44. Short, ‘Going for Gold’, 2003.45. ABS, ‘Australia Finishes Third’, 2004.
46. Kelly, ‘Asia Pride’, 2009.
47. Business Standard, ‘Upper-middle Income Magic’, 2008.
48. Ibid.
49. Bery, ‘The Next Twenty Years’, 2008.
50. Ibid.; see also Maddison, The World Economy, 2003.
51. Business Standard, ‘Upper-middle Income Magic’, 2008.
52. Dhoot, ‘Beijing Olympics’, 2008.
53. Ibid. See also BOCOG, ‘Global TV Viewing’, 2004; Japan Times, ‘4.7 Billion Saw Olympics’, 7 September 2008; Nielsen, ‘The Most Viewed Olympics Ever’, 24 August 2009; Nielsen, ‘Beijing Olympics Draw Largest’, 5 September 2008.
54. On ‘Pacific Asia, see Mark Borthwick, Pacific Century, 2006; Fu-chen Lo, Emerging World Cities in Pacific Asia, 1997; Xiaoming Huang, Politics in Pacific Asia, 2009; Yumei Zhang, Pacific Asia, 2003. On ‘East Asia’, see East Asian Study Group, Final Report, 2002; Shiraishi, ‘Regional Cooperation in East Asia’, 2009; Temple University, ‘East Asia’, 2009; Terada, Constructing an “East Asian” Concept’, 2003.
55. See APEC, ‘About Us’, 2009; see also Connors, Davison and Dosch, The New Global Politics, 2004; Eccleston, Dawson and McNamara, The Asia-Pacific Profile, 1998.
56. See ERINA, ‘Maps of Northeast Asia’, 2009.
57. For the sake of convenience, by ‘China’ is meant the People’s Republic of China (PRC) plus the Special Administrative Region (SAR) of Hong Kong, the SAR of Macau, and the Republic of China (otherwise known as Taiwan or Chinese Taipei).
58. ERINA, ‘Maps of Northeast Asia’, 2009.
59. See APEC, ‘About Us’, 2009; see also United Nations Statistics Division, ‘Composition’, 2009.
60. See Close and Askew, Asia Pacific and Human Rights, 2004a; Close and Askew, ‘Globalisation and Football in East Asia’, 2004b; Close, Askew and Xu Xin, 2007.
61. Nielsen, ‘Opening Ceremony’, 14 August 2008.
62. Sharma, ‘Nearly One in Three’, 2008.
63. Nielsen, ‘Beijing Olympics Draw Largest’, 5 September 2008.
64. Kelly, ‘Asia Pride’, 2009; see also Mangan and Dyreson., Olympic Legacies, 2008.
65. Sui, ‘What Will China’s Olympic Legacy Be?’, 2008.
66. Ibid.; see also All About China, 2008.
67. Geeraerts, ‘After the Games’, 2008.
68. Asia One, ‘Olympics Helped’, 2008.
69. Los Angeles Times, ‘“The Best Olympics Ever”’, 2008.
70. Jaquelin Magnay, ‘Beijing Gloss Fades’, 2008.
71. See Amnesty International, ‘China: Legacy of the Beijing Olympics’, 2008; Amnesty International, ‘China: Free Thwarted Olympics Petitioner’, 2009; Financial Times, ‘China: Beyond the Games’, 2008.
72. OHCHR, ‘Status of Ratification’, 2009; see also OHCHR, ‘International Law’, 2007.
73. Japan Times, ‘Beijing Claims Profit’, 20 June 2009.
74. Reuters, ‘For Sponsors’, 2008. In 2010, ‘Shanghai will host the 2010 World Expo, replacing the Olympic “One World, One Dream” motto for the Expo’s catchphrase of “Better City, Better Life”’ (Gardner, ‘China’s Olympic Legacy’, 2008).
75. Naidu, ‘China May Avert’, 2008.
76. Ibid.
77. Gardner, ‘China’s Olympic Legacy’, 2008.
78. Quoted in Gardner, 2008.
79. Gardner, ‘China’s Olympic Legacy’, 2008.
80. Quoted in Gardner, 2008.
81. Gardner, ‘China’s Olympic Legacy’, 2008.
82. Quoted in Gardner, 2008.
83. Ibid.; see also Pew Research Center, ‘The Chinese Celebrate’, 2008.
84. Gardner, ‘China’s Olympic Legacy’, 2008.
85. Ibid.
86. Kelly, ‘Asia Pride’, 2009.
87. ‘Competition among Japanese cities for the right to mount a 2016 bid began in 2004, and the Japan IOC settled on Tokyo on August 30, 2006’ (Kelly, ‘Asia Pride’, 2009).
88. Kelly, ‘Asia Pride’, 2009.
89. Ibid.
90. Ibid.; see also Farrer, ‘One Bed, Different Dreams’, 2008.
91. See Japan Times, ‘Japan Eager’, 24 November 2009: ‘the shift in political power in September [in Japan following the parliamentary general election], Japan aggressively lobbied a U.S. congressional nuclear task force to maintain the credibility of the U.S. “nuclear umbrella” to deter possible attacks by China and North Korea, sources said Monday’.
92. Kelly, ‘Asia Pride’, 2009.
93. Ibid.; see also Nathan, Japan Unbound, 2004, Sherif, ‘The Aesthetics of Speed’, 2009.
94. Kelly, ‘Asia Pride’, 2009.
95. Ibid.; see also Leheny, Think Global, 2006, Harootunian, Japan After Japan, 2006.
96. Kelly, ‘Asia Pride’, 2009.
97. ‘Over the next 50 years, Brazil, Russia, India and China - the BRIC economies – could become a much larger force in the world economy […]. If things go right, in less than 40 years, the BRIC economies together could be larger than the G6 in US dollar terms. By 2025 they could account for over half the size of the G6. Currently they are worth less than 15%. Of the current G6, only the US and Japan may be among the six largest economies in US dollar terms in 2050’ (Wilson and Purushothaman, ‘Dreaming with BRICs’, 2003).
98. ‘The BRICSAM countries are a group of large developing economies whose elevated economic growth and growing regional and international influence will have ripple effects on the world. Not only will these countries experience significant changes as a result of their economic and political rise, but the BRICSAM countries are also likely to be the beneficiaries of this change as the global economic balance of power shifts away from the industrialized countries’(Centre for International Governance Innovation, ‘BRICSAM’, 2009). Brazil has been selected by FIFA to host the 2014 World Cup, and in December 2009 the Japanese government decided to support a bid by Japan to host either the 2018 or the 2022 event (see Hongo, ‘Cabinet OKs Move’, 2009).
99. Games Bids, ‘South Africa Considers 2002 Bid’, 22 October 2009.
100. Games Bids, ‘Tokyo To Bid For 2020 Summer Games’, 7 November 2009.
101. See Close, ‘Regional Integration the East Asian Way’, November 2008; Close,‘Regional Integration the East Asian Way’, December 2008; East Asia Vision Group, ‘Towards and East Asian Community’, 2001; Kim, 2004.
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This article was first published in the International Journal of the History of Sport and is republished on www.playthegame.org in an edited version with kind persmission from the author and the initial publisher Taylor and Francis Group.

Original source:
‘Olympiads as Mega-events and the Pace of Globalization: Beijing 2008 in Context’ by Paul Close International Journal of the History of Sport Vol.27:16-18 pp.2976-3007
http://www.informaworld.com

Client control and the limits of professional autonomy: the case of sports medicine and the use of performance-enhancing drugs

Tue, 16 Nov 2010 11:28:00 +0100

- (This research article was presented by Ivan Waddington, Visiting Professor, Norwegian School of Sport Sciences in Oslo and University of Chester in the UK, in a keynote lecture at the international doping conference 'Body enhancements and (il)legal drugs in sport and exercise – human and social perspectives' in Copenhagen 10 November 2010.) Over a good many years I have consistently argued that if we wish to understand patterns of drug use in sport then we need to examine the central role of sports physicians in the use of performance-enhancing drugs. One or two other writers – most notably John Hoberman and Christophe Brissonneau – have also consistently sought to emphasize the central role of physicians in this process.In my presentation today I want to draw upon research in both the sociology of sport and the sociology of medicine in an attempt to theorise the involvement of sports physicians in the doping process. More particularly I want to suggest that the involvement of sports physicians in doping should not be seen as an isolated example of unethical behaviour but that it should be seen as just one aspect of a more general pattern of unethical behaviour which is by no means uncommon in the practice of sports medicine. In this regard, I want to suggest that sports medicine is what Malcolm has called a ‘peculiar practice’, that is, it is a form of medical practice in which the constraints on medical practitioners are distinctively different from the constraints on practitioners in most other forms of medical practice and that these constraints mean that sports physicians are more likely to deviate from what are considered good standards of practice, in both a technical and an ethical sense, than are physicians in other forms of medical practice.

