Implementation and compliance of good governance in international sports organisations

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Part I: Implementation

Sports organizations and their members and events are often dependent on a mix of revenues including public and private subsidies. Therefore, it is in the clear interest of European taxpayers, corporate companies and sports fans that sports organizations govern their affairs in an efficient, transparent, accountable and democratic manner.

(…)

To achieve better governance in sport, many sports organizations need to revise their internal and external mechanisms to cope with the ongoing commercialization, professionalization and globalization of sport.”

(Source: Play the Game (2011), Grant application form 2011, Project proposal 'Action for good governance in sport').

According to this quote, a number of actors and agents have the goal or objective to improve the current governance in international sport federations (IF’s). One of the issues is: How can the desired situation (i.e. the adoption and compliance of good governance policy and code(s) in IF’s) be realised? Or, in other words, how can the process between the establishment of a goal/objective and the final elaboration in practice be achieved?

This issue is about policy implementation (O'Toole, 2000). Implementing policy seems simple: One sets political-administrative ambitions, translates these to concrete policy goals and measures, organizes the necessary resources, chooses the right role as policy maker, mobilises stakeholders and achieves implementation. These are the standard ingredients of an attractive implementation strategy. But, actual implementation processes are often more stubborn.

This contribution focuses on existing implementation theory, in order to draw a picture of the unruly practice in general and that of IF’s in particular. We will discuss possible implementation and control strategies for adoption of good governance in the specific contexts of IF’s.

Investigating implementation

The implementation theory, which arose mainly from the 70s, is substantial. Inside this theory, there are different views about what implementation is or what it should be. Overall, three generations of implementation research can be distinguished (DeLeon and DeLeon, 2006; Fitz, 1994):
1. The first generation of implementation research is almost invariably associated with the authors Pressman and Wildavsky (1973) and their study of the Oakland project. These and other authors examine case studies in which they decompose the problems in the implementation processes. Ultimately, the researchers did not succeed in developing a generic theory, but their analysis remains limited to drawing lessons learned about actual policy implementation in the light of original goals (which are translated and deformed through execution).

2. In the late ’70s, early ’80s, academics mainly thought about implementation from the top-down perspective (see e.g. Sabatier and Mazmanian, 1979; Hoogerwerf 2003). The leading question is: how can one ensure that centrally developed plans can be implemented in practice as intended by its makers? One of the clearest illustrations of the dominant top-down model of implementation is that produced by Lewis Gunn (1978) who argued that, for effective policy implementation, the following ten criteria would have to be met. Table 1 summarises Gunn’s ideal type of top-down implementation.

Table 1: An ideal model of perfect policy implementation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criteria</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Circumstances external to the implementing agency do not impose crippling constraint.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Adequate time and sufficient resources are made available to the program.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Not only are there no constraints in terms of overall resources but also that, at each stage in the implementation process, the required combination of resources is actually available.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Policy implemented is based upon a valid theory of cause and effect.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>The relationship between cause and effect is direct and that there are few, if any, intervening links.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>There is a single implementing agency which need not depend upon other agencies for success or, if other agencies must be involved, that the dependency relationships are minimal in number and importance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>There is complete understanding of, and agreement upon, the objectives to be achieved; and that these conditions persist throughout the implementation process.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>In moving towards agreed objectives it is possible to specify, in complete detail and perfect sequence, the tasks to be performed by each participant.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>There is perfect communication among, and co-ordination of, the various elements or agencies involved in the program.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Those in authority can demand and obtain perfect obedience</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Gunn 1978

3. As an ideal type Gunn’s list of criteria are valuable in understanding why policies such as good governance might not be implemented fully or indeed at all. For example, the fourth criterion (a valid theory of cause and effect) is open to much debate regarding the likely effect of ‘good governance’ on a range of stakeholder groups and whether those groups perceive the ‘effect’ as a desirable or beneficial one.

4. In the early 80s, simultaneously with this top-down approach, a strong focus on bottom-up processes arises (see e.g. Lipsky, 1980). So-called street level bureau-
Bureaucrats are seen as key to implementation: they are decisive for the successful or failed execution of policy. From this perspective, implementation cannot be separated from policy making; implementation is part of policy making, because the performer helps shape policy. Others, e.g. Yanow (1989) further encouraged this approach: policy especially is ‘made’, where it is executed. Within IFs those charged with responsibility for implementing good governance policy and practices will, it is argued, of necessity have to adapt policy to suit the particular circumstances of the federation (money, staff expertise, requirements of commercial partners, legal context etc.). While often ‘street level bureaucrats are seen as conservatives resisting change on the basis of self-interest, a more sympathetic view is that they are simply pragmatists – doing their best to achieve implementation in accordance with constraining local circumstances. What they lack is not commitment but rather capacity.

