The Insider’s Guide to Match-Fixing in Football

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TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY ARE CRITICAL TO RESTORING TRUST AND TURNING BACK THE TIDE OF CORRUPTION

With governance committing huge sums to tackle the world’s most pressing problems, from the instability of financial markets to climate change and poverty, corruption remains an obstacle to achieving much needed progress.

The 2013 Corruption Perceptions Index shows that nearly three quarters of the 176 countries in the index score below five, on a scale from 10 (very clean) to 0 (highly corrupt). These results indicate a serious corruption problem.

To address these challenges, governments need to integrate anti-corruption measures in all spheres, from their responses to the financial crisis and climate change to commitments by the international community to eradicate poverty. Transparency international advocates stronger implementation of the UN Convention Against Corruption, the only global initiative that provides a framework for putting an end to corruption.

Denmark, New Zealand and Singapore are tied at the top of the list with a score of 9.5, followed closely by Finland and Sweden at 9.3. At the bottom is Somalia with a score of 1.1, slightly trailing Myanmar and Afghanistan at 1.4 and Iraq at 1.5.

Moccles among decliners over the past year are some of the country’s most affected by a financial crisis precipitated by transparency and integrity deficits. Among those improving in the past year, the general absence of OECD states underlines the fact that all nations need to bolster their good governance mechanisms.

The message is clear: across the globe, transparency and accountability are critical to restoring trust and turning back the tide of corruption. Without them, global policy solutions to many global crises are at risk.
THE JAPANESE MAFIA

Yakuza, Law, and the State

PETER B. E. HILL
Functional benefits of corruption (Merton)

"The only thing worse than a society with a rigid, over-centralized dishonest bureaucracy, is one with a rigid, over-centralized honest bureaucracy."


Supported by:

Goldsmith (1999) Correlates of political corruption in emerging markets
Theobald (1990) Corruption, Development and Underdevelopment
Leff (1964) Economic Development through bureaucratic corruption
Nye (1967) Corruption and Political Development
“HOLMES GAVE ME A SKETCH OF THE EVENTS.”
“The tragedy has been so uncommon, so complete, and of such personal importance to so many people that we are suffering from a plethora of surmise, conjecture, and hypothesis. The difficulty is to detach the framework of fact–of absolute undeniable fact–from the embellishments of theorists and reporters.”

Sir Arthur Conan Doyle – The Silver Blaze – 1891
Other Topics

- “Missing the Big Boys: Why some leagues have more corruption than others”

- “To fix or not to fix? Why club officials decide to fix matches”

- “Give me one of their phone numbers: Why some players fix matches”

- “Offers you can’t refuse: Are people coerced into fixing?”

- “The Murder Rate of Capone’s Chicago and Favour Banks: how the system works”

- “Can I trust you? How to fix a football match”

- “What the hell do you think you’re doing? How referees and players perform fixed matches”
Four Types of Facts

1. Facts we know, we know.
2. Facts we do not know, we know.
3. Facts we know, we do not know.
4. Facts we do not know, we do not know.

Michael Polanyi – ‘Tacit Knowledge’
University of Arizona’s Curriculum on Medical Ignorance (CMI)
[Q-Cubed: Questions, questioning and questioners "Ignorance Map"]
Documents for Qualitative Research

1) Thesis statement - “This thesis is about….”

2) Chronology - What happened and when
   • List of questions - The simpler the better
   • List of people to interview -
METHOD ONE

CONFESSION DATABASE

Only people with direct knowledge of fixing - players, coaches, officials, referees, corruptors, etc speaking about their methods.
**Senior Player:** The first goal must come immediately. Even before the people take their seats. That way it is not noticed so much. And then two more, as they develop, but all in the first half.

**Junior Player:** And in the second half?

**Senior Player:** (laughing) In the second half we all lie down and take a nap.

**Junior Player:** (worried) But this will not look bad?

**Senior Player:** Look bad to who? Do not worry. No one pays attention at these times. Everyone looks the other way. Only be careful never to shoot at the Bari goal tomorrow. That would be a mistake.
Genoa Coach: What the fuck is going on? Your player just scored a goal!? 