The systematic involvement of sports physicians in doping has been well documented elsewhere and there is no need to recite that evidence at length here. However, it may be worth reminding ourselves that there has hardly been a major drugs scandal in which sports physicians have not been central actors.

Sports physicians in the Soviet Union were heavily involved in the development and use of drugs in the 1950s and their efforts were paralleled on the American side by Dr John Ziegler, who played a major role in the development and dissemination among American weightlifters of Dianabol. From the 1960s, East German sports physicians were key players in the state-sponsored system of doping. By the late 1960s and early 1970s, western sports physicians were involved in developing and refining the technique of blood doping, which was used with such spectacular success by team doctors working with the American cycling team at the 1984 Los Angeles Olympics. Four years later, following Ben Johnson’s disqualification at the Seoul Olympics, the spotlight fell on Johnson’s doctor, Dr Jamie Astaphan, who had prescribed steroids to Johnson and, in the Dubin Enquiry which followed, evidence was presented of networks of physicians all over Canada and the US, and indeed many other countries, who were prepared to prescribe drugs to athletes. In the mid-1990s, the team doctor at Juventus Football Club was involved in the systematic administration of drugs to players at the club during a period in which Juventus won three Italian championships and one European Cup, while the 1998 Tour de France provided clear evidence once again of the involvement of team doctors in doping. In recent years in Italy, several leading sports physicians and associated specialists, most notably Dr Franceso Conconi and Dr Michelle Ferrari, have been involved in systematic doping. In 2006 a major police operation in Spain revealed an extensive blood doping network run by Dr Eufemio Fuentes in Madrid; the huge scale of this operation may be judged by the fact that Dr Fuentes had been involved in blood doping perhaps as many as 200 elite athletes and that the turnover of his operation was estimated to have topped 8 million euros in the previous four years.

In summary, and as the British Medical Association (BMA) – not a body given to sensationalist statements – has noted, ‘it is clear that, at the elite level, the involvement of team doctors in doping is not uncommon and that it has not been confined to the former communist countries of eastern Europe’ (BMA, 2002: 84).

Of course, doctors who are involved in drug use are not just in breach of the rules of sport – and in some cases of the criminal law – but their behaviour is also in clear breach of codes of medical ethics such as the World Medical Association’s (WMA) declaration on principles of health care for sports medicine (WMA, 1999). However, I want to suggest that this is not an isolated example of unethical conduct on the part of sports medicine practitioners, but that this is just a part of a broader spectrum of unethical behaviour which is not uncommon in the practice of sports medicine. Let us examine this more closely.

Sports medicine: a peculiar practice?
The sociological study of sports medicine is in its infancy, with just a few published studies in the area. Most of these have focused on the relationship between physicians and athletes with reference to how athletes define, give meaning to, and manage pain and injury, and these studies have identified important characteristics of the web of relationships in which sports physicians are involved. The work of Howard L. Nixon is a good place to start.

Nixon has made a major contribution to our understanding of the sociology of risk, pain and injury in sport (Nixon, 1992; 1993; 1994; 1996). Nixon focuses on the interrelationships within sports groups, or ‘sportsnets’ as he calls them, and attempts to identify the links between athletes and other members of the ‘sportsnet’ such as other athletes, coaches and – of particular relevance for us – team medical staff. Nixon suggests that a central characteristic of sporting culture is the ‘culture of risk’ and that the structural characteristics of sportsnets expose athletes to what he called ‘biased social support’ – he refers to a ‘conspiratorial alliance’ involving sports physicians as well as coaches and administrators – that can influence and impose messages which foster the acceptance by athletes of risk, pain and injury and an associated willingness to continue training and competing even when injured and in pain; he also notes that sportsnets insulate athletes from, and inhibit them from seeking, regular medical care from outside the sport system.

Stephen Walk has suggested that one implication of Nixon’s work is that ‘medicine is practiced differently, more competently, and/or more ethically in non-sports contexts’ (Walk, 1997: 24). To what extent is this the case? Does the network of relationships in which sports medicine practitioners are involved limit their professional autonomy and constrain them to make medical compromises, in terms of both technical and ethical aspects of practice, which their colleagues in other branches of medicine are less constrained to make? And if this is the case, then is the involvement of doctors in doping simply part of a more general process in which sports physicians are less constrained than are their colleagues in other branches of medicine to behave in an ethical fashion? An examination of the day-to-day practice of the team physician, drawing on some of the studies in this area, may help to answer some of these questions.

The day-to-day practice of sports medicine
In his book ‘You’re Okay, it’s Just a Bruise’, in which he details his work as a team physician with the Los Angeles Raiders, Huizenga (1995) presents a revealing and disturbing picture of medical practice in the National Football League (NFL), which he describes as a system based on ‘the dominating owner or coach selecting and paying for the team doctor – who is then magically expected to have the player’s best interest at heart’ (Huizenga, 1995: 315). The owner’s influence, he suggests, can be all-pervasive and can impact on all aspects of the team doctor’s role, including clinical decision-making. In this context, Huizenga documents the regular occurrence of malpractice and unethical behaviour by team physicians. Examples cited by Huizenga include the following: a senior Raiders’ team physician who did not use a stretcher to move a player with a possible neck injury – thereby, says Huizenga, playing ‘Russian roulette’ with the player’s spinal system – because the club owner did not want a stretcher to be used as he held ‘the team gets demoralized and plays less aggressively when they see a teammate getting carted off the field on a stretcher’ (p124-5); the non-disclosure of information to players about their injuries and ‘knowingly misrepresenting vital information to the patient’ because the owner wanted the players to continue playing (the title of the book refers to an incident in which a player with a potentially dangerous spinal problem was told by a team doctor: ‘You’re Okay, it’s just a bruise’) (pp. 258-271); the prescription of anabolic steroids to ‘bulk up’ a player (p.149-50); doctors coaching young players to feign injury, against the rules of the NFL, so that they could deliberately fail an independent medical examination and thereby be placed on the injured reserve list (this allowed young players to develop their skills at the club while ‘hiding’ them from other clubs who might seek to sign them).

Huizenga also cites one other revealing practice. Under a collective bargaining agreement, the contract of a player cannot be terminated while he is ‘physically unable to perform the services required of him’, i.e. while he is injured and Huizenga notes: ‘Currently when a dispute arises, team orthopedists testify against the player – their patient. It’s unheard of for a doctor in any other situation to testify against his own patient, unless that patient has literally committed murder’ (p. 316). These incidents suggest that it may not be unusual for club medical staff to breach medical ethical guidelines, the rules of the NFL and/or the law by subordinating the interests of the individual player-as-patient to those of the club. Following the stretcher incident, Huizenga was on the point of resigning, saying: ‘It’s not ethical for me to stay here. I can’t be associated with this kind of medicine’ (p. 125). He eventually resigned in protest when the club owner supported a team doctor who deliberately withheld information from a player about a potentially serious spinal problem (pp. 266-7).

Managing injuries: return to play decisions and informed consent
Many of the unethical practices identified by Huizinga were also found in a study of club doctors and physiotherapists in English football. Thus Roderick and his colleagues found that relevant information about their injuries may be not conveyed to players, or may even be deliberately withheld as a matter of club policy (Roderick et al. 2000: 175-6). It is significant that in the United States there has been a good deal of litigation concerning informed consent in the field of sports medicine, with a central claim in many cases being that information was withheld – either negligently or intentionally – from athletes about the true nature of their conditions, thereby preventing the athlete from making a properly informed choice about his/her fitness to return to play (Herbert and Herbert, 1991:121). Such situations clearly raise serious ethical concerns.

In relation to return-to-play decisions in English football, the need to get players playing again as quickly as possible after injury constitutes a major constraint on club doctors and physiotherapists and also has potentially important implications for the quality of care which players receive (Waddington, 2006). The need, as one physiotherapist put it, to 'get players fit yesterday' leads to what one doctor called the ‘unfortunate’ need to make medical compromises in his treatment of players. (Waddington, 2000: 75-6). In this regard, Waddington et al. (1999) found clear evidence that in some situations the professional autonomy of clinicians may be severely restricted and team doctors and physiotherapists may find themselves involved in situations in which players are regularly returned to play before they are medically fit to do so. Under these conditions, team doctors and physiotherapists appear to have two choices, both of which are problematic. They may simply adapt to and accept the situation, in which case the quality of care they are able to offer will be compromised to a greater or lesser degree. Alternatively, they may come to feel that their professional autonomy has been so compromised that they are unable to do their job in what they consider a properly professional manner. Significantly, Huizenga’s book suggests that physicians in the NFL may also find themselves with a similar dilemma: either accept the constraints imposed by club owners and provide care which may be seriously compromised or, as Huizenga did, resign because it is not possible within that situation to provide what the doctor feels is an acceptable level of care.