Overall, existing literature on implementation roughly brings forward two basic dimensions, which are important to distinguish implementation types:

5. The extent to which implementation is a top-down (vertical) or bottom up (horizontal) phenomenon;
6. The extent to which implementation emanates from a ‘design’ or blueprint of a steering actor (schedule), or from an arena with several actors (interactions).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Primate of control</th>
<th>Control via:</th>
<th>Arena/actors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vertical</td>
<td><strong>Control model</strong>&lt;br&gt;Control by hierarchy</td>
<td><strong>Decentralisation model</strong>&lt;br&gt;Control by frameworks, conditions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Horizontal</td>
<td><strong>Participation model</strong>&lt;br&gt;Cooperation, focus on plan making</td>
<td><strong>Interaction model</strong>&lt;br&gt;Evolution of policy execution</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Based on, among others: Hoogerwerf, 2003; Smith, 1973; Sabatier and Mazmanian, 1979; Pressman and Wildasky, 1973; Hill and Hupe, 2002; DeLeon and DeLeon, 2002; Majone and Wildavsky, 1979)

DeLeon and DeLeon (2002) conclude, when they overlook the implementation theory up to now, that no single implementation strategy can be formulated. There is no ‘one size fits all’ strategy possible, the context is decisive for the success of a chosen implementation strategy. Thus, in some cases a bottom-up approach is suitable, but in other cases a top-down approach is appropriate.
Also, Matland (1995) indicates for example that the degree to which there is:

- Ambiguity: discussion on the policy objectives, and
- Conflict: discussion of the means to achieve goals determines the gradient of the implementation. Actors should adopt their implementation strategy accordingly.

Policy implementation is about the relationship(s) and coordination of policy in a specific context. This context is – to elaborate on the degree of ambiguity and conflict – by definition multi-level (different layers within the government and society are involved in policy), distributed (the various actors are spread and different), path dependent (previous decisions framing the possibilities for the future) and politicised.

### Achieving implementation

The stakeholders that want to implement good governance in IFs face the following question: What implementation strategy is appropriate in the specific contexts of IFs?

We define implementation strategy as how implementation is formed by one of the actors involved in implementation, aimed at realizing and optimizing policy impact. In essence, an implementation strategy - within each type of relationship – is about the creation of some form of coordinated action. The way coordination (and thus the implementation strategy) is designed, can vary and depends partly on the relationship and the context in which policy should take place. There are several possible coordination mechanisms, both directly and indirectly more (freely derived from Mintzberg, 1983):

- Approximation: for small projects involving close contact between the actors involved.
- Direct supervision
- Standardisation of work, through rules, procedures
- Standardisation of results, focusing on output / performance
- Standardisation of knowledge and skills through professional development of workers in the field or be the implementers of policy

If we sell the coordination mechanisms at the different implementation strategies, we get the following diagram.

### Table 3: Coordination alternatives per implementation type

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Primate of control:</th>
<th>Control via:</th>
<th>Arena/actors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Schedule/design</td>
<td>Arena/actors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vertical</td>
<td>• Supervision</td>
<td>• Standardisation of output</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Standardisation through rules</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Horizontal</td>
<td>• Intensive cooperation in planning phase</td>
<td>• Standardisation of skills</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Creation of commitment</td>
<td>• Mutual, but non-participatory adaptation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Danish Institute for Sports Studies

Play the Game
Strategies to implement good governance in international federations

The promotion of good governance in international sport federations differs from international conventions in three important ways: first, good governance is mainly a set of principles rather than a set of definite requirements; second, there is no single internationally agreed set of good governance principles against which the behaviour of IFs can be measured; and third, there is no generally recognised international organisation which is acknowledged as the ‘guardian’ of good governance.

In the case of IFs, it can be argued that the context for implementation of good governance is mainly characterized by a high degree of ambiguity about the policy objectives, both within and between the IFs and between IFs and a large number of stakeholders. The extent to which a coherent and publicly accepted model of good governance exists is low. There are also different views on how good governance can best be achieved. Much of the debate about implementation of good governance policies and practices is underpinned by a top-down model of policy implementation. Within AGGIS, it is important to look at how control within IFs occurs or may occur, and to what extent a top-down approach is appropriate within the context of good governance and IFs. To control good governance is very complex and within IFs opposition may exist.

