16.11.00
1. Introduction to the doping cave: 1981, I meet prof. Conconi

2. 1981 - 1984 blood transfusions

3. 1986, the discovery of doping diaries

4. 1987, an interview to L'Espresso

5. 1987, the faked jump 

6. 1989, a book: Campioni senza valore

7. 1992, the appointment to scientific anti-doping committee

8. 1992-1994, science, conscience, logig and information

9. 1994, the EPO dossier

10. 1994-1996, reflux

11. 1996, the EPO dossier reappears

12. 1996, the international setting and extra-sports context

13. 1996, CONI, the Italian parliament and the magistrate

14. 1997, the Di Terlizzi case

15. 1997-1998, everybody has forgotten

16. 1998, the scandal of the Rome Anti-doping laboratory

17. 1998, the president of CONI resigns from office

18. 1998, criminal investigations begin

19. 1998-1999, work on a new anti-doping law begins

20. 1998-1999, from the scandals to the Lausane fiasco

21. 1998-2000, doping from the producer to the consumer

22. 1999, Nandrolone and EPO champions

23. Analysis of international situation

24. The media system: Basic considerations

25. Rediscovery of ethics or crisis

26. The sporting education of children and youngsters

27. The solutions: Creation of the World Anti-Doping Agency

28. The solutions: The search to improve anti-doping analysis methods

29. The solutions: Campaigns to safeguard sportmen's health

30. The solutions: Agreements with international pharmaceutical companies

31. The solutions: Approval of specific criminal laws

32. The solutions: International cooperation among magistrates

A Global Code: WADA's Greatest Challenge


Doping Control Tops the Agenda at Sydney Games


Doping in Sport: Some Issues for Medical Practitioners


Doping Trade: Business for The Big Ones


Doping in Italy - the international impact


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ANTI-DOPING: THE FRAUD BEHIND THE STAGE



The head of research at the Italian Olympic Committee (CONI), Sandro Donati, recounts his personal story about twenty years of fighting against doping in Italian and international sport. An unbelievable story which nevertheless is true.


 

1. Introduction to the doping cave: 1981, I meet prof. Conconi

Just a few days after becoming National Coach for 800m and 1500m male runners, I met Prof. Conconi at a scientific congress where I was a speaker. He was informal, as if we had known each other for a long time, and asked to speak to me. He congratulated me on my new appointment and told me the Italian Athletics Federation had asked him to advise me of their project.

 

 

Sandro Donati has worked from within the Italian system on putting an end to doping in sports. Photo: Niels Nyholm

He had elaborated a new system, improving upon the one used in Finland, for the transfusion of selected red blood cells, which were stored Iat -90, enriched with particular substances and then transfused two or three days before an important event. He said: "it means an improvement of 3 to 5 seconds for 1500m races, 15 to 20 seconds for 5000m races and 30 to 40 seconds for 10,000m races."

 

I was astounded as I suddenly understood that doping really did exist and that the rumours concerning the Italian medals at the Moscow Olympics were true! But I did not let on; I immediately decided I would not let him understand what my position was so that I would be able to gather as much information as I could.

 

He went on to say: "in the next few weeks we shall carry out a number of field tests and then draw the blood - a total of 1000 c.c. on two separate occasions - of the athletes you consider more promising in view of the oncoming Athens European Championships".  

 

I made no comment and just said I would be available for the field tests.


I was very upset when I got home as I realised that in the new environment I had just entered, high level performances were to be obtained through any means. But was there anyone I could take into my confidence?

 

 

2. 1981 - 1984 blood transfusions

I decided the best thing would be to tell everything to the athletes themselves. I called a meeting and illustrated the proposal, adding that for my part, I would never accept this type of procedure, even though it had not been expressly forbidden by the IOC, because it had all the characteristics of doping. I told them they were absolutely free to chose, but that if they were to accept I would resign and go back to my desk at CONI.