A particularly striking example of the way in which team physicians may be constrained to make clinical compromises is provided by Malcolm’s work on rugby club doctors in England. The example relates to the diagnosis of concussion. In recent years there has been growing concern about the long-term health risks associated with concussion. In order to protect players’ health, the International Rugby Board (IRB) has adopted a precautionary policy which requires that any player sustaining any concussion must abstain from playing and training for a minimum period of three weeks’ and should only resume when declared symptom free after a medical examination’ (Malcolm, 2009: 196).

However, one consequence of the IRB rule is that any diagnosis of concussion will automatically deprive the club of the player’s services for three weeks. Within this situation, the resistance of players and coaches to a diagnosis of concussion has led ‘to a rejection of treatment protocols’. Thus Malcolm found that most club doctors have effectively rejected the IRB guidelines and their underlying precautionary philosophy, and that many go to considerable lengths to avoid offering a diagnosis of concussion, with the loss of the player’s services which this would entail. Some doctors even argued that loss of consciousness – traditionally regarded in the medical literature as the most serious symptom of concussion – was not, on its own, sufficient to diagnose concussion (Malcolm, 2009: 202).

Malcolm (2009: 205) notes that a rule which was designed to protect players’ health has actually had ‘the unintended consequence of leading clinicians to avoid the diagnosis of concussion’ and he concludes that clinicians ‘come to diagnose concussion in a way that they know will be acceptable to others’ (Malcolm, 2009: 201), i.e. to coaches and players; in effect, club doctors have simply abandoned a medical definition of concussion and have substituted for it the lay understanding of coaches and players. As Malcolm notes, ‘Allowing sporting performance criteria to override medical guidelines … enables the diagnosis to become consistent with rugby players’ (and coaches’) own definitions of what constitutes an injury’ (Malcolm, 2009: 191). Clearly the professional autonomy of physicians is seriously undermined in a situation in which diagnosis and treatment come to be dependent on lay, rather than clinical, criteria.

Perhaps the most striking recent example of unethical medical practice in rugby was provided by the so-called ‘Bloodgate’ scandal involving Harlequins Rugby Club in 2009. Trailing in an important match, Harlequins wanted to bring on a specialist kicker, Nick Evans, but Evans had previously been substituted and could only return to the game as a temporary substitute for a player with a blood injury. Another player, Tom Williams, had been given a sachet of fake blood which he used to produce the effect of a bleeding mouth injury. He was led off the field by the club physiotherapist – who had been a party to the plan – but the club doctor on the opposing side was suspicious and asked to examine the ‘injured’ player. In the dressing room, the Harlequins club doctor then made a small incision in Williams’ mouth to produce genuine blood. Following a disciplinary hearing at the Health Professions Council, the physiotherapist was struck off the register, while the General Medical Council held that the doctor’s action had ‘not been in the best interests of her patient’ and she was given a formal warning that her actions had been ‘unacceptable’. (Guardian, 19 August, 2009; Sunday Times, 23 August 2009; Guardian, 24 August 2010; Daily Mail, 6 September, 2010; Guardian.co.uk 14 September 2010). It is clear that the medical staff allowed their commitment to the club’s sporting success to override their commitment to the ethics of medical practice and the case illustrates very clearly the pressures on club medical staff to deviate from good practice.

Patient confidentiality
In a study of team medical staff in English professional football, Waddington and Roderick (2002) found that breaches of patient confidentiality were not unusual. More specifically, they found that there is no commonly held understanding governing the management of confidential issues and there are considerable variations in terms of both the amount, and the kind, of information about players which doctors and physiotherapists pass on to managers/coaches.

While some physiotherapists emphasized their primary responsibility towards the player-as-patient, others saw their primary responsibility as being towards the club. Several physiotherapists emphasised that they were employed by the club and saw this as sufficient justification for passing on information which would normally be considered confidential, such as information relating to a player’s drinking habits or other aspects of a player’s off-the-field lifestyle.

Waddington and Roderick also identified serious breaches of medical ethics among doctors; the most flagrant breach occurred in a case in which a club doctor clearly acted as an agent for the club and used confidential medical information about a player to advance the interests of the club over and against those of the player. In this case, the club doctor threatened that he would make public medical information about a player – information which was actually incorrect and which exaggerated the extent of a player’s medical problems – in order to undermine the player’s desired transfer to another club (Waddington and Roderick, 2002: 120-1).

A study of 16 sports physicians in New Zealand revealed a similar lack of consistency to that found by Waddington and Roderick in terms of how physicians deal with confidential issues. Some of the New Zealand physicians had accepted contracts which actually obliged them to share medical information with coaches and team management and five physicians said that they were prepared to disclose information, even against the wishes of the athlete, but in line with their contractual obligations; in this situation the interests of the individual athlete-as-patient were clearly subordinated to those of the club. Ten physicians indicated they would keep such information confidential, citing a commitment to traditional obligations to confidentiality and one practitioner was unsure of what s/he would do in these circumstances (Anderson, 2009: 1080).

Although there is clearly a need for more studies in this area, there are enough data to suggest that breaches of patient confidentiality may not be unusual within the sports medicine context. The UK General Medical Council has noted that ‘patients have a right to expect that [doctors] will not disclose any personal information … unless they give permission’, but it seems that elite sportspeople may not infrequently be denied a right which other patients routinely enjoy.

Sports medicine, client control and medical practice
In a classic essay Eliot Freidson (1960; 1966) pointed out that medical professionals cannot exist without clients but that clients ‘often have ideas about what they want that differ markedly from those held by the professionals they consult’ (1966: 260). As a result, consultations between practitioners and clients often involve a clash between ‘two different, sometimes conflicting, sets of values’, based on differing understandings of health and illness. Freidson noted that there may be more or less congruence between the lay cultural understanding of the client and the professional understanding of the physician and that, to understand what takes place in medical practice, it is necessary to examine the relative sources of power of doctor and patient. This led Freidson to propose two polar types of medical practice: (i) colleague-dependent practice, in which interaction is primarily dependent on the professional evaluations and decisions of the doctor and his/her professional colleagues and (ii) client-dependent practice, in which interaction between doctor and client is largely dependent on the lay evaluations and decisions of clients.

A critical determinant of the type of practice, suggests Freidson, is the setting within which the practice is located. In this regard, the ‘authoritative source of professional culture’ is located in professionally controlled organizations such as hospitals and medical schools (Freidson, 1966: 267). Of critical importance is the fact that the further this professional system is penetrated, the more free it is of the lay influence of patients. Thus, a ‘layman seeking help finds that, the further within it he goes, the fewer choices can he make and the less can he control what is done to him. Indeed, it is not unknown for the “client” to be a petitioner, asking to be chosen: the organizations and practitioners who stand well within the professional referral system may or may not “take the case”, according to their judgement of its interest’. As a result: ‘Choice, and therefore positive control, is now taken out of the hands of the client and comes to rest in the hands of the practitioner, and the use of professional services is no longer predicated on the client’s lay understandings – indeed, the client may be given services for which he did not ask, whose rationale is beyond him’ (Freidson, 1966: 267-8).

At the other extreme, suggests Freidson, is the position of practitioners located in the local community. Unlike hospital doctors, who receive their patients by referrals from other professionals, doctors who practise in the community are dependent on attracting their own lay clientele and, in order to do so, are constrained to behave in ways which are in closer accord with lay expectations. As Freidson notes in relation to community-based practice, to ‘survive without colleagues, it must be located within a lay referral system and, as such, is least able to resist control by clients, and most able to resist control by colleagues’ (Freidson, 1966: 268, italics in original). Thus whereas the hospital-based doctor is surrounded by professional colleagues, is subject to their evaluation and is expected to be responsive to the clinical and ethical standards which they share, the community based practitioner (especially the isolated solo practitioner) is not surrounded by or subject to evaluation by professional colleagues but is much more subject to evaluation by, and is therefore required to be more responsive to, the lay demands of his/her clients for it is they, rather than professional colleagues, who will determine the success or otherwise of the community based practice. And as Freidson notes, lay influence may more or less control not only the practitioner’s success in attracting clients, ‘but, to some extent, also his professional technique and manner’ (Freidson, 1966: 266).

The peculiar features of the situation of the team physician in professional sport mean that this type of practice is characterized by an even higher degree of client control than is normally the case in community based practice. In this regard, the contrasts between the position of the hospital-based doctor and the team physician are striking. The team doctor works within an organization in which the key values are not professional values relating to health, but lay values relating to sporting success. And if hospital doctors are the highest status workers – the ‘stars’, as it were – within the hospital, the ‘stars’ within sports clubs are the players and coaches, while the doctors are reduced to the role of lower status, ‘bit part’ players, mere ‘service workers’, whose job it is to look after the stars. Significantly, their remuneration and status within the clubs is often consistent with their position as service workers. Huizenga, for example, records that he ‘apologetically’ raised the issue of his salary with the owner of the Los Angeles Raiders, who offered him, in a ‘take it or leave it’ manner, an annual salary which was less than many players received for a single game (Huizenga, 1995: 63).