If we consider the total playing field, an interaction approach seems – according to the implementation theory – most appropriate in a context of various and inequitable actors, without clear hierarchy and power to control. This would argue for a strategy of standardisation of skills and mutual, but non-participatory adoption.
Part II: Compliance

Introduction

The study of compliance draws upon a number of related themes in academic research, most notably the literature on policy change, policy implementation and the monitoring and assessment of compliance.

Questions such as ‘What would encourage the adoption of good governance principles by IFs?’ and ‘Why do some IFs adopt principles of good governance while others do not?’ can best be answered by reference to the rich research literature on policy stability and change. Table 1 summarises some of the main explanations of policy stability and change and makes clear the wide range of possible processes ranging from informal processes to legally imposed international agreements. Selected explanations/processes are discussed below in a little more detail.

Investigating compliance

Policy learning, lesson-drawing and policy transfer

Implicit in much of the discussion of the development of public policy is the assumption that countries learn from each other and that a process of policy transfer is in operation: such assumptions can also be applied to non-governmental organisations. At a common sense level policy learning and policy transfer are attractive. All IFs are in competition with each other for scarce resources such as talented athletes, commercial sponsorship, broadcasting opportunities and access to major multi-sport events such as the Olympic and Paralympic Games. Some IFs are also in competition with commercial providers, for example triathlon and marathon, or player organised events (such as in golf and tennis).
Table 1: Good governance, international sport federations and selected mechanisms of policy change

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimension</th>
<th>Policy learning</th>
<th>Policy transfer</th>
<th>Path dependency</th>
<th>Mimetic isomorphism</th>
<th>Engineered normative convergence</th>
<th>Imposition through policy regimes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Likely locus of initiative</td>
<td>International arena</td>
<td>International</td>
<td>International</td>
<td>International</td>
<td>International/ national governmental</td>
<td>International</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Likely lead actor/ organisation</td>
<td>International federations, governments, interest groups</td>
<td>International federation</td>
<td>International federation or other ISO e.g. IOC</td>
<td>International sport organisations (IOC, CGF); governmental organisation (CoE, EU, UNESCO); and/or lobby organisations (Play the Game)</td>
<td>International policy regime</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basis of engagement</td>
<td>Voluntary</td>
<td>Voluntary</td>
<td>Constrained</td>
<td>Uncertainty</td>
<td>Voluntary, but also social pressure</td>
<td>Compulsion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Key relationships</td>
<td>Bi-lateral</td>
<td>Bi-lateral i.e. one IF transferring practices from an exemplar</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Multi-lateral</td>
<td>Multi-lateral; role for weak (non-legal) policy regime</td>
<td>Multi-lateral/ policy regime lead agency, but can be bi-lateral</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nature of power (explicit, agenda setting, ideological)</td>
<td>Both overt and ideological</td>
<td>Ideological</td>
<td>Agenda control</td>
<td>Ideological</td>
<td>Normative, socialisation, ideological</td>
<td>Explicit, usually based on international law or quasi-legal agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good governance</td>
<td>Pattern of regular contact through ASOIF, ANOC, AIOWF, IOC; decisions by CAS; meetings with domestic federations</td>
<td>Need to understand the pattern of relationships between IFs. Are there ‘families’ of IFs which tend to transfer ‘lessons between each other?</td>
<td>Acceptance of key aspects of good governance makes it difficult to avoid the extension of good governance practices in the IF</td>
<td>Adoption of many policies and management practices from major IFs or the IOC</td>
<td>Accumulation of pressure through engineering social expectations</td>
<td>World Anti-Doping Agency</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: adapted from Houlihan 2009

The cluster of related concepts of ‘policy learning’, ‘lesson-drawing’ and ‘policy transfer’ has featured prominently in much recent analysis of policy change. Policy-learning is
rooted in an Eastonian systems model of the policy process where the policy-making cycle is regularly energised by feedback on the impact of existing policy. While the process of policy learning within IFs can be largely confined to learning from its more innovative national members it is accepted that policy learning can, and increasingly does, involve analyses of policy and practice in similar organisations. More recent conceptualisations of governmental policy learning have emphasised the intentional aspect of the process which moves beyond feedback on existing policy and involves the systematic scanning of the environment for policy ideas (see Yamamoto, 2008). While it is to be expected that IFs would engage in intentional scanning of the governance policies and practices of their competitors and also of the governance expectations of their existing or potential partners (corporate sponsors, event organising bodies and host governments for example).