Venice Coach: I know, I know. The players are crazy! They scored by mistake!
It was an ongoing process that I wasn’t aware of anymore in the end. It affected me in a way that I stopped noticing things going on around me. I only hung out at this café, at some point it was like my second living-room. I was around all the time. I was there eight days out of the week and was treated by them like a very special person (Robert Hoyzer, 2005).
Art Hicks: U.S. Basketball Player

One thing you never heard about the gamblers is how good they were at what they did. They were experts at human nature and that’s why so few of the kids they approached ever turned them down. They catch you at just the right time, when you’re vulnerable. They can look at a kid’s game and see there ain’t no love there… Whatever the problem, they knew how to exploit it. The gambler becomes the most reliable person in your life. He replaces the coach.
Appendix 2 Example of Confession Databank

Note: This is an excerpt from the covertly recorded conversations between a Belgian criminal Jean Elst and Raymond DeDecker the "Referees coordinator" of the team Anderlecht. It is 1984 and Anderlecht is in the European Cup, but is suffering from a loss of form. De Decker decides to try and bribe the referee for the upcoming match against Banik Ostrava. He asks Elst to approach the referee, an Englishman Graham Hackett.

Cassette 1: Anderlecht vs. Banik Ostrava

{Access}{Agents}
Jean: Hello.

Raymond: Jean, it is Raymond here.

Jean: Hey buddy, what did you need me for so urgently?

Raymond: I'd like to ask you something, but it has to stay between the two of us.

Jean: So what is it about?

Raymond: Is there a possibility that you could set something up for Anderlecht? I immediately thought of you and I am convinced that you are the guy who could do these things. {/Agents}{/Access}
METHOD TWO

QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS (STATISTICS)

**Fixed Match Database:** 137 matches that were judicially proven to have been corrupted; and 120 matches that we can reasonably presume to have been played honestly.

**Fixing/Non-Fixing Players Database (FPD):**
117 players who were approached to fix a match.
93 fixed, 24 who refused.
Penalties: honest vs. fixed matches – by corruptees

- Control Group 1
- Control Group 2
- Players Corrupted
- Referees Corrupted

[Diagram showing the percentage of matches with penalties vs. matches without penalties for each group.]
Own Goals: honest vs. fixed matches – by corruptees

[Graph showing comparison between Referee, Players, and Control Group 1 with and without Own Goals]
Red Cards: honest vs. fixed matches – by corruptees

- Control Group 1
- Control Group 2
- Players Corrupted
- Referee Corrupted

% With Red Cards / % Without Red Cards
Time of season vs. Corruptee as player

Quadrant of Season

- Referee
- Player

1st  2nd  3rd  4th  Knockout
Goalk eepers  
Defenders  
Midfielders  
Forw ards

Actual  
1-5-3  
1-4-4  
1-4-3-3
Ages of Briber Players in the Malysian League 1994

- 0–25: 4 players
- 25–29: 12 players
- Over 30: 11 players
Ages of Bribed Players vs. Average Age of Players

- **Players who Fixed Matches**
- **Percentage of players in age group**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Percentage of Players</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0-24</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>25-29</td>
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<tr>
<td>over 30</td>
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METHOD THREE

INTERVIEWS

Bettors (B1) - 23
Corruptor (COR 1) - 10
Player (P1) - 37
Referees (R1) - 6
Sports Official (SO1) - 50
Law Enforcement (LE 1) - 21
Journalists (J1) - 24
Others (O1) - 13
Michael Franzese: USA

• Capo in Colombo crime family
• Made billion dollars in gas tax scheme
• Helped extort athletes
• Fixed baseball, basketball and boxing matches
Example of Interview Notes

Interview notes with P2

Date and time: May 9, 2005 Ė 3.00 to 5.50 pm
Hotel Malaya in Chinatown, Kuala Lumpur

Background: Ex-midfield player for Selangor (the ÓManchester UnitedÓ of the Malaysian league) and the Malaysian National Team.

Summary:

- Claims that one in four of the games were fixed during the 1980s.
- Claims that he was approached once to fix a match.
- That the key component was a small group of players within the structure of the team. They, more than coaches, had sway on the playing decisions. They decided which games would be fixed, which players would be asked to join the fix.
- The fees paid to the fixing players were bet so as to double the price paid to fixing players.

Interview

{2nd_stage_setup }{Specific_games}I{ Motivations_players }I{ Motivations_players } was approached to fix a game once. It was dreadful. We were doing very well. We had won 9 games in a row. No losses. A senior player came to me and offered me 20,000 RM to fix the next match [later says it is against Perlis, state team from north of country]. I told him no, I was not interested. }{/Motivations_players} {/2nd_stage_setup}