A similar point was made by a doctor at an English football club, who said that the club quibbled about his bill, even though it was ‘peanuts’, while another club doctor indicated that he received just £5,200 per year for his services, even though he had calculated that, applying the BMA’s recommended scale of charges to the number of hours he worked, he should have been receiving £25,000 (Waddington et al., 1999: 9-10, 13-14). And if their remuneration is often commensurate with their role as service workers, so too is their non-financial status. In his study of rugby club doctors, Malcolm (2006: 176-77) recorded ‘a number of incidents where medical staff were demeaned by the behaviour of others within the rugby club setting’ and he noted that the ‘level of respect afforded to some medical staff in some rugby club contexts … marks out sports medicine as being … characterized by social rules quite different from those of other, “normal”, forms of medical practice, where great respect is usually accorded to medical practitioners’. And far from respecting their status as medical experts, some managers in English football simply disregarded the advice of their own club doctors and physiotherapists.

Not only do team doctors work in a situation which is dominated by lay sporting values but this is also a situation in which, unlike doctors in many other settings, they are frequently professionally isolated. Thus Malcolm (2006b: 383) noted that rugby club doctors ‘tend to work in isolation from other professional colleagues’ while, in professional football, Waddington (2000: 77) found that not only were club doctors professionally isolated within the club, but there were also relatively few opportunities for them to meet professionally with doctors from other clubs (Waddington et al. 1999: 14). As Freidson has noted: ‘All else being equal in this situation of minimal observability by colleagues and maximum dependence on the lay referral system, we should expect to find the least sensitivity to formal professional standards and the greatest sensitivity to the local lay standards’ (Freidson, 1966: 269). This is, it is suggested, what we frequently find in the case of sports medicine.

One final point needs to be addressed. If club doctors are constrained on a day-to-day basis to make medical compromises, and also to accept what they would, in other circumstances, certainly regard as unacceptable rates of pay as well as relatively low status, then we need to ask: why do doctors accept such forms of employment? On this issue the evidence is clear.

Job motivation
By far the most common motivation which leads doctors to accept employment as team doctors relates not to professional goals, such as improving clinical expertise or qualifications, or moving into sports medicine as a full-time career – most club doctors continue to work in another area of medicine which constitutes their main source of income – but rather, derives from their longstanding love of sport and, in many cases, their commitment to a particular team. One English football club doctor, whose father had been the previous club doctor, explained: ‘I did medicine so that I could be the team doctor – I wasn’t interested in any other team’. Another club doctor said: ‘Basically although I’m 46, there’s a ten year old boy inside saying “Fantastic! Fantastic! It’s great”’, while another doctor said that he did the job because he had always enjoyed playing football and being a club doctor was ‘the next best thing to playing’ (Waddington et al. 1999: 10).

In rugby, Malcolm noted that the most commonly cited motivations for acting as club doctor were ‘support for the team’ (82.4 per cent) and a ‘general interest in sport’ (67.6 per cent) with just 5.5 per cent indicating that their interest in sports medicine was a major motivational factor (Malcolm, 2006a: 170).

In the American context, Huizenga describes a visit to the office of Dr Rosenfeld, who was a senior doctor with the Los Angeles Raiders. Huizenga says that Rosenfeld had ‘one of the largest Beverly Hills practices and took care of a veritable Who’s Who of Hollywood stars. But once I stepped into his office, I could see what made him really proud. His walls were plastered with Raider memorabilia and multiple shots of Dr Rosenfeld assisting dazed athletes off the field with thousands of spectators serving as a blurry backdrop’ (Huizenga, 1995: 8).

Most club doctors have a strong and prior commitment to sport before they enter club medical practice. As Freidson has noted, there may be a marked discrepancy between the professional culture of doctors and the lay culture of their patients; however, in the case of team medical practice, it might be suggested that this gap is bridged, not by the fact that the patients share the professional culture of the doctor but, on the contrary, by the fact that the team doctor shares the sporting culture of his/her clientele. What are the key elements of this sport ethic?

Coakley (2007: 161-3) has noted that the key aspects of the sport ethic are a dedication to ‘the game’ above all else; a relentless striving for improved performance; an acceptance of risk and a willingness to play through pain and injury; and an unwillingness to accept obstacles in the pursuit of sporting success. He also suggests that many forms of deviance within sport, such as drug use and violence, may be understood as arising not from a rejection of these norms of sport but as a result of over-conformity – that is an unquestioned acceptance of and extreme conformity to these norms in the pursuit of sporting success. This type of ‘overdoing-it deviance’, he suggests, involves an over-commitment to the goal of sporting success which may lead, for example, to the willingness to risk serious injury in order to continue competing and to an acceptance of drug use or other unfair means if these enhance the likelihood of sporting success.

Coakley’s concept of over-conformity is also helpful in understanding those aspects of the behaviour of sports physicians which deviate from what is generally considered good medical practice. Many club doctors, it is clear, have a longstanding and real commitment to the sport ethic. However, key aspects of the sport ethic sit uncomfortably alongside the key values of medical ethics. And just as some athletes develop an over-conformity to the sport ethic so too, it is suggested, do some team doctors. Thus while most team doctors will have a dual allegiance to medical ethics and to the sport ethic, their work situation constrains them to pay greater attention to the latter at the expense of the former; in short, the work situation of team doctors constrains them to ‘buy into’ the sport ethic and to the key goal of sporting success and, at least to some degree, to ‘buy out of’ medical ethics. The clearest example of this process of over-conformity to the sport ethic and the associated ‘buying out of’ medical ethics is provided by the widespread involvement of sports physicians in the development and use of illicit performance-enhancing drugs (Waddington, 2000; 2004; Waddington and Smith, 2009).

Conclusion: Physician behaviour and deviant medical careers
We know a good deal about the constraints faced by elite level sportspeople and the ways in which these constraints – particularly the greatly increased importance which has come to be attached to winning – may be associated with the decision to use performance-enhancing drugs. What has been much less studied are the constraints on team physicians to deviate from conventionally accepted standards of professional behaviour. In this regard a research agenda might usefully consider the following questions. Given their involvement in sportsnets and their often strong personal interest in sport, to what extent are team physicians themselves constrained by the greatly increased importance which has come to be attached to winning and by a sporting agenda in which ‘second place doesn’t count’? To what extent do they experience pressure, perhaps not just from athletes but also from the coaches, managers and others, to supply athletes with performance-enhancing drugs? How easy is it to resist such pressures where the prescription of such drugs may mean the difference between winning and losing an important competition which may involve considerable international prestige? To what extent do doctors themselves understandably wish to be part of a medal-winning or record-breaking team? Is not such participation in a winning team in itself testimony to their professional skill, even if this is used in a way which might generally be considered deviant? In much the same way that it is important not to see the drug-using athlete as an isolated individual, so it is equally important not to see drug-prescribing doctors as isolated individuals, but to examine the everyday constraints on their behaviour and the ways in which these constraints might open up deviant careers within medicine.

Dr. Ivan Waddington is a Visiting Professor at Norwegian School of Sport Sciences, Oslo, and at the University of Chester, UK.

This presentation was made at the International Doping Conference 'Body enhancements and (il)legal drugs in sport and exercise – human and social perspectives' at the Department of Exercise and Sport Sciences, Copenhagen University on 10 November 2010. It is published in Play the Game's knowledge bank with kind permission from the author.

See also Ivan Waddington's presentation from Play the Game 2002: Doping in Sport: Some Issues for Medical Practitioners