Policy transfer refers to the process by which the lessons learnt (see Rose 2005, for a fuller discussion of lesson-drawing) are transferred: how lessons are internalised, how lessons are recorded and described and how they are incorporated into a different organisational infrastructure and value system in the importing organisation. Bearing in mind that organisational policy can be variously conceptualised as aspiration, action (involving the commitment of resources) or inaction (Hogwood, 1987; Jenkins, 1978; Heclo, 1972) Rose (2005, p. 16) defines policy transfer as 'action-oriented intentional activity'. An awareness of the extent to which the transfer mechanism facilitates or constrains transfer is crucial. For example, in many IFs the governing board may inhibit the transfer of good governance lessons (because they challenge the interests of board members) even though the lesson is clearly understood and the potential benefits to the federation are acknowledged. As should be clear the analysis of the transfer process is as important as an understanding of the process of policy learning and lesson drawing. Lessons may well be accurately learned but be imperfectly transferred or transferred to an unsupportive organisational infrastructure or an unsympathetic value system.

The attractiveness of the concepts of policy-learning and transfer are not without problems, the most obvious of which are the difficulty of explaining how policy makers learn (Oliver, 1997), what constitutes learning (Bennett and Howlett, 1992), how learning might be quantified (Pierson, 1993) and what motivates organisations to learn. This last point is especially relevant in relation to good governance as for many IFs the costs will be more apparent than the benefits. In addition there are substantial concerns relating to the process by which lessons are communicated and transferred policies are recreated in the receiving organisation. These concerns notwithstanding, it is clear that policy learning and transfer are well established practices within many organisations in the sport subsector.

International policy regimes: organisational power or the power of ideas?
Krasner defines regimes as ‘sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations’ (1983, p. 2). While Krasner was referring explicitly to governmental international policy regimes his definition can be easily applied to non-governmental regimes or to hybrid regimes (of which the nascent ‘good governance’
regime might be an example). In attempting to operationalize this concept it is argued that successful regimes possess some or all of the following characteristics: first, they exhibit a degree of stability in the pattern of relationships between actors and, by implication possess some process by which voices/interests can be acknowledged or ignored; second, regimes possess the organisational capacity to fulfil maintenance functions, such as agenda setting, policy monitoring and review, verification of compliance and, in some, the enforcement of compliance; and third, regimes actively defend and promote their values.

Many regimes therefore have an identifiable organisational capacity, such as a permanent secretariat, while others fulfil regime maintenance functions through the actions of one or more member states or organisations as, for example, does the United States in maintaining the regimes associated with the GATT agreement and WADA and CAS do in relation to the World Anti-Doping Code. The organisational significance of the non-governmental organisations such as IFs, the IOC and Play the Game in relation to good governance may be complemented, augmented or replaced by state organisations such as the Council of Europe, EU or individual governments. It has also been suggested that direction and organisational capacity can be provided by an epistemic community which Haas has described as ‘a network of professionals with recognised expertise and competence in a particular ... issue area’ (1992, p. 3). Arguing that ‘control over knowledge and information is an important dimension of power’, Haas suggests that the potential of epistemic communities to exercise influence increases with uncertainty and with inter-organisational resource dependence. Uncertainty and dependence are characteristics of aspects of governance relations.

The most common explanation for the formation of regimes and the mechanisms by which they exert influence is that they are the creatures, if not the products, of hegemonic self-interest, where ‘stronger states [or organisations] in the policy sector will dominate the weaker ones and determine the rules of the game’ (Keohane and Nye, 1977). It is possible to argue that the putative good governance regime fits this analysis as the policy could be interpreted as seeking to reform IFs in order to make them more suitable partners for corporate and governmental interests.