 

All seven of them said it would never occur to them to accept.

 

A few days later, Prof. Conconi sent his assistants to perform the field tests and I carefully took note of all the data they recorded for each athlete. I then processed these data and found that the test elaborated by Conconi and extensively publicized on international scientific publications was by no means as significant as he claimed.

 

I therefore decided on a counterattack; I refuted the test thus putting off the moment in which I would have to give the more important reply, the one about the blood transfusions; a practice that probably killed the young middle distance runner, Fulvio Costa.


Prof. Conconi waited for a few weeks and then wrote to Primo Nebiolo who was President of Italian Athletics Federation as well of the International Athletics Federation to report my lack of co-operation.

 

I was summoned by the Head Coach, Enzo Rossi, who very urbanely tried to persuade me; I firmly refused saying that if he wanted to perform blood transfusions on the athletes in my charge, he would first have to find another coach to substitute for me. I knew I had the full support of the athletes and of their respective club coach. He did not insist but said he hoped I would change my mind.

 

Just before the Los Angeles Olympics, Italian Athletics Federation officials became more determined; the Head Coach summoned my best athletes and asked them whether they wanted to improve their performance in view of the Olympic Games through blood transfusion. I was present in this occasion but had been asked not to express an opinion. All the seven athletes refused!


The Head Coach left the room in a rage.

 

After a few days, behind my back, Prof. Conconi invited two of these athletes to visit the University of Ferrara and, once again, tried to persuade them to try blood transfusion without letting me know about it. Both of them refused and came to talk to me that same evening as soon as they returned to the Tirrenia Training Centre.


I protested heatedly but was told I would be relieved from office immediately after the Olympic Games. All the other National Coaches, so had the athletes (5000m, 10,000m, marathon and walk races, Men and Women) had accepted blood transfusion.

 

It was then that I understood how, when it comes to doping, the key figure is the coach; it is not really a question of honest or dishonest athletes but of honest or dishonest coaches.

 

During that same period, apart from the blood transfusions organized by Prof. Conconi, Italian Athletics Federation was also implementing another project with Prof. Conconi and with the complicity of one of the major Italian research institutes; the administration of testosterone and of anabolic steroids to athletes specializing in different Athletics events.

 
These procedures were of course kept secret; I heard of them only because I was still working with the National Team. None of my colleagues opposed them, in fact they were very pleased that the Federation provided them with "methods" that would allow them to achieve better results and so improve their reputation.


I did not know how to organize a movement of opposition as I had to be careful not to lose my job with CONI.


A dear friend of mine, Renato Marino, suggested I speak to his uncle who was a Member of Parliament. I was very agitated on my way to this appointment but I managed to explain clearly just how dangerous the situation had become with CONI supporting the doping methods carried out by Italian Athletics Federation.

 

He introduced me to a younger Member of Parliament, Adriana Ceci, who was haematologist and immediately took this issue to heart. Together we prepared a question in Parliament to the Minister of Health. The Ministers reply came after a few weeks - blood transfusions aimed at improving sports performances were outlawed and defined blood doping.

 

The reaction of the entire sports system was particularly violent and led to heated debates on the major newspapers and on television. Italian sports officials denied that blood transfusions had been performed on Italian athletes in view of the Los Angeles Olympics, but they had to acknowledge the letter sent by the Ministry of Health and agree to ensure that blood transfusions would not be performed in the future.

 

Also the IOC promptly declared that blood transfusions were forbidden, and this method was officialy denominated blood doping. One little move of a seemingly powerless individual had delivered a sensational blow to the propagators of doping - it was unbelievable!

 

 

3. 1986, the discovery of doping diaries

A physician and former decathlete by name of Daniele Faraggiana had been instructed by the Athletics Federation and by the Weightlifting Federation to "treat" the athletes of their respective National Teams - mostly with anabolic steroids and with testosterone. People talked about it but there was no proof. Proof could come only from phototats of the documents he always carried with him. Far from easy, but at long last it was done!