Conceptualising corruption in sport: Implications for sponsorship programmes

Tue, 02 Nov 2010 13:19:00 +0100

The issue of corruption in sport is becoming ever more important and controversial, especially given the global reach sport has and the millions of dollars invested in sport by companies. The aim of this article is to define and conceptualise corruption in sport and begin to discuss the implications of corruption for sponsorship programmes. By coding and analysing a data set collected of cases of corruption in international sport as the first stage of a five-stage mixed-method approach, the author will begin to highlight the implications of such behaviour for sponsors of sport whilst discussing potential strategies for sponsors should they become embroiled in such a sporting scandal. As the industry has grown, sports, teams and, perhaps most extensively, players have established worldwide appeal and an ever-growing consumer base. Aware of this global appeal, companies have sought to capitalise and pay millions of dollars to be associated with these sports, teams and players, recognising the power of sport and sports events in reaching target audiences. Gaining brand equity can result from being associated with successful teams or athletes or being recognised as sponsors of popular sports, with the sports, teams or athletes involved in such relationships also benefiting from this brand image. Not only can this prove very lucrative for potential sponsors but, also, it inevitably opens many avenues that sports, teams and players can exploit, especially for financial gain. There has been much debate as to why sport has become such a lucrative global industry in sport management literature. Whannel (1992) suggests that it is the “uncertainty [of sport] that gives its unpredictable joys their characteristic intensity” (Mason, 1999:405). It is this uncertainty and unpredictability that makes sport such an exciting opportunity for businesses around the world to take advantage of. But what happens if this uncertainty and unpredictability has been taken away? In recent years, there has been an increasing number of reports detailing ‘corrupt’ behaviour by individuals at all levels of sport and those associated with it, both on and off the field of play, in the pursuit of financial success, usually reserved for those who are winning global championships or events. Allegations of match fixing, illegal gambling, bribery and doping plague the industry. But what impact does this type of behaviour have on the companies that have invested millions of dollars in sport? How do sponsors react if it is reported that their star endorser has used performance-enhancing drugs (PEDs) or fixed the result of a match? Or if an event is rife with cheating? Are sponsors becoming more cautious in their use of sport as a means to reach target audiences? The aim of this article is to conceptualise and define corruption in sport and begin to discuss the implications of corruption for sponsorship programmes. Corruption in Sport
Corruption in sport is not a new phenomenon. At the Olympic Games in 388BC, Eupolos of Thessalia bribed three of his competitors in a fighting tournament allowing him to win the gold medal (Maennig 2005). Notable cases in the modern era of sport include the fixing of the 1919 World Series by members of the Chicago White Sox who took bribes from gamblers, Ben Johnson’s infamous failed drugs tests in the 1980s and the Calciopoli scandal that rocked Italian football in the last decade. Much research has been conducted into why and how corruption occurs in fields outside of sport, with particular focus on politics and business (Treisman, 2000; Aidt & Dutta, 2008; Den Nieuwenboer & Kaptein, 2008; Shen & Williamson, 2005; Getz & Volkema, 2001; Lloyd & Walton, 1999; Paldam, 2002), some of which can be applied to the issue of corruption in sport. Den Nieuwenboer & Kaptein (2008) identify three downward spirals of corruption within an organisation – each can be utilised to discuss why athletes or officials might choose to cheat to win or cheat to lose. Using Cressey’s (1953) trust violation theory, the concept of the ‘spiral of divergent norms’ suggests that individuals might justify their behaviour so as to be not their fault. In sport, this could describe the case of the 1919 World Series match fixing scandal, when, according to reports, Chicago White Sox players accepted funds from gamblers to lose matches after the owner of the team had refused to pay bonuses that had previously been promised. In business, the pursuit of profit brings with it stresses and pressures on employees and management. The notion of a ‘spiral of pressures’ suggests that “high pressures on performance… seduce people to engage in any type of corruption that increases one’s performance” (Den Nieuwenboer & Kaptein, 2008:138). Individuals then feel that in order to continue to perform at the attained level, they have to continue to break the rules – “performing well through corruption will automatically increase the threat to identity, starting a self-perpetuating spiral of increasing pressures to commit corruption” (138). Out of the three spirals of corruption, it is the opinion of the researcher that this has the most relevance in sport. Being successful in sport can increase the earning potential of athletes. If an athlete uses PEDs to attain the desired level of achievement, popularity or earning, what they choose to do to maintain this becomes an issue. In order to remain at the pinnacle of their sport and the public ‘face’ of organisations, an athlete might have to continue to use these substances, thus ‘starting a self-perpetuating spiral’. This is perhaps also true of a sport like motor racing where the difference between victory and defeat is milli-seconds. During the 2006 and 2007 seasons, the two leading teams in Formula One, McLaren and Ferrari, accused each other of spying to give them access to top-secret technological information about their rival. As technology is developed and enhanced, so the need for continued spying becomes apparent. The final spiral discussed by Den Nieuwenboer & Kaptein (2008), the ‘spiral of opportunity’, suggests that “the risk of getting caught and/or punished is such that it does not deter (potential) perpetrators” (139). This is particularly the case if managers within an organisation are either failing to punish those conducting corrupt activity or, perhaps even more serious, if the managers are actually conducting the corrupt activity. It could be argued that this spiral of opportunity describes, to a certain degree, the match fixing scandal that rocked Italian football. Den Nieuwenboer & Kaptein (2008) also state that “the more corruption has been tolerated and is prototypical, the greater the difficulty to punish it” (139). This has definitely been the case with Major League Baseball’s handling of steroid use in the sport. Defining the Issue
In order to fully understand corruption as a phenomenon and to be aware of the potential implications of the activity, it is vital that a relevant and useful definition is devised. In its simplest form, corruption has been defined as “dishonest or illegal behaviour” (Collins English Dictionary). Treisman (2000:399) defines it as “the misuse of public office for private gain”, and Ashforth & Anand (2003, in den Nieuwenboer & Kaptein, 2008:134) suggest that corruption is “the misuse of authority for personal, subunit and/or organisational gain”. These definitions of corruption are valid when investigating behaviour of sports officials and corruption in the governance of sport. Investigations into the awarding of Olympic hosting rights (in particular, Salt Lake City) provide an example of a ‘misuse of authority’ (of a bidding committee) for ‘organisational gain’ (the decision to choose that city as host of the Olympics and the associated rewards that accompany such a choice). It can be argued, however, that these definitions are not relevant when discussing corruption committed by athletes. Senior (2006) provides a classification of corruption that assists in the development of a sports-focussed definition, arguing that in order for corruption to occur, five conditions have to be met simultaneously “when a corrupter (1) covertly gives (2) a favour to a corruptee or to a nominee to influence (3) actions(s) that (4) benefit the corruptor or a nominee, and for which the corruptee has (5) authority” (27). This appears to describe match fixing – the ‘relationship’ between the fixer and the player or players of the sport. In existing published research, there is a debate as to what actually constitutes corruption in sport. Sociologists Hughes & Coakley (1991) suggest that corrupt behaviour (or ‘positive deviance’) in sport occurs when individuals want to be viewed as ‘athletes’ by peers and wider society – the use of PEDs may be one way of achieving this. According to Hughes & Coakley, athletes do not tend to view their overconformity to the sport ethic as being deviant and suggest that “through positive deviance people do harmful things to themselves and perhaps others while motivated by a sense of duty and honour” (311). Maennig (2005), on the other hand, suggests that “corruption may take the form of behaviour by athletes who refrain from achieving the level of performance normally required in the sport in question to win the competition and instead intentionally permit others to win, or behaviour by sporting officials who consciously perform their allocated tasks in a manner at variance with the objectives and moral values of the relevant club, association, competitive sports in general and/or society at large” (189). Maennig (2005) fails to recognise or acknowledge doping as a form of corruption in sport. He argues that corrupt activity is a failure to perform, whereas using PEDs in sport leads to super-performance by an athlete and is an individual activity. It is clear that these two ‘definitions’ of corruption are at odds – how can an athlete be doing everything to overconform to the sport ethic, to be seen as an athlete, and allow an opponent to win? The failure to acknowledge doping as a form of corrupt behaviour also raises questions for the researcher in that it does involve more than one person. In most cases, athletes and other individuals, including coaches are involved in the use of these PEDs – for example, the systematic doping of athletes in East Germany in the 1970s and 1980s. Neither definition offered mentions the importance of an exchange of money or benefits between parties involved. According to Senior’s (2006) definition, there has to be a benefit to at least one person in the arrangement. This might be tangible, in the form of a lucrative sponsorship or endorsement agreement, or intangible, the promise of higher status within a team. In further response to Maennig’s (2005) omission of doping as a form of corruption, if doping causes one or more parties to receive money (in the form of bonuses and/or sponsorship and endorsement agreements) that they would otherwise not have received, then surely it is a corrupt behaviour. For the purposes of this research, gamesmanship, for example using personal information about a referee or umpire to try and gain advantage in a game, is not seen as corruption. Measuring this type of behaviour is troublesome – referee reports of this type of activity would need to be quantified to be able to determine the extent to which a player is trying to influence the referee and would be subjective, based on the ideas or opinions of both the referee and those designing the scale utilised to quantify the behaviour. Professional referees ‘should’ also be able to ignore this type of behaviour and not let it affect their own performance. The types of behaviour that are seen as corruption in this research can be both measured and recognisable as having a negative effect on a sporting contest. After taking into account these concerns and the explanations of corruption offered in other fields as well as the development of an extensive database of cases of corruption in sport, the author proposes a new definition upon which to build the research project: “Corruption in sport involves any illegal, immoral or unethical activity that attempts to deliberately distort the result of a sporting contest for the personal material gain of one or more parties involved in that activity” Using this definition, the researcher can begin to highlight the implications of such behaviour for sponsors of sport. Methodology
In the first stage of a five-stage mixed-method approach, a database has been constructed detailing cases of corruption in different sports and from across the sporting world currently containing in excess of 3,000 cases. These cases have then been coded into category-sets (Guetzkow, 1950) to identify key themes and patterns of corruption in sport. (Please see Table 1) Table 1 Sample of doping cases in international sport Sports with large salaries, substantial win bonuses and popularity with fans and businesses are affected by corrupt behaviour. ‘Smaller’ sports, like fencing, badminton and mountain biking, are also affected by corruption just as more popular sports are. (Please see Table 2) Table 2 Sample of match/race fixing cases in international sport Maennig (2005) divides corruption in sport into two categories. ‘Competition corruption’ involves activities by athletes and/or those officials who have a direct responsibility for the outcome of a sporting contest. ‘Management corruption’ involves non-competition decisions made by sporting officials and governing bodies that include the awarding of host city status for major sporting events, negotiation and allocation of rights, the awarding of contracts for construction of sporting venues. Implications for Sponsorship Programmes
As previously stated, there is little research investigating the impact of corruption in sport on sport-sponsor and athlete-sponsor relationships. Companies are investing millions of dollars in sponsorship agreements and more in leveraging these agreements to secure competitive advantage. Amis, Slack & Berrett (1999) argue that “a sponsorship opportunity should be assessed as to its potential of helping a firm to secure a position of competitive advantage” (252). At the same time, corruption in sport is costing these same companies millions of dollars in brand value. It becomes imperative, then, that sponsors recognise a number of possible strategies that may be employed as a result of such behaviour. Wilson et al (2008) have evaluated how player transgressions, defined by Aaker et al (2004) as “a violation of the implicit and explicit rules guiding relationship performance and evaluation” (2008a: 100), like alcohol or spousal abuse, impact upon the sport-sponsor relationship. They state that "an understanding of the dynamics of sport-sponsor relationships and the potential damage created by player transgressions is critical, particularly given the lack of existing relevant research" (105). It is the opinion of the author that by replacing the words ‘player transgressions’ with ‘corruption’, the same is true. Success in the sporting arena can lead to athletes being targeted by organisations to be part of sponsorship and endorsement agreements. At the World Athletics Championships in Rome 1987, Ben Johnson “beat (Carl) Lewis in the 100 metres and set an astonishing new world record of 9.84 seconds… With his new star property pronounced clean, Johnson’s agent immediately started negotiating millions of dollars in sponsorship” (Simson & Jennings, 1992: 169). Johnson, of course, wasn’t clean and lost these sponsorship deals, costing the organisations time and money. On the other hand, it might be argued that sponsors actually perpetuate the problem of corruption in sport, particularly in the instance of doping. There have been examples in sport where athletes have been awarded thousands of pounds in sponsorship by large organisations, with performance criteria in place. When these athletes discover that many of their competitors may be using PEDs, and with the sponsorship agreements worth so much in funding, the options available to them are limited at best. Strong relationships with sponsors, established on the basis of trust and communication, can minimise the potential impact of such player behaviour on any business agreements (Wilson et al, 2008a), especially given the potential for image transfer (McCracken, 1988). In today’s media culture of sensationalising the reports of player transgression, a strong relationship means that the ‘fall-out’ from such behaviour can be dealt with in such a way to preserve the association. Wilson et al (2008b) also suggest that a number of factors will influence how a sponsor might react in such a situation. The level of media interest, the nature, frequency and severity of the transgression and how closely related the transgression is to the sponsor’s business or target market will determine the severity in which the sponsor will deal with any potential situation. It can, therefore, be suggested that relationships between a sport, team or athlete and the media, fans and/or other stakeholders will be adversely affected by corruption. The media ‘interest’ in a case of corruption in sport may lead to fans and sponsors losing interest or faith in a particular team or athlete, affecting not only the potential revenue generation of the team or athlete concerned but also those around them, including other teams in a league or other athletes on the start line of a race. Implications for sponsors may include the forced withdrawal of their support from sport in its entirety, a strategy that many Tour de France sponsors have utilised. The image of the Tour de France has been tarnished by the use of PEDs by cyclists, with many teams, like Team T-Mobile, struggling to attract sponsors to the sport, and thus having to withdraw. Withdrawal from a particular sport and supporting others might provide sponsors with a means of still utilising sport as a marketing communications tool whilst balancing the potential negative impact of corruption. Financial services company ING saw sport as a means of reaching target markets and gaining competitive advantage, sponsoring Formula 1 and the Renault team within the sport, investing in excess of $80m during the 2008 season, with $65m of than total being paid to Renault (BBC Sport, 2009). They, along with fellow sponsor Mutua Madrilena, immediately withdrew their support from Renault as a direct result of the Crashgate scandal. The company has, however, recently renewed its relationship with the New York Marathon. It might also be expected that sponsors include more rigorous and extensive performance-related clauses in contracts with teams, athletes and/or the sports themselves to try and protect their interests and investments. There is also the possibility that sponsors may choose to ignore corruption in sport, maintaining that any relationship with sport is a positive one. It is clear that corruption in international sport is a very real issue that is threatening the financial future of some parts of the industry and undermining its integrity. Sponsorship programmes have and will continue to be effected by this corrupt activity. However, there are potential strategies that sponsors can employ to ensure their image and reputation is not irrevocably damaged. This research project aims to evaluate these possible strategies.