An alternative, and less state-centred, explanation for the formation of regimes assumes that ideas matter, first, in creating a predisposition to co-operate and comply, and second, in explaining the content of regime rules and how they evolve. According to Nadelmann, in his study of global prohibition regimes, ‘moral and emotional factors related neither to political nor economic advantage but instead involving religious beliefs, humanitarian sentiments ... conscience, paternalism, fear, prejudice and the compulsion to proselytise can and do play important roles in the creation and the evolution of international regimes’ (1990, p. 480). Checkel (see also Risse et al 1999) also emphasises the importance of ideas as a source of influence and argues that international institutions are often effective in shaping policy due to a process of socialisation of key domestic policy actors in government such that ‘sustained compliance [is] based on the internalisation of new norms’ (Checkel, 2005, p. 804). Checkel argues that ‘There is growing empirical evidence to suggest that what starts as strategic incentive-based
cooperation within international institutions often leads at later points to preference shifts' (Ibid., 2005, p. 814).

Two examples of regimes are first, the promotion of Olympism generally and gender equity more specifically and second, the increasing concern with athletes’ rights and particularly their post-competition careers prospects. Although there is considerable justifiable debate about the sincerity and significance of value systems such as Olympism it is arguable, at least, that they have had some influence on the policies of governments and IFs in areas such as the treatment of young athletes, gender equity and post-career support. Ascribing influence to international policy regimes is, however, rarely straightforward, as evidence of a high degree of actor compliance may only indicate an association rather than a causal relationship. Furthermore, there is considerable disagreement whether regimes as international institutions are more than simply a camouflage for state power operating through the medium of IFs (for example China engineered IF rule changes in table tennis and badminton to protect its national advantage).

Path dependency
Underlying much of the discussion about policy learning is the assumption that policy change will be affected by both past experience and new information. As Greener notes, policy learning 'considers policy legacies to be one of the most significant elements in determining present and future policy' (Greener, 2002, p.162). As such, policy learning has much in common with the concept of path dependency which suggests that initial policy decisions can determine future policy choices: that ‘the trajectory of change up to a certain point constrains the trajectory after that point’ (Kay, 2005, p. 553). Path dependency is also connected to the broader policy analysis literature on the importance of institutions which, for Thelen and Steinmo, are seen as significant constraints and mediating factors in politics, which 'leave their own imprint' (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992, p. 8). Whether the emphasis is on institutions as organisations or as sets of values and beliefs (culture) there is a strong historical dimension which emphasises the ‘relative autonomy of political institutions from the society in which they exist; … and the unique patterns of historical development and the constraints they impose on future choices” (Howlett and Ramesh, 1995, p. 27).

The relevance of institutionalism for the analysis of good governance in IFs is clear. Past decisions need to be seen as institutions in relation to current policy choices with path dependency capturing the insight that ‘policy decisions accumulate over time: a process of accretion can occur in a policy area that restricts options for future policy-makers’ (Kay 2005, p. 558). In a hard application of the concept of path dependency one would argue that early decisions in a policy area result in current policy being ‘locked in’ and also, perhaps, locked on to a particular policy trajectory. For example, early decisions about the composition of boards, the location of IF headquarters within particular domestic legal frameworks and the relationship between the board and the president may establish and progressively reinforce a culture of secrecy and oligarchic decision-making.

In summary, it may be hypothesised that once an IF takes its initial decisions about governance it is locked on to a predictable policy path. For example, initial governance
decisions, which might have been taken in order to protect the sport from governmental interference, might well lead to increasing secrecy and the development of a self-perpetuating leadership clique.

**Achieving compliance**

Compliance rests, conceptually, between implementation and impact, and may be defined as the day to day, routine, behaviour of an organisation which conforms to the rules and expectations of an agreement, of the Code. As Jacobson and Weiss point out in relation to intergovernmental agreements ‘Measuring compliance is more difficult than measuring implementation. It involves assessing the extent to which governments [or other policy actors] follow through on the steps they have taken to implement international accords’ (Jacobson and Weiss, 1997, p.123). One problem in relation to good governance is the uncertainty of what it is that is being implemented as there is no good governance formal agreement or convention: good governance is closer to a set of expectations of ethical behaviour.

The likelihood of achieving compliance depends in part on the structure of the particular problem and the strength of the incentives for individual international federations to defect. The incentives to defect are generally stronger in collaboration situations than co-operation situations. Collaboration situations, such as the classic prisoners' dilemma, are those where joint compliance is preferable to joint violation, but where individual parties to an agreement gain more from an agreement if they defect while others continue to comply. By contrast in co-ordination situations or co-operation games, such as the allocation of satellite orbits or short wave radio frequencies, the incentive is for individual actors to comply as long as a sufficient proportion of other parties to the agreement also comply. Within the literature of regime theory the dominant assumption is that most agreements exist in collaboration situations and that consequently compliance is best achieved through the adoption of a coercive strategy where resources are invested in extensive monitoring and where sanctions are applied to those in non-compliance. Good governance is closer to a collaboration problem, but is far from being a good fit insofar as it is not clear whether complying or not complying with the requirements of good governance provides any significant relative advantage between IFs.