 

The documents listed everything: the names of all the athletes involved (between them the shot put Olympic Champion in Los Angeles, Alessandro Andrei), the drugs that had been administered, the respective dosage, the negative effects on their health, the targets that had been set, even the "philosophy" behind the whole process.

 
It also emerged that the Anti-Doping Laboratory in Rome, duly accredited by IOC, was used for a totally different purpose: to establish after how long traces of these drugs would disappear from the urine samples of the individual athletes.


The documents also proved that Dr. Faraggiana was regularly paid by the two Federations to administer these drugs and that he provided forbidden substances also to Prof. Conconi


 

4. 1987, an interview to L'Espresso

The excellent results obtained at the European Championships, Mei and the 400-metre runners, induced the Federation to increase the number of disciplines in my charge; I became National Coach for the 100m, 200m, 400m, both relay races and the 800m.


In March, two of my sprinters, Pier Francesco Pavoni and Antonio Ullo, placed second and third in the 60m dash at the European Indoor Championships. We then began to prepare for the World Championships that were to be held in Rome during the month of August.

 

Taking advantage of the fact that these achievements had given me credit, I released a number of controversial interviews on the issue of doping. Also Pavoni strongly attacked Athletics Federation.


 

5. 1987, the faked jump 

The day before the beginning of the World Championships, the secretary of the Field Judges told me that the Long Jump event was going to be arranged so as to favour the Italian athlete Giovanni Evangelisti. She said to me "a jump of 8m 38cm will be arranged for him so that he will be third after Carl Lewis and Emmian".

 

I was at the Stadio Olimpico and watched the competition very carefully. Evangelistis first trial was a no jump, the following ones were quite modest but the distance given was every time over 8 metres. Finally, the fifth jump; a very poor performance, the spectators were disappointed and so was Evangelisti himself.

 

As he was getting dressed, one of the Judges went to him and obviously told him to turn around and look at the electronic scoreboard; after a few seconds it showed 8 metres and 37 centimetres; the exact result that had been established beforehand.

 

I went home in rage; I could not understand how they had managed it and it drove me mad that they would probably get away with it once again. I did not sleep all night and in the morning I went to the police station and reported everything.

 

When the newspapers took up my accusation, CONI started a separate enquiry. Neither of these investigations seemed to be getting anywhere; on the contrary all the witnesses denied everything. My situation was becoming extremely difficult as CONI was ready to sack me.

 

Everything around me appeared to be crumbling. First Athletics Federation withdrew my appointment as National Coach, then the Civil Court of Rome decided my accusations had no foundation and dismissed the case; the Committee established for the CONI investigation was about to do the same.

 

With the few friends still ready to help me, I stubbornly continued to look for proof of the fraud until I found a young Field Judge, who trembled even as he spoke, but told me he had overhead the other judges when they agreed to arrange the fifth jump. He said: "I think they recorded the distance, by electronic instruments, before Evangelisti jumped".


I now had a clue and I started looking for the television recordings of the event. A journalist friend of mine agreed to let me watch hours of film recorded with various cameras. After a long day in front of the video I finally found what I was looking for. The film showed clearly how the Field Judge went to the pit, placed the marker, focused the Seiko apparatus, returned to the pit, retrieved the marker and then waited for Evangelisti to jump.

 

Ironically, that jump was particularly poor, about 7 metres and 85 centimetres, quite 50 centimetres below the distance which was officially measured.


 

6. 1989, a book: Campioni senza valore

I decided to set down the details of this nine-year struggle in a book, Campioni senza valore (Worthless Champions), to illustrate how the struggle had constantly risen in level and how I had encountered unimaginable levels of corruption.


The book was presented to the press in one of the major bookshops in Rome. Quite a number of journalists and other authors attended, and during the first week the sales were very successful.