This research article was first published in The European Business Review, and is republished in Play the Game's knowledge bank with kind permission from the authors.

About the authors

Samantha Gorse is a PhD candidate and research scholar at the Centre for the International Business of Sport, Coventry University. Her PhD is investigating the impact of corruption in international sport on sponsorship programmes. Her other research interests include marketing strategies in professional sport, entrepreneurship in sport and sports law.

Dr Simon Chadwick is Professor of Sport Business Strategy and Marketing at Coventry University. He is a Director of CIBS, Editor of the International Journal of Sport Marketing and Sponsorship and has worked with organisations involved in sport including the Football Association, Mastercard, the four tennis Grand Slams and FC Barcelona. Professor Chadwick has been widely quoted in various media outlets including the Wall Street Journal, Forbes, Time, Newsweek, The Economist, Bloomberg, CNN, Reuters and the BBC. He is the author of more than 300 books, papers, articles and reports on sport.

Samantha Gorse is continuing to build her database of cases of corruption in sport – currently in excess of 5,000 cases have been collected and recorded.

To do this, she would appreciate your help. So if you have information or know of any other data sources that she might use to expand her database, please contact samantha.gorse@coventry.ac.uk

References

Aidt, T.S. & Dutta, J. (2008) Policy Compromises: Corruption and Regulation in a Democracy, Economics & Politics, 20(3):335-360
Den Nieuwenboer, N.A. & Kaptein, M. (2008) Spiralling Down into Corruption: A Dynamic Analysis of the Social Identity Processes that Cause Corruption in Organisations to Grow, Journal of Business Ethics, 83(2):133-146
Getz, K.A. & Volkema, R.J. (2001) Culture, Perceived Corruption and Economics: A Model of Predictors and Outcomes, Business Society, 40(1):7-30
Heidenheimer, A.J. & Johnston, M. (2007)(eds) Political Corruption: Concepts & Contexts, 3rd edition, New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers
Hughes, R. & Coakley, J. (1991) ‘Positive Deviance Among Athletes: The Implications of Overconformity to the Sport Ethic’, Sociology of Sport Journal, 8(4):307-325
Kindra, G.S. & Stapenhurst, R. (1998) Social Marketing Strategies to Fight Corruption, The Economic Development Institute of the World Bank
Lloyd, C. & Walton, P. (1999) Reporting Corporate Crime, Corporate Communications: An International Journal, 4(1):43-48
Maennig, W. (2005) ‘Corruption in International Sports and Sport Management: Forms, Tendencies, Extent and Countermeasures’, European Sport Management Quarterly, 5(2):187-225
Maennig, W. (2008) Corruption in international sports and how it may be combated, IASE/NAASE Working Paper Series, Paper No. 08-13 (August 2008)
Mason, D.S. (1999) ‘What is the sports product and who buys it? The marketing of professional sports leagues’, European Journal of Marketing, 33(3/4):402-418
Paldam, M. (2002) The cross-country pattern of corruption: economics, culture and the seesaw dynamics, European Journal of Political Economy, 18(2002):215-240
Scott, J.C. (1972) Comparative Political Corruption, Englewood Cliffs, CA: Prentice Hall
Shen, C. & Williamson, J.B. (2005) Corruption, Democracy, Economic Freedom and State Strength: A Cross-National Analysis, International Journal of Comparative Sociology, 46(4):327-345
Senior, I. (2006) Corruption – The World’s Big C: Cases, Causes, Consequences, Cures, London, UK: The Institute of Economic Affairs
Simson, V. & Jennings, A. (1992) Dishonoured Games: Corruption Money & Greed At The Olympics, London, UK: Simon & Schuster Ltd.
Treisman, D. (2000) The causes of corruption: a cross-national study, Journal of Public Economics, 76(2000):399-457
Westberg, K., Stavros, C. & Wilson B. (2008b) An examination of the impact of player transgressions on sponsorship b2b relationships, International Journal of Sports Marketing & Sponsorship, January 2008:125-134
Wilson, B., Stavros, C. & Westberg, K. (2008) Player transgressions and the management of the sport sponsor relationship, Public Relations Review, 34 (2008):99-107

GB United? British Olympic Football and the end of the Amateur Dream.