In considering whether reliance on monitoring and sanctions are the optimal instruments for ensuring compliance it is useful to examine the reasons for compliance and types of non-compliance, partly because compliance may have little to do with the design of an agreement or set of ethical guidelines and equally non-compliance may be due to factors beyond the scope of sanctions. The most obvious explanation of compliance is perceived self-interest either because the agreement on good governance will enshrine a beneficial balance of advantage or will protect existing gains from erosion. For example, the major IFs might see an agreement as reinforcing the security of their relationship with sponsors and broadcasters. Second, actors may also comply because the agreement requires no change in their existing policy and practice: compliance is simply coincidental. Consequently, the lower the thresholds, for example in relation to frequency of elections, maximum length of terms of office and reporting of meetings the easier it is to
achieve a high level of compliance. It is easier for the Swiss to comply with the ban on whaling than it is for the Norwegians.

Just as compliance has multiple causes so too does non-compliance. As table 2 indicates there are three primary causes of non-compliance – choice, inability, and inadvertence – and within each category there is a further subset of causes. The test of a sophisticated and successful policy regime is that it has a repertoire of instruments tailored to the range of sources of possible non-compliance in a particular policy area.

Table 2: Causes of non-compliance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Choice, for example due to:</th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• a desire to retain the benefits of the 'badge' of good governance, but avoid the obligations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• objective is partial/selective compliance</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• free-rider strategy (benefit from the compliance of others, but avoid those costs themselves)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>• resources needed for compliance have been knowingly diverted elsewhere</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• benefits of compliance have low organisational salience</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Inability, due to:

• lack of necessary financial or administrative resources

Inadvertence, due to:

• inadequate, but sincere, attempt at implementation
• incompetence i.e. poor understanding of requirements

What conditions foster the actual compliance? Rule compliance in general (although empirical evidence is limited) and code compliance in particular turn out to be dependent on:10

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10 Appendix 1 provides a literature overview of ‘code compliance’
Inducements, education and sanctions tend to be reactive tools, dealing with breaches of international policy regimes must be credible and potent if they are to be effective. Significantly, transfers. Sanctions, the most common tool of implementation in most international from either inability or inadvertence and include educational efforts and financial inducements, information are most effective when the causes of non-compliance arise the most common of which are inducements, information and sanctions.

Table 3: Conditions to encourage code compliance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. Moral disapproval</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Overall, not the objective part, but the perception, the moral evaluation of norms and maintenance is crucial. For example, when it comes to general rule compliance, the subjective risk of being caught influences rule compliant behaviour. Compliance is best reached by responsive and context specific models (Huiman and Beukelman, 2007). In other words: there is an external pressure and the fear of reputational damage (Wymeersch, 2006). Judicial enforcement is not favored (Huisman and Beukelman, 2007, Wymeersch, 2006).</td>
</tr>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>2. Inside-outside interaction</th>
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<tr>
<td>Seidl (2007) argues that the interaction between the focal organisation and external actors is a condition for the effectiveness of governance codes (Seidl, 2007). Especially the interaction of an organisations’ director stimulates the adoption of and compliance to corporate governance codes (Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009).</td>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>3. External scrutiny</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In general, the extent of compliance is positively associated with company size. However, underlying principles are that larger companies – listed in the different stock market indices – get more attention and are more closely scrutinised by the media and the investor community (Akkermans et al. 2007; Talaulicar and Werder, 2008; Werder et al. 2005).</td>
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<tr>
<th>4. Positive leadership behavior</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Code compliance is insured by a board of directors and management taking responsibility for applying the code, under the overall guidance of the shareholders (Wymeersch, 2006). There is a need of an ethical tone at the top (Mintz, 2005). Generally, an integral approach is needed, which is necessary for the implementation of high standards of ethical behaviour throughout the organisation (Bon and Fisher, 2005). The practical implementation of a governance code cannot be realised by a compliance program alone and needs to be accompanied by relevance in everyday business, that is: by moral values of the company culture (Wieland, 2005).</td>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>5. Realistic contents</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>Another aspect of complying to codes is that internal norms and values do not deviate too much from the code to be adopted (Huiman and Beukelman, 2007). The code ambitions have to be achievable.</td>
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<th>6. Relatively low compliance costs</th>
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<tr>
<td>The positive relation between company size and compliance is also based on relatively lower compliance costs (Talaulicar and Werder, 2008).</td>
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Strategies to encourage good governance codes compliance in international federations