 

Then, all of a sudden, the publisher stopped providing the bookshops and I was submerged by telephone calls and letters from all over Italy: nobody could not find my book. The publisher told me they had problems with the distribution but that everything would be solved shortly. Nothing happened; my book disappeared for ever.


 

7. 1992, the appointment to scientific anti-doping committee

After four years of exile, which turned out to be useful to purge my mind of all the poison and tiredness I had accumulated, the President of CONI summoned me and told me he thought I deserved to be rewarded for all I had done for sports. He therefore offered me to become Head of CONIs Research Department (Settore Ricerca e Sperimentazione).


Shortly afterwards, as doping was becoming a major issue, CONI created a Scientific Anti-doping Committee, which was quite ambiguous since some of the members, such as Prof. Conconi, and the Heads of Romes Anti-doping Laboratory, were heavily involved in doping activities. The President of CONI invited me to sit on this Committee.

 
It was obvious that my name would be used to give credit to the Committee. I thought it over and, in the end, decided to accept as the time had come to oppose doping from an official position and from within the system.


 

8. 1992-1994, science, conscience, logig and information

To begin with, I introduced anti-doping tests to be performed without prior notice on Italian athletes of all sports disciplines.

 
I then suggested to install a telephone line on which anyone could call, toll-free, to ask for information on medical or pharmacological aspects, or to provide any type of information on events related to doping. The telephone number was widely publicised on the media.


I also suggested to reduce the length of the suspension for athletes who had proved positive at anti-doping tests but were willing to co-operate by giving complete information on who had introduced them to doping and provided the forbidden drugs.

 

At the same time, I obtained the IOC official statistics on the number of positive tests detected in each one of the 21 accredited Anti-doping Laboratories throughout the world. The data clearly showed that the Rome Laboratory was way behind all the others with a ridiculously low number of positive tests. I pondered over the possible meaning of these statistics and then asked to meet both the President and the General Secretary of CONI to advise them of this situation.

 

When the meetings of the Scientific Committee began, it became immediately apparent that it was not an assembly of saints and virgins. As Secretary of the Committee, I was careful to instruct my collaborators to take very detailed minutes of each meeting so as to record the exact details of all discussions. I mentioned earlier that Prof. Conconi sat on this Committee. Conconi was always particularly nice to me, nearly sickening.

 

A number of incidents occurred to change the atmosphere and re-establish the distance between the various members of the Committee.
Right from the beginning I questioned the work done by the Rome Laboratory on the basis of the IOC statistics; the responsibles were not able to find a reasonable explanation for the ridiculously low number of positive tests.

 

A few months later, I asked Prof. Conconi to perform anti-doping tests on urine and blood samples of a professional cyclist, Francesco Moser, who was "assisted" by Conconi, and was preparing to go to Mexico City to try for a new one-hour track record. Prof. Conconi refused and the other members of the Committee voted against these tests...


Then, Prof. Conconi submitted to the Committee a request of 150,000 US $ to finance a research project aimed at the detection of erythropoietin. His request was supported by the President of CONI, Dr. Pescante. I showed Conconis project to chemistry experts who concluded it could not possibly be successful since the technical bases were wrong. The request was therefore refused much to the President's annoyance.

 

After the refusal of Prof. Conconis request the President of CONI lost interest in the Committee and did not even answer my proposal to organize an International Contest for a method to detect erythropoietin. I realized that the time had come to let this Committee die out as it was ambiguous and I was being used as a screen.


 

9. 1994, the EPO dossier

Before the Committee was closed down, however, I decided to investigate closely, and very secretly, on the incidence of doping among professional cyclists.

 

I identified twelve key-figures of the cycling milieu, athletes, physicians, officials, and spoke to them assuring that the information would remain strictly anonymous, as my interest lay in collecting information that I would then report to the President and to the General Secretary of CONI in order to establish adequate measures.