Mon, 01 Nov 2010 13:59:00 +0100

This is the first chapter of the book GB United? British Olympic Football and the end of the Amateur Dream by author and journalist Steve Menary.

Introduction

“It would be great if our country could have a football team in the Olympics. To perform at the Olympics would be special for a lot of players. I might come out of retirement – if I’m retired by then!”
David Beckham, 2005

On 6 July 2005, Britain was alive with news that the world’s biggest sporting event was coming. The International Olympic Committee (IOC) had decided that in 2012, the Olympic Games would return to London, bringing the best athletes from virtually every sport on the planet, including one that few in Britain associate with the modern Olympiad – football.

Of all the Olympic sports, football today seems most out of kilter with the original Olympic spirit. A game obsessed with money. Wages, debts, transfer fees all seemingly inflated beyond belief. But football was not always like that. Just like the Olympics, football’s origins lay in playing the game for sport, for fun. Most people still play football that way today; the tackling rougher, the passes less accurate, but for no reward other than simply playing the game of football.

Britain’s last involvement with Olympic football had petered out more than three decades before London won the rights to host the 2012 Games and the prospect of a home team drew great interest.

“It would be great if our country could have a football team in the Olympics,” said England star David Beckham after London won the bid in 2005. “To perform at the Olympics would be special for a lot of players. I might come out of retirement – if I’m retired by then!”

But not long after those initial heady days, the squabbling over international football’s greatest anomaly began. In the Olympics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland is represented by one team in all sports. In football, the independence of the four Home Nations dates back to the game’s origins. No one was giving up their autonomy.

“The FAW will not undertake anything that would jeopardise its position as a separate nation within Fifa and Uefa,” said Football Association of Wales (FAW) secretary general David Collins. “Wales doesn’t want to compromise its position as a separate nation within Fifa and Uefa. It wants to continue playing football internationally as Wales. And I must say that everything I’ve heard from the Welsh media and the supporters in Wales fully endorses the [FAW] council’s decision.”

Fifa’s statutes included a special, longstanding rule permitting the independence of the four Home Nations. In 2004, these statutes were revised as part of a centenary project. Fifa’s executive committee discussed the “British statute” but its continuing role was not even put to a vote. Any of Fifa’s 208 members can question the statute. A change would require support from three-quarters of Fifa’s members but no challenges ever emerged because for many years there was little justification. London 2012 changed all that.

By late 2005, the Scotland Football Association (SFA) and the FAW had insisted that unless Fifa president Sepp Blatter back up in writing his verbal assurances that taking part in the Olympics would not damage their independence, they would not take part in 2012. With the Irish Football Association (IFA) representing Northern Ireland sitting warily on the fence, but then Prime Minister Gordon Brown advocating a united team – and Sir Alex Ferguson as manager – England’s Football Association (FA) were in a politically impossible position.

When David Will, a Scottish lawyer and former Fifa vice president, warned in October 2007 that Blatter’s verbal assurances could not be relied on, a united team was all but finished. Will told the BBC:

“There’s nothing to stop an association saying ‘the four British associations have played together at an Olympics so they can do at a World Cup as well’. We should not take the chance of joining a British team. I’m sure Sepp Blatter means what he says but why should the associations take that chance? I have never accepted that we should take such a risk. It is more important to be in the World Cup as independent associations than in the Olympics as one. For many years there were threats to the independence [of the Home Nations] and those could surface again.”

Blatter subsequently shifted his position in March 2008. To end British bickering over the issue, he suggested that a team comprised solely of English players play in London.

In early 2009, the Northern Irish, Scots and Welsh wrote a joint letter to the FA opposing the whole concept of a GB Olympic XI and refusing to discuss the idea ever again. Secretly, however, all four associations were thrashing out a deal. The Irish, Scots and Welsh agreed to let the FA take sole charge and only Englishmen would be British Olympic footballers in 2012.

The pact took the international game in Britain back more than a century, when football and the Olympics combined to produce the sport’s first real world championship. Then, only Englishmen represented Great Britain too – and everyone played for free.

Few players desire international football for the money but appearance fees are paid, although not disclosed by the likes of the FA. In the Olympics, commercial opportunities abound and few athletes in any discipline could be described as true amateurs, but no one gets appearance money.

That ethos was the one so loved by the public schools and their alumni that developed and codified football. These were gentlemen bred to uphold the British Empire and often lead battles. A Corinthian ideal on how to play the game emerged long before Baron Pierre de Coubertin began to put his dream of reviving the Olympics into play. In the British Isles, solidarity was praised with matches played to the highest standards of sportsmanship.
Should an opponent lose a player to injury, good form insisted that the other side simply take a man off to even up the sides. Matches were not to be played for trophies and leagues were not tolerated.

A Victorian trend for codification saw rules of the game formalised in 1863 and the FA was formed in London to agree regulations. The FA’s founders, those who set themselves up to run the game, came from southern England, the universities and the public schools. The FA’s first meeting in the evening of 26 October 1863 at the Freemason’s Tavern on Lincoln’s Inn Fields in central London included representatives from prestigious public schools like Blackheath Proprietary, Charterhouse and Kensington.

Those few clubs present, like Crusaders or the No Names XI, were all southern. Their organisation was not the English FA but the FA, still to this day the only one set up with no geographical boundaries. The game was more developed in Britain than anywhere else in the world and England’s pioneers were all amateurs, gentlemen of the sport, purists. Men who believed in that Olympian ideal of sport for sport’s sake and neither wanted nor needed money to compete.

“You see, it is not worth the while of a university or public school man to run the risk of accepting payment for his services on the football field,” said Charles Wreford-Brown, England’s captain in the mid-1890s. “Taking wages and presents, a good pro makes about £5 a week all the year round but just think what a public school or university man, or anybody of social position, would lose if he were discovered taking money secretly.”

Born in Bristol in 1866, Charles Wreford-Brown is the epitome of the footballing gentleman. A fine all-round sportsman, who later played county cricket for Gloucestershire and chess for Britain, his football career started out in goal before the burly Wreford-Brown moved to centre-half. His skills won him five full England caps and his wit a footnote in the game’s history.

After leaving Charterhouse, Wreford-Brown went to Oriel College, Oxford. On leaving his digs one day with his sports kit a passing friend stopped Wreford-Brown. Public schoolboys of the day often added “er” to the end of words. Wreford-Brown was asked if he was playing “rugger” as rugby union was then known. Football was “association” or “soc” and, with a touch of wit, Wreford-Brown added the obligatory “er” and replied that “no,” he was off to play “soccer”. Football suddenly had a new name. It stuck.

Wreford-Brown loved football and the Corinthian spirit mirrored in de Coubertin’s new Olympic movement. Over the years, Wreford-Brown would lead efforts to keep these values untainted, reacting against increasing commercialisation that would prompt many of his peers to turn their backs on soccer.

When the FA Cup had been set up in 1871, the competition was dominated by Wreford-Brown’s social elite and their Old Boys’ clubs. Winners in the first decade included grand old names such as Old Etonians and Old Carthusians, a club for ex-Charterhouse students such as Wreford-Brown.

Football was also well established in Scotland, driven partly by the foundation in 1867 of gentlemen’s side Queen’s Park in Glasgow. Internationals between England and Scotland began in 1872. The Scottish FA (SFA) was created the following year – the first of many dividing lines in the history of British football.

The game changed rapidly as more people began to benefit from stopping work halfway through a Saturday. Working men now had time to play and watch this sport that the gentlemen loved. When organised football under the auspices of the FA had begun, all players were amateurs but secret payments quickly started.

By the 1870s, football was a popular spectator sport and clubs such as Aston Villa began taking gate money. Players in turn asked for travel expenses. The sport was drifting towards professionalism in both England and Scotland, where young Scotsmen were being lured south by better pay. The SFA responded by barring these exiles from their national team.

In 1882 the English FA ruled that a player receiving “remuneration or consideration of any sort above his actual expenses and any wages actually lost” would be banned for an indefinite period. Clubs immediately looked for ways round this rule. Ruses ranged from duplicate sets of accounts to paying players for non-existent jobs outside football.

To many of the gentlemen, money was perverting their sporting idyll. Nothing symbolised this ague more than Scotland routinely gaining the upper hand over England in the annual fixture. For ferocious English gentlemen such as NL “Pa” Jackson, this was simply untenable. A response was needed to combat money and the Scots. The answer was the formation of a private members’ club for university graduates and ex-public schoolboys to play together regularly and strengthen the England side.

Corinthian FC was created in the 1882/83 season to play friendly matches against the public schools and top professional sides. The aim of these matches was to instruct the opponents in how to play the game and also boost England. Over the next seven seasons, 88 England caps were awarded for the matches against Scotland – 52 went to Corinthian players.