Organisations generally rely on a limited and often crude range of instruments to achieve compliance the most common of which are inducements, information and sanctions. Inducements and information are most effective when the causes of non-compliance arise from either inability or inadvertence and include educational efforts and financial transfers. Sanctions, the most common tool of implementation in most international policy regimes must be credible and potent if they are to be effective. Significantly, inducements, education and sanctions tend to be reactive tools, dealing with breaches of
an agreement after they have occurred. The third approach to enhancing compliance attempts to be proactive by placing an emphasis on the design of the compliance system. It thus seeks to move away from explanations of compliance that rely solely on the calculation of interests or the exercise of power and to treat agreement design as an independent variable in compliance.

The focus on systems design is based on assumptions that are in marked contrast to those of the enforcement school. The central assumption is that there is a general propensity to comply among actors and that non-compliance is more often the result of ambiguity and resource limitations rather than choice (Haas, Keohane and Levy, 1993; Chayes and Chayes, 1995; Chayes, Chayes and Mitchell, 1998). As a result ‘non-compliance is best addressed through a problem solving strategy of capacity building, rule interpretation, and transparency, rather than through coercive enforcement’ (Tallberg, 2002, p.613). Within this perspective a central focus is on the capacity – administrative, economic and legal and – of organisations to ensure the compliance of other actors. Chayes and Chayes argue that if the assumption that non-compliance is primarily due to inadvertence or lack of capacity ‘then coercive enforcement is as misguided as it is costly’ (Chayes and Chayes, 1995, p.22). The energy of the supporters of an agreement would be better directed towards ensuring that the compliance system provides for the necessary capacity building, rule interpretation mechanisms and transparency rather than investing in elaborate sanctions infrastructures.

The attraction of designing a variety of means for achieving policy compliance needs to be balanced with the general view that, other things being equal, compliance increases with the greater specificity and transparency of rules. A high level of specificity and transparency enhances compliance because those predisposed to comply have clearer guidance about what they need to do and can be confident that their compliance is visible to others, and non-compliers are easily identified and find it more difficult to argue that their failure to comply is due to inadvertence. However, the cost of clarity of specification and transparency is often a loss of subtlety and depth which frequently shifts the focus away from policy impact to the less valuable monitoring of policy outputs.

The primary purpose of a compliance information system is to ensure maximum transparency, but also to ensure that the data collected is relevant and of high quality, and is analysed thoroughly and disseminated widely. As Mitchell notes ‘To make the threat of a retaliatory violation – or linkage via sanctions or inducements – credible, the regulated actors must know that their choices will not go unnoticed’ (Mitchell, 1994, p.19). An effective compliance monitoring systems is deemed essential.

The final element in the compliance system is the non-compliance response system. First there needs to be a structure which enables and facilitates compliance through the provision of advice, administrative support and possibly financial support. A supportive response to non-compliance is important when the applications of sanctions may be ‘politically’ difficult. The availability of an inducement-based response system might alter the cost-benefit calculation of potential non-compliers. However, inducements are normally more expensive than sanctions. The second requirement is that sanctions must have a clear source. Too many international regimes construct elaborate sanctions, but
lack an organisational focus for their application particularly as interested actors have little incentive to act independently to apply sanctions.

Starting points for change strategies
The compliance conditions are changes more easily than the preconditions for the adoption of codes. The six conditions as presented in Table 3 are taken as a starting point for building stones of a change strategy:

Building stone 1
The first condition shows the importance of moral disapproval. Reputational damage turns out to be more effective than judicial enforcement. The naming and shaming strategy can be applied (condition 1).

Building stone 2
Intense communication between the focal organizations and external actors, including the media and investors or members, can be fruitful. The discourse on good governance then should at first be focused on positive leadership behavior (conditions 2, 3 and 4).

Building stone 3
Codes need to be sector specific, taking one step at a time. This lowers the compliance costs. Once codes are adopted, next steps will be taken more smoothly. A ‘muddling through’ strategy, making small progress each team, is recommended (conditions 5 and 6).
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Part I

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PART II