After four months of investigation, I arrived at extraordinary conclusions:

 

  1. anti-doping tests on cyclists were very rarely positive because they used new substances, peptidic hormones, which cannot be traced with urine tests; 
  2. in particular, the erythropoietin hormone also known as Epo, was being used ever more frequently; 
  3.  the idea of using Epo for athletes involved in endurance sports, and therefore also for cyclists, had clearly come from Prof. Conconi, who had been nominated member of the IOC Medical Committee some years before; 
  4.  Prof. Conconi and his assistants had signed very important contracts with professional cyclist clubs to administer Epo to the cyclists; 
  5. at that time the production of Epo was quite limited and the substance was provided only to the hospitals who treated nephrology and the cyclists therefore obtained it through illegal channels; 
  6. the cost of Epo on the black market was very high (about 150 US$ per dose); there were also other very expensive hormones, such as Gh, or Igf1; in other words the doping market was becoming as lucrative as the narcotics market;

 

I wrote out a 14-page report and sent it, complete with a protocol letter, to the President and to the General Secretary of CONI. The President did not even answer it. The General Secretary sent for me and said he was very worried.

 

Time passed but nothing more was said about my report.


 

10. 1994-1996, reflux

The only outcome of my report on Epo was that the President of CONI stopped talking to me, while the General Secretary talked of other matters; he also mentioned that I should make better use of my capacities, instead of concentrating only on doping.

 
In the meantime the media had forgotten all about doping and were busy magnifying the performance of this or that champion athlete. Page-long interviews with Prof. Conconi filled all the newspapers.

 

The President of the IOC Medical Committee, Prince de Merode, accorded Prof. Conconi the financial support that had been refused by CONIs Scientific Committee! Prof. Conconi therefore posed as the great champion of the struggle against doping while he actually administered the forbidden substances in his laboratory!


 

11. 1996, the EPO dossier reappears

October 1996 marked the beginning of a period the President of CONI and other high sports officials are not likely to forget.


One of the major Italian sports daily newspapers, La Gazzetta dello Sport, began a series of articles, rather sterile and unenthusiastic, on doping; I just looked on and smiled as this happened after a whole two years of complete silence. After the sixth or seventh instalment, the Journalists of the Gazzetta asked me to help them. I jokingly pointed out that they had not needed my help for the past two years, nor for the other instalments.


I gave them the name of a physician in Florence, who for many years had been in charge of the national women road cyclists team, and who had contributed significantly to my report on the incidence of Epo doping among professional cyclists.

 
The two journalists went to Florence where Dr. Flavio Alessandri gave them a number of details; he also underlined that he had already given these same details to me, nearly two and a half years before, when I was preparing a report for the President of CONI. The two journalists knew something and came to me asking about the report. I said "ask the President of CONI, I delivered it to him more than two years ago".


The President first tried to deny the existence of such a report, and then admitted to having received it, but could not explain why he had kept it secret without doing anything about it.

 

All hell broke loose. I was in Russia for a scientific congress but my collaborators informed me of the scandal that had followed the publication of these facts first on the Gazzetta and then on other newspapers. CONI was being asked to answer for:

 

a) having ignored the heavy accusations contained in the dossier;


b) not having reported these accusations to the Court of Law;


c) not having interrupted, or even discussed CONIs collaboration with Prof. Conconis Centres.

 

Many italian and international newspapers contacted me; I was ready for the press campaign that followed and after so many years of struggle, I knew how to manage it.

 

The dossier was taken up by the press and by television in Italy and abroad; in particular LEquipe, the major French sports daily dedicated the front page to this issue.


 

12. 1996, the international setting and extra-sports context

During the various conversations I had with journalists from all over the world, I was careful to keep in mind the following concepts:

 

a) doping is not a strictly Italian problem but an international one;

 

b) my reason for talking to them was not only to denounce what was happening in Italy, but mainly to raise the issue at an international level;

 

c) the root of the problem is international; the pharmaceutical companies which produce these substances are multinational companies; the illegal import and export of these substances is managed by