The gentlemen had briefly re-established themselves but nothing could stop the juggernaut of professionalism. Underhand payments were rife. On 20 July 1885, the FA accepted that the situation was uncontrollable. Professionalism was ushered in.

Earnings varied from 30 shillings a week at Sunderland to players taking a cut of the gate receipts at Birmingham. To uncompromising Corinthian idealists like Jackson, these professionals were known as players. Anyone who played for free was a gentleman. In match programmes, professionals were listed solely by their surnames but amateurs’ initials were included as a prefix, so everyone knew who took money and who did not.

Jackson even preferred to separate gentlemen from players wherever possible outside of matches. When England sent a squad on tour to Germany in 1909, Jackson was reported as being “astounded” that amateurs and professionals in the team not only travelled in the same train carriages but ate and went to concerts together.

Not everyone was as obdurate as Jackson. Steve Bloomer, a leading professional with Derby County, recalled playing an international match against Scotland, when Wreford-Brown was his captain. The moustachioed Wreford-Brown played in long shorts with side pockets full of money. After each professional scored a goal, the patrician Wreford-Brown pressed a coin into the palm of the scorer’s hand.

The social divides were not as extreme as cricket, where gentlemen would often insist on separate dressing rooms from the professional players, but as football clubs in the Midlands and the North embraced professionalism and recruited working-class players, the isolation of the southern gentlemen amateurs increased.

The people that created the distinction between “association football” and “rugby football” and set down the rules were losing their grip, but chances to retain their status were there. When the Football League was set up in 1888, one early plan included seven professional clubs from the Midlands and the North and one from the South – the gentlemen amateurs of Old Carthusians – but to the league’s founders, like the Birmingham shopkeeper William McGregor, there was no place in his competition for these dinosaurs. Football’s history played out very differently.

The idea of an amateur club playing in the English professional league would linger for decades but the days of gentlemen winning the FA Cup were gone. In 1894, to sate the demands of ambitious gentlemen who wanted a competition that they could win, the FA set up the Amateur Cup. PA Jackson was chairman of the FA Amateur Cup Sub-Committee, who spent £30 on a splendid trophy. To put that sum in context, a farm labourer could expect £25 for a year’s work tilling fields.

That first tournament featured a host of clubs well established in the professional elite today, including Tottenham Hotspur, Middlesbrough, Ipswich Town and Reading. The first champions in 1894, however, were Old Carthusians, with Wreford-Brown dominant at centre-half. He missed the next year’s final, when Old Carthusians lost to Middlesbrough but returned in 1887 to claim another winners’ medal.

Corinthians sat out the competition, thinking it beneath them, but the Casuals, another amateur club set up for Old Boys from Charterhouse, Eton and Westminster, soon took part. The two clubs were always close (and shortly before World War Two would merge) and an early pact saw Corinth – as Corinthians were often known – standing aside to allow Casuals a clear run at the Amateur Cup, but the Old Boys’ clubs soon lost interest in the trophy. Old Carthusians did not even bother to defend the trophy they had won in 1897.

Many of these gentlemen’s clubs existed in a sporting nether world, oblivious to changes in the sport, notably the introduction of the penalty kick in 1891, which was deemed unsporting and often simply ignored. “Penalties are an unpleasant indication that our conduct and honesty is not all it should be,” an Old Carthusians official told The Times after a debate between the club and Casuals before the 1894 Amateur Cup final in Richmond.

When the Arthur Dunn Cup for public schools later began in 1902/03, many of the Old Boys’ clubs quit the Amateur Cup for their own exclusive competition, away from the established amateur game, now often full of working-class amateur teams. Seeing their peers sidelined on the pitch, gentlemen like Pa Jackson and Wreford-Brown, who loathed gambling on sport, saw money streaming through the game and instead looked to influence the running of the game.

In 1886, the FA introduced match fees for internationals of 10 shillings a game. Amateurs playing for England took nothing. In 1891, the Football League first tried to regulate wages. This was partly to pacify the avarice of club owners but also underpinned the amateur game by making professionalism unpopular in terms of earnings for any gentlemen tempted to go pro. Initially, players could earn no more than £10 a week. This was a maximum not an average, and for the next 70 years footballers would struggle to free themselves from this yoke.

In 1901, the clubs tightened their grip. A maximum wage of £4 a week was put in place. That wage was twice what a works foreman earned and four times a farm labourer’s take-home pay. Only the very top players received such a sum, while a works foreman and farm labourer generally had better terms and conditions than a footballer. The game also developed the invidious retain-and-transfer system, where players were kept at clubs after their contract expired. Unless transferred or agreeing to a new club proposed contract, players had to stay with the club – usually unpaid.

A fledgling players’ union foundered in 1901 but six years later the Association of Football Players and Trainers Union (the forerunner of the PFA) was formed. Negotiations with the Football League produced a rise in 1910, taking the maximum wage to £5 – on the proviso this was paid in two rises of 10 shillings apiece after two and four years of service respectively.

When World War One broke out, wages were cut until after the war. The union protested and a rise to £9 a week was secured in 1920. International match fees, last increased in 1908 to £4 a game, went up to £6 a game. For non-international players, this settlement was not great. Players new to the league started on £5 a week and the new rise came in increments of an extra £1 per week each year. To reach the top of the pay scale was a lengthy business. The union protested, asking for £10 a week, but membership was weak.

In 1922, the league draconically cut the maximum wage to £8 in the playing season and £6 in the 15-week summer break. The PFA agitated but the limit stayed right up until 1945, when the close-season rate went up to £7 a week. By comparison, average manual workers then were earning about £24 a week. Little wonder that playing football was seen as unattractive.

A handful of talented amateurs with sufficient time to train played in the Football League but with many eschewing the professional game altogether, a flourishing amateur scene developed around northern England and the London area. Gentlemen such as Wreford-Brown had mostly vanished from the pitch but their influence within the FA produced legislation to protect their credo.

An amateur who tried but failed to break into the professional game faced an uncertain future. Players needed to seek reinstatement as an amateur from the FA. This was possible but far from certain. Former Olympian Hugh Lindsay, widely regarded as one of the most talented amateurs never to turn professional, explains that:

“If you didn’t make it as a pro you couldn’t even play on a Sunday. All you could do was go into the Southern league with the other old pros. In some ways, the professional game was a bit of a closed shop, them and us between the amateurs and the professionals. If you went in as a mature person, you were looked on as an amateur because most of the lads had been apprentices and cleaned the boots. If you waltzed in at 20 or 21, you weren’t always looked on that favourably.”

The maximum wage continued to make the professional game unattractive for anyone with aspirations of a decent wage but in 1947 the PFA achieved its biggest breakthrough by forcing the introduction of minimum pay levels. At the bottom, a professional aged between 17 and 18 would be paid at least £3 a week. For players aged 20 and over, the base rate was £7 a week in the season and £5 in the break. These negotiations, which involved a National Arbitration Tribunal, set the maximum wage at £12 a week in the season and £10 a week in the summer. This ruling applied to England, Scotland, Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland.

Another raise was secured in 1951 – to £14 a week – and the next year, playing internationals became even more attractive when appearance fees surged 50 per cent to £30 a game. As the austerity of the 1950s passed, earnings were gradually pushed up to a playing season maximum of £20 with a floor for players aged over 20 of £8 a week. Most players outside the top flight, however, still earned less than the maximum set by the Football League right back in 1891, but the restrictions put on the game were slowly unravelling.

Entertainment tax had been introduced during World War One, but in 1957 activities such as football and theatre were exempted. This freed up more money and the players knew it. In 1960, when the average manual worker’s wage was £56 a week, Jimmy Hill’s PFA made further wage demands that were backed up by a strike threat. The following year the league caved in. The maximum wage was finally abolished.

Football became even more of a free-for-all as amateur clubs used money from the entertainment tax exemption to fuel higher secret payments to players. This had always gone on but shamateurism as the practice became known was rampant by the 1960s. The FA again tried to legislate with rules, such as banning players from signing for clubs more than 50 miles from home. This was aimed at stopping teams that flagrantly attracted the best players with big enough secret payments to make lengthy trips worthwhile, but the amateur ideal was in its dog days; nowhere more so than at the Olympics.

The amateur code had supported British footballing efforts at the Olympics, which ranged over six decades from glorious success to failures that were sometimes pitiful, sometimes valiant. For the amateur players, the Olympics was the peak of their ambition, offering an often once-in-a-lifetime experience rarely available to their peers, an opportunity to mix with the world’s greatest athletes in all disciplines, a chance to travel to places that so many people could only dream of. This is their story.

Steve Menary is a regular contributor to Play the Game and his new book on the history of the GB Olympic football team, ‘GB United? British Olympic football and the end of the amateur dream’ is published by Pitch Publications.

The book can be ordered at https://www.amazon.co.uk/GB-United-British-Olympic-Football/dp/1905411928/ref=sr_1_4?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1283774855&sr=1-4